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Abstract 
In 2007 a new Nepal in the form of Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal 
was born. The idea of this new Nepal was to create a political space in which all 
Nepalese peoples irrespective of caste, ethnicity, gender and religion could relate 
to each other in equal social relations.  Yet Nepal continues to harbour a deeply 
unequal society led by unequal distribution of opportunities for economic and 
social mobility. This thesis critically examines the difficulties in attaining equality 
of social relationships through ethnographic observations of everyday lives 
between Bahun, Dalit and Tamang communities in a rural village in Nepal. In 
doing so the ethnography investigates how the structure of caste influences the 
interplay between everyday cultural as well as organized development (bikas) 
practices in changing social and political milieu in creating unequal 
opportunities.  
Informed by location specific as well as national historical- political 
contexts, the thesis explores how caste status and its associated practices of 
discrimination link with wealth, leadership roles, education and networks to 
create uneven playing fields for various social groups in accessing land, utilizing 
financial institutions and even migrating in ways that only further consolidate 
their pre-existing structural positions.  The thesis shows how the state’s rhetoric 
of equal social relations and its discourses and practices of growth-oriented 
development ignore unequal social relations and thus prove incapable of 
eradicating the structural poverty of the Dalits. 
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Glossary 
Bahun (Brahmin), Chhetri, Thakuri and Sanyasi: According to the Hindu caste 
system these are the “high” or “upper” castes. In the latest national political 
lexicon they are also known as Khas Arya though this new identity is yet to be 
widely spread.  
Bastee: A human settlement, a close synonym to Tole. 
Birta: Land grants gifted by the state to individuals. Birta was tax-free and usually 
inheritable. The state abolished it in 1959. 
Dalit: Former acchyut (untouchable) caste group. 
Dasain: A Hindu festival celebrated in September or October 
Khet: Irrigated lands where rice can be grown. 
Kipat: A system of communal land tenure system prevalent in some ethnic groups 
of the hills. 
Janajati: Ethnic peoples who claim they are outside of Hindu caste system and 
who have their own cultures, languages, customs, traditions and religions.  
Madheshi: The people living in the plains (Terai or Madhesh) but traditionally not 
referring to the people who later migrated from the hills and mountains to reside 
in Terai.  
Raikar: State-owned lands whose tenures can be passed on to individuals who 
pay taxes to the state for land use. 
Ropani: A unit of land measurement widely used in the hills including 
Kathmandu Valley and is equivalent to 5,476 square feet in area. 
Saujee: Depending on context, it means a property holder, a rich man, a shop-
keeper, a business-man, and a local money-lender. 
Tihar: A Hindu festival celebrated in October or November a few weeks after 
Dasain. 
Tole: A cluster within a human settlement. 
Zamindar: A landlord or a class of landlords working as an intermediary 
collecting revenues from peasants living in villages to pay to the state. 
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Major political events in Nepal 
1769 Initiation of the territorial expansion of the kingdom of Gorkha 
by annexing the surrounding princely states which eventually 
led to the formation of the present-day Nepal 
1814-1816 War with the East Indian Company with the subsequent Treaty 
of Sugauli which decisively halted the territorial conquests of the 
Gorkhali/Nepali kingdom; much lands lost to the British; 
Nepalese sovereignty compromised as Nepal needed the British 
consent before taking any decision relating to international 
relations 
1846 Kot (court) massacre which saw the diminution of monarchy to 
mere tutelage and rise of all powerful Prime Minister Jung 
Bahadur Rana who established a hereditary system to Prime 
Ministership 
1850 Jung Bahadur Rana’s visit to Great Britain and France 
1854 Promulgation of the Muluki Ain (national code) by Jung Bahadur 
Rana which legalized caste-based practices and penal system 
1857-59 Jang Bahadur’s assistance to the East Indian Company with 9,000 
military troops to suppress the Indian Mutiny 
1859 East Indian Company’s return of some of the lands to Nepal 
which the latter had lost during 1814-1816 war 
1914-18  Nepal’s support to Britain with about 100,000 soldiers during the 
First World War 
1923 Recognition of Nepal’s full sovereignty by Britain 
1939-45 Mobilization of Nepal’s resources for supporting the British in 
the Second World War 
1951 End of the 104 years of autocratic Rana rule after successful Jana 
Kranti (People’s Revolution); promise of elections for 
Constitution Assembly (CA); first experiments with ideas and 
ideologies of modernity, modernization, and democracy 
15 December 
1960 
Dismissal of Nepal’s first democratically elected government by 
King Mahendra Shah 
1962 Banning of all political parties by the promulgation of 
Constitution of Nepal 1962; “Panchayat democracy’” launched; 
monarchy, centre of all political powers  
1972 Crown Prince Birendra Shah’s accession to the throne of Nepal 
after King Mahendra’s death 
 x 
1979-80 Amidst speculations of electoral fraud election of a multi-party 
system defeated in a referendum: continuation of “improved” 
Panchayat democracy 
1990 Panchayat system overturned and replaced by reinstated 
multiparty parliamentary democracy established through a Jana 
Andolan I (People’s Movement): Hindu state identity retained 
and most powers of the monarch curbed by the new 1990 
Constitution: many rights and freedoms restored 
1996 With the promise of delivering a “new” Nepal, Jana Yudha 
(People’s War) launched by the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoists) 
27 June 2001 Massacre of King Birendra and his immediate family: accession 
to the throne of Nepal by Gyanendra, Birendra’s younger brother 
2002 The parliament dissolved: more direct political role taken up by 
Gyanendra 
1 February 2005 Political leaders arrested, civil liberties stifled, a state of 
emergency declared and direct executive powers assumed by 
Gyanendra 
22 November 
2005 
A 12-point agreement reached between the Maoists and the 
alliance of seven different political parties with prime goal of 
replacing “autocratic monarchy” with “democratic republic” and 
launch of Jana Andolan II 
April 2006 The success of the Jana Andolan II (a nineteen-day People’s 
Movement); the parliament restored; a ceasefire declared 
May 2006 Nepal declared a secular state; practices of untouchability 
criminnalized by the state  
21 November 
2006 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement reached; end of the Maoist 
War; the political mainstreaming of the Maoists Party; roadmap 
for CA elections declared 
15 January 2007 An Interim Constitution promulgated; 1990 Constitution 
nullified 
10 April 2008 CA elections held; the Maoists elected as the largest party 
28 May 2008 Monarchy abolished by the first ever meeting of the CA; Nepal 
to have Constitution which would recognize its “federal 
democratic republican” status 
21 July 2008 Ram Baran Yadav, a Madheshi man, elected the first-ever 
President of Nepal 
27 May 2012 The end of the term of First CA; a new constitution by the CA 
remained un-promulgated  
 xi 
19 November 
2013 
Second CA elections held; emergence of Nepali Congress Party 
as the largest party; the Maoist Party relegated to a third rank 
behind the United Marxist Leninist Party 
20 September 
2015 
A new Constitution 2015 which federated Nepal into eight 
provinces promulgated; largely celebrated but still disapproved 
by some regional political parties and ethnic groups 
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Chapter 1  
Inequalities in “Old” and “New” Nepal 
Anything new is already transitioning towards becoming old. Yet each 
time we break with the past, we experience something new. Therefore, each time 
new configurations of political powers and societal governance structures 
replace older ones, we sense newness in almost every sphere of life. The year 2006 
is one such time in recent memory of Nepal. 2006 marked the end of a bloody 
ten- year long Maoist Revolution (1996-2006) which took thousands of lives. Soon 
monarchy was bade farewell. “His Majesty’s Government of Nepal” became just 
the “Government of Nepal.” The state dropped its Hindu1 identity to don a 
secular one. A centralised unitary system of governance was to be replaced by a 
federated system. A new national anthem and coats of arms replaced the old ones 
(Hutt, 2012). A man from the marginalised Madheshi2 community became the 
first-ever President, marking the end of the custom in which the position of Head 
of State was held by a monarch. In 2007 the secular country itself got a new formal 
name: “Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal.” 
The country needed a new Constitution not drafted by the king’s chosen 
“experts” as in the past, but by members of an elected Constituent Assembly. To 
accommodate the aspirations of traditionally marginalised groups such as 
women, Dalits3, Madheshis, Janajatis (ethnic groups)4, people living in rural and 
                                                          
1 About 80% of Nepalese population believe that they are Hindu (Dahal, 2014). 
2  Madheshis are Nepalese peoples residing in the Southern plains called Madhesh or Terai who 
are of Hindu, Muslim or of indigenous origins. Many Madheshis see themselves as 
marginalised groups because they feel that the dominant hill-based social groups use the claim 
that the Madhesis only recently migrated to Nepal from India and therefore are not “original” 
Nepalese and exclude them socially and politically (Pradhan, 2007). 
3  Dalits, formerly referred to as “untouchables” rank at the most bottom according to Hindu 
religious system. I investigate this subject more in coming chapters, especially Chapter Four. 
4  Janajatis are the segments of Nepalese populations who claim to be indigenous residents of 
Nepal and have their own language, culture and tradition exogenous to hierarchical Hindu 
structure. I explore this further in coming chapters, most specifically in Chapter Four. 
 2 
remote areas, religious/geographical minorities, and physically/mentally 
challenged peoples in a more inclusive and more equal “New Nepal”, the 
elections for the Constituent Assembly themselves were to be held under a 
system of proportional representation. To improve social relations between 
different caste and ethnic groups in Nepalese5 society and to demonstrate a 
political commitment to eradicate caste-based discrimination, the Government of 
Nepal in 2006 declared Nepal to be an “untouchability and caste-based 
discrimination free” nation. It further sanctioned “Caste-based Discrimination 
and Untouchability (Offence and Punishment) Act 2011” prohibiting any such 
offence both in public and private spaces with the provision of penalties and 
punishments against such offences. While past laws had secured the rights of 
Nepalese citizens to practice religion as per tradition handed down from ancient 
times and be protected against discrimination on the basis of religion, race, 
gender, caste, and tribe, many argued that the monarchy’s identity as Hindu, led 
to the dominance of Hindu values and culture which left much room for the 
continuation of caste-based discriminatory practices (Bennett, 2005; Bhattachan, 
Sunar, & Gauchan, 2009; Khanal, Gelpke, & Pyakurel, 2012). So more than 152 
years after Muluki Ain 1854 (National Code 1854) had legalised and legitimised 
the caste system and more than half a century later since India had abolished 
                                                          
5 I prefer “Nepalese” over “Nepali” to refer to the citizens of Nepal. If I were writing this PhD in 
Nepali language then I would have to use the term “Nepali” since I would have no other 
alternative. Many writers, including non-natives, writing on Nepal have adopted the term 
“Nepali” accommodating the protest by some who argue that “Nepalese” is a colonial term 
invented by the British. But such an argument hides the fact that “Nepali” itself is a product of 
internal colonisation. Historically the language Nepali was known as Khas, Parbatiya or 
Gorkhali language spoken by the “rulers” and the Hindu community of hill-origins of Nepal. 
“Nepali” only attained its present elevated status once the state recognised it as an official 
language when many other regional, local and ethnic languages and dialects were dying 
(Gellner, 1997; Pradhan, 2002; Whelpton, 1997). Since the English language allows me to use 
Nepalese to denote the peoples from Nepal just like it allows people from Japan, Lebanon, 
Sudan, and Vietnam to be called Japanese, Lebanese, Sudanese, and Vietnamese respectively 
without any sense of derogation or colonial overtones, I choose the term “Nepalese” over 
“Nepali” in my entire thesis. I use “Nepali” only at times when I refer to it as a language and 
only when it is used for political purposes.  
 3 
such a practice in 1949, the Nepalese state managers took a firm political step 
towards establishing a discrimination-free society in Nepal. 
These macro changes at the national governance level were also 
supplemented by reforms at the levels of service delivery. The civil services 
which had been overwhelmingly led and staffed by “high-caste” Hindu men 
from the hills were made subject to policies of affirmative action to 
proportionally increase the employment of the marginalised social groups. A 
sense of newness and inclusiveness is still felt as —even at the time of my writing 
in 2017— for the first time ever women have assumed some of the top political 
and judiciary posts of President, Chief Justice and Speaker of the House.  
The “old”, however, is not completely dead. The “old” relentlessly 
persists, as hill-based “high-caste” men continue to hold the top executive post 
of the Prime Ministership and disproportionately comprise the leading core of 
major political parties both at the national and local levels. The tension between 
the “old” and the “new” is so strong that even when the new Constitution, 
prepared by people’s representatives elected through the second Nepalese 
Constituent Assembly6, was promulgated in September 20, 2015, not all were 
satisfied.  While the mainstream media telecast many Nepalese people 
celebrating the event with dipawali (lights, firecrackers and candles), many others 
representing the dissenting voices of women’s groups, Janajatis and Madheshis 
expressed their utter dissatisfaction by publicly burning the document 
(Haviland, 2015). Women groups contended that the new constitution unduly 
favoured men over women. They claimed that the new constitutional provisions 
made it difficult for a single mother and a Nepalese woman married to a 
                                                          
6 The Constituent Assembly elected the first time in May, 2008 had failed to deliver the 
Constitution in the periodically extended stipulated time of four years. The second Constituent 
Assembly was elected in November 2013. 
 
 4 
foreigner to pass Nepalese citizenship to her children. The Madheshis and 
Janajatis protested that the federal delineation of the proposed provinces could 
negatively affect their political representation perpetuating their 
marginalisation.     
This narrative captures the more recent history of Nepal’s long-standing 
experimentation with prajatanta (democracy), a Western idea of governance that 
penetrated Nepal and Nepalese consciousness during the 1950s when Nepal first 
initiated its experiments with modernity.  I now want to provide a very brief 
history of the ideology of democracy in Nepal. But before I do that I want to 
briefly make my position clear on how I have used the concept of ideology itself 
throughout my thesis. Although the concept of ideology is hotly contested 
(Heywood, 1992) and even contradictorily understood at times (Eagleton, 1991), 
I simply follow Martin Seliger’s suggestion that it is a set of ideas using which 
people justify means and ends of any organized political or social action to 
preserve, correct, rebuild or even uproot a given social order (Seliger, 1976). 
Therefore, the ideology of (Nepalese) Panchayat system (1962-1990) in which the 
Nepalese monarchy had absolute political power is in sharp contrast to 
constitutional monarchy (1990-2006) in which the monarch has limited power. 
Similarly, the ideology of constitutional monarchy in turn is in opposition to the 
ideology of a republic (2006-date) which has no room for monarchy at all.  
After the toppling of the brutal autocratic Rana regime7 in 1951 democracy 
began to extend its first roots into Nepalese soil, accompanying it was the idea of 
development (bikas)8. Yet this small seedling of Westminster style multi-party 
                                                          
7 The Ranas had reduced the Shah monarchs to titular heads and had re-defined the position of 
Prime Minister of Nepal as a hereditary position, which allowed them to rule Nepal for 104 
years from 1846 to 1951. 
8 Different authors use differently spelt vikas, vikash, bikash or bikas to mean the same thing: 
development. I have chosen to use bikas.  
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parliamentary democratic practices (Weller & Sharma, 2005) got quickly 
uprooted by King Mahendra (1920-1972) when he decided to “gift” Panchayat 
democracy to “his” peoples in 1962. Panchayat democracy was democracy in 
name only. It concealed an authoritarian rule in which all political parties were 
banned and the King enjoyed complete power.  Nepal was only to catch up with 
the world-wide surge of democracy— which Samuel P. Huntington has called 
the “The Third Wave” of democracy (Huntington, 1993)—  through the successful 
Jana Andolan I (People’s Movement I) in 1990 which established a multi-party 
parliamentary democracy.  
The reinstatement of a multi-party democratic system provided the 
Nepalese people with unprecedented freedoms, which in turn lead to 
traditionally marginalised social groups demanding increased participation in 
shaping national laws, policies and governance systems as well as their fair share 
of the fruits of bikas. These marginalised social groups increasingly challenged 
the state-managers who had governed Nepal for hundreds of years through the 
imposition of the hierarchical Hindu caste system that privileged hill-based high-
caste Hindu culture, values and norms (Bista, 1991; Cameron, 2010; Gellner, 2001, 
2007b; Gray, 2012; Hangen, 2007; Hutt, 2012; Lawoti, 2010a, 2012; Mage & 
D'Mello, 2007). Unfortunately for many Nepalese, the high aspirations and 
expectations generated with the 1990 turn to democracy were poorly matched by 
the disappointing performances of the subsequent governments: corruption rose, 
nepotism proliferated, bikas was stranded (Panday, 1999; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2004).  
Discontented with the functioning of democratic practices post 1990, 
many Nepalese— especially the traditionally marginalised groups from rural 
areas who felt “disconnected” with urban areas, particularly the capital 
Kathmandu—were easily lured by rebellious and violent leaders and cadres of 
the Maoist Party into believing that alternative futures: more prosperous, more 
 6 
egalitarian, and more inclusive, were possible (Gellner, 2007a; Lawoti, 2010a, 
2010b; Muni, 2010; Nayak, 2008; D. Thapa, 2004, 2012). These groups began an 
armed struggle which they called Jana Yudha (People’s War) against the state in 
1996 and constructed the discourse of a “New Nepal.” And when the Maoists 
were joined by the other democratic forces to successfully launch Jana Andolan II 
(People’s Movement II) against an authoritarian monarchy in the year 2006, 
much newness in almost all facets of life was felt in Nepal.   
The ideology of democracy, also introduced the concept of 
constitutionalism, redefining the Nepalese people as citizens of a nation-state, 
rather than subjects to divine kings. Throughout its history Nepalese democracy 
has thus taken various avatars from Panchayat Prajatantra (Panchayat 
democracy) to present-day loktantra and ganatantra (republic democracy) with 
elements of samabeshita (inclusiveness) (Hangen, 2009, p. 164).9 Unlike 
democracy, however, the idea of bikas (development) has never weakened since 
its emergence in the 1950s. It may mean different things to different people, yet 
it has always remained central to every government whether led by the king or 
by political parties, centre, left or right. Every government has justified and 
continues to justify the use (or abuse) of power in the name of delivering bikas, 
whether it is guided by the bureaucratic hands of “big government” or the 
“invisible hand” of the “free market.” Yet many attribute the Jana Andolan I (of 
1990), the violent Maoist Revolution (1996-2006) and Jana Andolan II (2006) to the 
failure of bikas,  noting that groups marginalised on the basis of caste, ethnicity, 
gender, and geography felt that they could not access the benefits of bikas, or 
                                                          
9 In Nepali language, “tantra” means “to govern/rule”, “praja” means subjects to the king while 
“lok” or “gana” mean peoples. Therefore, during monarchical Panchayat democracy and 
constitutional monarchical democracy, prajatantra meant democracy. However, with republic 
status, loktantra or ganatantra has more or less replaced prajatantra.  Not much difference exists 
between loktantra and ganatantra but left-oriented parties such as the Maoists Party tend to use 
ganatantra whereas centre left like Nepalese Congress prefer loktantra. 
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received them only in meagre shares (Muni, 2010; Thapa, 2004, 2012). Therefore, 
each time a new government came to power, it looked to consolidate its position 
by promising to make bikas better, greater, more accessible, more equitable, and 
more inclusive.  
Yet after more than sixty years of bikas and decades of democratic 
practices, statistics suggest that Nepal—with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita per annum of $479— is one the poorest countries in the world (GON & 
UNCTN, 2013). While national statistics using the national poverty-line maintain 
that poverty in Nepal stands at 23.82%, if the international poverty line of US $ 
1.25/day/person is used the same figure can be as high as 55% (GON, 2011). 
Likewise, 38% of Nepal’s population of 26 million are food energy deficient, and 
23 of its 75 districts are chronically food insecure relying upon national or 
international food aid for survival (GON, 2012b, 2013b).   
Such dismal economic indicators are further marred by distinct social and 
political inequalities 10 along the lines of caste and ethnicity. Various ethnic 
(Janajati) and “low-caste” (Dalit) groups continue to feel politically and culturally 
marginalised as in the “old” feudalistic past prior to 1950s (Gellner, 2007a; 
Lawoti, 2010b, 2012; Pradhan, 2002). The national rate of poverty is much worse 
amongst Dalits and Janajatis (GON & UNCTN, 2013, p. 9-10) than “high-caste” 
groups. Poverty trends between 1996 and 2011 indicated that while all social 
groups have made some progress in reducing poverty, the improvement was 
most significant among the “high-caste” Bahuns11, for whom improvement was 
almost three times more than that experienced by the Dalits (Figure 1). Similarly, 
“high-castes” enjoy a relatively high Human Development Index (HDI) at 0.538, 
                                                          
10 Please see (Lawoti, 2010b, 2010c, 2012; Lecomte-Tilouine, 2009b) for discussions on various 
forms of political inequalities in Nepal. 
11 Although many studies use Brahmin to mean the same group I have preferred to use the more 
colloquial term Bahun.  
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Janajatis have “mid” HDI of 0.482 and the Dalits a low HDI at 0.434 (GON & 
UNDP, 2014, p. 17).12 Per capita income figures in 2011 for the above three groups 
follow the same order NRs. 49,878, NRs. 37,726 and NRs. 33,786 respectively 
(GON & UNDP, 2014, p. 97). These inequalities are also reflected in 
landownership patterns: Dalits form the bulk, more than 70%, of the landless and 
marginal landholders in Nepal (Nepali & Khadga, 2012). In the present largely 
agrarian Nepalese economy in which about 86% of population live in rural areas 
and depend on land for food production, landlessness and near landlessness 
translates to high vulnerability to food insecurity (GON, 2013b).  
Figure 1 Poverty incidence by caste and ethnicity in Nepal (selected indicators)      
(Source: GON, 2005, 2011) 
Caste or  
ethnic group 
1995/96 (%) 2011 (%) Improvement (%) 
Bahun (hill) 34.10 10.34 69.67 
Dalits (hill) 57.80 43.63 24.51 
Janajati (hill) 48.70 25.93 46.75 
 
Research Questions 
Nepal’s trials with modernisation, modernity and democracy since the 
1950s are in direct confrontation with long-held and state-supported Hindu caste 
system. While the first promotes, aspires, nurtures and defends secular notions 
of democratic citizenship wherein every citizen is considered to be “equal” to 
another, the latter prescribes birth-ascribed hierarchy and inequality. Yet even 
after politically forsaking Hindu caste ideology and seeking to implementing 
democratic bikas practices for so many decades, Nepal continues to harbour a 
very unequal society. All the indicators of human progress measured in terms of 
HDI, per capita income, landownership etc., show almost one to one 
                                                          
12 Since HDI is a composite of four variables namely (i) life expectancy at birth, (ii) adult literacy 
rate, (iii) mean years of schooling, and (iv) Gross National Income per capita, each HDI score 
may generally be directly proportional to each of the four components. 
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correspondence with caste hierarchy. The “high-castes” are the least poor, the 
most landed, with highest HDIs, while the “low-caste” Dalits are the poorest, 
landless or land-poor, with lowest HDIs. The Janajatis remaining somewhere in 
between. 
It is against this backdrop of the dialectics between the civic, political and 
cultural equality granted by the laws in democratic polity and the persistent 
inequalities that I locate the central questions of my PhD research project: 
(i) How and why do inequalities continue to get reproduced and how are 
they changing in “new” Nepal? 
(ii) Have the discourses and practices of bikas been able to reduce poverty, 
especially amongst the Dalits?  
To answer these questions, I have undertaken an ethnography of a rural village 
not far from Kathmandu. As I show below it is important to note here that many 
scholarly works on (in)equality fall within in the discipline of philosophy and 
many more in the field of economics. However, Charles Tilly’s theorizing of 
inequality as an asymmetrical relationship between two persons or sets of 
persons (e.g. caste, ethnic group, etc.) which generates more advantages for one 
than for another resulting in “unequal control over value-producing resources” 
(e.g. land, money, etc.) (Tilly, 2000, p. 782) provides a good scope to study (in) 
equality anthropologically. Therefore, the above research questions have been 
formed according to the guidance provided by Tilly (Tilly, 2001) for my 
ethnographic research: 
1. What asymmetrical relations prevail among persons, groups, categories, 
and social locations? 
2. How do persons, groups, categories, and social locations end up in the 
positions they occupy? 
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3. What effects do 1 and 2 have on individual and collective social 
experience? 
4. How do 1, 2, and 3 change?  
 
The Ideal of Equality and the Prevalence of Inequality 
While the notion of equality between citizens and the royals, and between 
various social groups within the citizenry entered Nepalese discourses only after 
the 1950s, but particularly after 1990, Western contemplation on the issue has a 
long history.13 Yet even in contemporary debates, equality—both as a concept 
and as ideal—is so highly contested that some have suggested that it has 
“substantive content of its own” and is actually an “empty” idea (Westen, 1982, 
p. 596). Yet the idea of equality has so many positive connotations that it is 
regularly employed in political rhetoric to generate great social movements and 
revolutions (Westen, 1990). Even if the idea of equality is close to utopia, 
significant inequalities are thought to polarise societies into antagonistic “haves” 
and “have-nots” eroding democratic solidarity and inviting instabilities (Rank, 
2004; Reid-Henry, 2015; Sandel, 2000, 2012; Stiglitz, 2012; Wilkinson & Pickett, 
2009). 
Debates over equality and inequality are further complicated by the fact 
that political philosophers to this day continue to debate the precise notion of 
equality (Anderson, 1999, 2012; Arneson, 1995). Scholars disagree on issues 
related to equality of what, equality among whom, and its relation to justice 
(Young, 2001). Further, opinions are divided on whether a society should have 
equality of outcome, opportunities, or of condition. Likewise, there is 
                                                          
13  Please see reviews in (Rees, 1971; Tawney, 1931; Turner, 1986). 
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disagreement over what it is to be equally distributed: Is it primary goods14 
(Rawls, 1971), resources (Dworkin, 1981), capabilities (Sen, 1992) or welfare 
(Arneson, 1989)?15 And since individuals differ in age, gender, physical and 
mental capacities and if left unrestricted can simply exchange or trade goods in 
ways that will easily disrupt any form of simple equality, some scholars have 
suggested that “equality literally understood” where everyone shares the same 
amount of wealth, power and authority “is an ideal ripe for betrayal” (Michael, 
1983, p. xi). Equality understood as such is bound to be disrupted and any 
forceful egalitarian distribution of wealth may be achieved only at the cost of 
repression (Nozick, 1974). However, according to Fourie et al.: 
While the ideal of equality clearly has distributive implications and 
may well match certain distributive notions of equality, equality is 
foremost about relationships between people (Fourie, Schuppert, & 
Wallimann-Helmer, 2015, p. 1). 
And, as Elizabeth S. Anderson argues: 
… the agendas defined by much recent egalitarian theorising are too 
narrowly focused on the distribution of divisible, privately 
appropriated goods, such as income and resources, or privately 
enjoyed goods such as welfare. This neglects the much broader 
agendas of actual egalitarian political movements … The disabled 
have drawn attention to the ways the configuration of public spaces 
excluded and marginalised them, and campaigned against 
demeaning stereotypes that cast them as stupid, incompetent, and 
pathetic … the aim of egalitarian justice is not to eliminate the impact 
of brute luck from human affairs, but to end oppression … the aim is 
to create a community in which people stand in relations of equality 
to others (Anderson, 1999, pp. 288, 289).  
                                                          
14  John Rawls thinks that goods which are desired by every human being are primary goods; 
these consist of things such as health, liberties, rights, income and social bases of self-respect 
(Rawls, 1971).   
15  Debates surrounding such questions have been insightfully captured in (Anderson, 1999; 
Arneson, 1995; Wolff, 2007) 
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In simple terms, social relations are more or less equal if citizens treat 
“fellow citizens as equals in social interactions” (Mason, 2012, p. 3). So, if a non-
Dalit can freely enter a Dalit’s house while a Dalit cannot enter a non-Dalit’s 
house; and if a Dalit can readily eat food and water given to her by a non-Dalit 
but the reverse is not accepted because of the perceived “impure” body of the 
Dalits, then these clearly are examples of unequal social relations (Bhattachan, 
Hemchuri, Gurung, & Biswakarma, 2003; Bhattachan, et al., 2009). Ideally social 
relations are equal if all individuals and social groups are considered to be of 
equal moral worth; regarded with equal esteem; not subject to contempt, 
discrimination, shaming or ridiculing on the basis of caste, race, physical and 
mental disability, sexual orientation, etc.; and are free from arbitrary domination 
and oppression (e.g. slavery) (Anderson, 2012; Fourie, et al., 2015; Fraser, 1997; 
Young, 1990). It is this conceptualisation and idealisation of social equality that 
the state-managers and peoples of various caste, ethnicity and geographic origins 
in Nepal are currently striving towards rather than aspiring to achieve absolute 
economic equality.  
While the units taken for analysis by most theorists are generally 
individuals rather than social groups, Iris Young writes that such an approach 
fails to expose the structural inequalities that constrain substantive opportunities 
of similarly positioned individuals “from developing their capacities or enacting 
their morally legitimate claims” (Young, 2001, p. 18).16. She further argues: 
What we refer to by group differentiations of gender, race, class, 
[caste], age and so on, in the context of evaluating inequalities as 
unjust, are structural social relations that tend to privilege some 
more than the others (Young, 2001, p. 2). 
                                                          
16  Young defines structural inequality as “a set of reproduced social processes that reinforce one 
another to enable or constrain individual actions in many ways” (Young, 2001, p. 2). 
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Following Young and on the basis of my earlier discussion of caste/ethnicity 
based inequalities, I have chosen caste and ethnic group as the analytic focus my 
research. 
Nepal’s Approaches to Inequality and the Discourse of Bikas 
Considering that all individuals are fundamentally moral equals 
(Anderson, 1999) and if achieving simple distributive equality is indeed doubtful, 
it is still important that everyone can at least have enough to lead a decent 
dignified life in accordance to Harry Frankfurt’s “doctrine of sufficiency” 
(Frankfurt, 1987, p. 22).  
With respect to the distribution of economic assets, what is important 
from the point of view of morality is not that everyone should have 
the same but each should have enough (Frankfurt, 1987; p. 21 - original 
emphasis). 
It is both the considerations that all humans are of equal worth and the notion 
that everyone should have enough which have guided the democratic citizenship 
principles and the discourse of bikas in Nepal. I now unpack each of these notions 
as they relate to the Nepalese case. 
Except for the Panchayat regime (1962-1990) and the former king 
Gyanendra’s period of direct rule (June 2001 – April 2006) Nepalese citizens have 
more or less enjoyed democratic citizenship in recent years. Although what 
constitutes democratic citizenship remains contested (Guttman, 1995), it ideally 
demands that each citizen irrespective of class, caste, ethnicity, race, religion, 
gender, and tribe is considered to be equal in worth; possessing equal civic, 
political and cultural rights; equality of treatment in the court of law; the right to 
vote; the right to stand for any public office; and the right to enjoy fully their 
cultural heritage (Arneson, 1995; Barbalet, 1988; Marshall, 1950). The Ranas first 
attempted to provide this kind of citizenship to Nepalese peoples through the 
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Nepal Act of 1947. But due to internal conflicts between the progressive Ranas 
and the conservative ones who felt they were “above” others and were born only 
to rule, the Act was never promulgated. Had it been promulgated it would have 
undermined the legitimacy and broken the legal foundation of caste hierarchy 
inscribed by the first Rana ruler himself through the National Code of 1854. Such 
a failure, however, was eventually and gradually overcome through the five 
consecutive Constitutions from 1951 to 2015, each of which consistently 
maintained that all citizens are to be considered “equal” before law and have 
“equal protection of the laws” with no discrimination to be made against any 
citizen in application of general laws on the grounds of religion, race, sex, caste, 
or tribe.  
On the political front after 1950 the state of Nepal attempted to organise 
the social relationships in Nepalese society according to the principles of secular 
democratic citizenship instead of caste-based hierarchy. Complementing this, on 
the economic front the state utilized the tool of bikas to try and maximise growth 
and minimise poverty. Although it started with failed land reform programmes 
and the equally unsuccessful “Village Development Program” funded by the 
United States (US) in 1952, bikas indeed has come a long way (Fujikura, 2013; 
Mihaly, 1965; Shrestha, 1993). Its early focus on infrastructure development such 
as road construction and hospital building has not entirely disappeared, but it is 
now understood to take many different forms. Bikas is to be employed not only 
to alleviate poverty, increase food security and nutrition but also to empower 
women and other traditionally marginalised groups. Although bikas has been 
criticised by some as being a top-down, as reproducing evolutionary model of 
modernisation that imagines the “archaic” developing countries catching up 
with the “modern” developed world (an idea which itself fails to acknowledge 
unequal power and trade relations biased towards the developed countries) it 
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continues to catch the imagination of Nepalese political leaders and commoners 
alike (Fujikura, 2001). The former king Mahendra rejected multi-party 
parliamentary democratic system because he claimed that it did not deliver bikas. 
But since many in Nepal thought that Mahendra’s “home grown” Panchayat 
democracy failed to deliver bikas, Panchayat democracy was ultimately rejected 
to give the parliamentary democracy a second chance in 1990.  Post 1990, various 
state managers of Nepal, following the dominant international economic mood 
of the time, have allowed bikas to be largely led by the invisible hands of the 
“market” in what has been termed a project of “neoliberalism” (Harvey, 2005).  
Yet, even after the re-instatement of democracy in 1990 many traditionally 
excluded social groups such as Janajatis, Madheshis, Dalits and women 
continued to feel excluded from the processes of bikas, and as a result believed 
that the armed Maoists provided the most hope (Thapa, 2012). Yet although they 
joined the Maoist War against the state, this did not mark the abandonment of 
their belief in the promise of bikas like many critics and scholars collectively called 
“post-developmentalist” would argue (Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1994; Sachs, 
1992; Shrestha, 1997). Rather, they thought that if the radical Left Maoist were to 
assume power, bikas would be more equitable, accessible and inclusive. Yet, 
when the Maoists received the opportunity to lead the government after 2007 
they only made some cosmetic reforms: increasing budgets welfare programmes 
while continuing to pursue high economic growth rates relying mostly on market 
mechanisms. Till the time of my writing despite post-developmentalists’ 
arguments against bikas, Nepal continues to play the “catch-up” game as 
recommended by modernisation theory and harbours the ambition to graduate 
from the status of a “least developed country” to a “developing” one by 2022 
(GON, 2016b).  
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So bikas remains an unfinished business, a goal that will one day be 
achieved. Such an unfulfilled dream encouraged the likes of Dr Baburam 
Bhattarai, a former top Maoist leader, to establish political parties aspiring to 
make Nepal bikashit (developed) in less than 25 years. In fact, when Prime 
Minister K P Oli of the United Marxist Leninist Party resigned from office in June 
2015, in his parting speech he challenged the new Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal 
Dahal of the Maoist Party and his government to implement the multiplicity of 
bikase (bikas related) projects that Oli’s government had initiated. True to the spirit 
of modernisation, most of the projects Oli mentioned were infrastructure 
development such as hydro-power development plants and road construction.  
Scholarly writing on Dalits, who many argue have least participated in, 
and least benefitted from the discourses and practices of bikas, fit into several 
categories: those concerned with the past and prevailing practices of 
discrimination (Bhattachan, et al., 2003; Bhattachan, et al., 2009);  those that 
explore Dalit’s political emancipation and inclusion (Aahuti, 2010; Guneratne, 
2010) those that chart contestations over identity (Cameron, 2010; Folmar, 2007; 
Kharel, 2010) and gender relations (Cameron, 2005); and those that explore caste 
hierarchy within a particular ethnic community, the Newar17 (Gellner & Quigley, 
1995; Parish, 1996). Underlying this scholarship is the pollution-purity system 
proposed by Dumont (Dumont, 1980) to describe the centrality of power in the 
concept of caste (Berreman, 1981; Beteille, 1965; Quigley, 1993). There is very little 
literature that examines Dalit marginality within the discourses of bikas and 
equality within the larger discourse of “New Nepal.” Through this research I 
                                                          
17The caste organisations in Nepal which share common similarities but are different by some 
peculiarities can generally thought to be of three types: the hill-based, the Madhesh-based, and 
ethnic community: Newar-based. Newars claim to be is an indigenous ethnic group of 
Kathmandu Valley who have their own complex caste system. 
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hope to make a small contribution towards contributing to new ways of 
understanding Dalit lives in relation to bikas.  
Research Interest, Methodology and Positionality 
When I was working with Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in 
Nepal in 2010, FAO had just launched the “One Billion Hungry Project.” The 
project intended to feed the hungry who were mostly concentrated in Sub-Sahara 
Africa, Asia (including Nepal) and the Pacific (FAO & WFP, 2010). About the 
same time in Nepal, various reports suggested that at least 25% of Nepal’s 26 
million population were suffering from hunger (GON, 2013b, 2014).18 Guided by 
such discourses Nepal started receiving international aid aimed at “tackling” the 
problem of food insecurity. 
Discourses of food security until the 1970s focused purely on food 
production and availability. But after Amartya Sen (Sen, 1981) argued based on 
his study of Bengal Famine of 1943 that hunger and even famine can occur in 
times of plentiful food production, the discourse of food security switched from 
a concentration on food production to one of food access. Accordingly, the World 
Food Summit in 1996 defined food security as a condition “… when all people, 
at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious 
food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy 
life” (FAO, 2006, p. 1). Such a discourse on food security reasoned that an 
individual could be food secure if she is able to access food by adopting any of 
                                                          
18Existing literature suggests that Nepal’s populations who are undernourished and remain 
most vulnerable to food insecurity can be clustered into three different groups: (i) an 
economically poor group: those who are landless, land-poor (holding less than 0.5 hectares), or 
are agricultural labourers, (ii) a geographical isolated group: those living in remote areas such 
as Mid-Western, Far-Western Regions and other parts of Nepal where road connectivity is not 
particularly good or reliable, and (iii) a socially marginalised group: those belonging to certain 
castes (e.g. Dalits) and ethnicities (e.g. Chepang, Mahji, Kumal, etc.) (GON, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 
2014; USAID, 2010). 
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the following: (i) producing, (ii) buying, (iii) exchanging or (iv) receiving food in 
gift form from state or non-state actors (Maxwell, 1996; Sen, 1981). In the 1990s 
fresh scholarship revealed that in dire situations humans choose to eat “inferior 
foods”, eat less or even skip meals in order to survive (Maxwell, 1996). For these 
humans, surviving was more important and urgent than eating. Therefore it was 
concluded that securing sustainable livelihoods was a pre-condition for securing 
food.19 With shifts in discourses of food security from focusing solely on food 
production, to food access, and later to securing sustainable livelihoods, the 
academic focus likewise switched its focus from food production, to food access, 
and finally to investigating a household’s or community’s productive capacities 
to sustain livelihoods.  
Academics of various disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, human 
geography, political science and economics have debated what food security or 
sustained livelihoods mean and how to achieve them. Yet the reports that 
calculate the number and typologies of food insecure populations at regional, 
national and international scales are still mostly produced by economists. Macro 
and micro-economists normally estimate the numbers of food insecure 
populations by using ahistorical statistical and econometric methods and models 
relying heavily on and analysing economic variables such as food prices, 
household incomes, labour productivity, agricultural production and 
productivity, trade statistics and the like. They treat these economic variables as 
the core factors and either entirely ignore cultural structures and forms local 
governance or label them as unexplained variables (GON, 2013b, 2014). Since 
                                                          
19According to Ian Scoones, International Development Studies, one of the leading global 
institutions in the field, based at the University of Sussex, United Kingdom (UK), livelihood and 
sustainable livelihood is: “A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both 
material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is 
sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its 
capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base”(Scoones, 1998, p. 5). 
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such approaches dis-embed humans from socio-cultural and political structures 
and also from the historical contexts that shape their actions, the pictures 
produced are often incomplete, economically deterministic, narrow and 
ultimately removed from lived reality. Discontented with such approaches and 
methods and with a desire to supplement them with alternative analysis I have 
taken an ethnographical approach to investigate the issue of food insecurity in a 
manner informed not only by economics but also by culture, politics and history, 
Research conducted using this approach is more holistic than other approaches 
and constructs pictures closer to reality (Edkins, 2000; Scoones, 1998).  
 I have also used Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptualization of cultural and social 
capital to supplement my observations on material and economic possessions in 
understanding inequality in broader terms. Bourdieu defines cultural capital as: 
… what is called culture, cultivation, presupposes a process of 
embodiment, incorporation, which insofar as it implies a labour of 
inculcation and assimilation, costs time, time which must be invested 
personally by the investor. Like the acquisition of a muscular body, it 
cannot be done second hand (so that all effects of delegation are 
ruled out) (Bourdieu, 2011, p. 48) 
 I have applied this conception of cultural capital in Chapter Five, for 
instance, while discussing the origins of vast inequalities in land ownership, to 
show how a certain social group utilized the ability to read and write Nepali 
language, cultivated through investments in time, labour and money, to its 
advantage to register large tracts of land during the land reform programme in 
the 1960s, while the social groups completely lacking such an ability or having 
the ability to read and write Sanskrit language only were considerably at a 
disadvantage. Similarly, I have also deployed the Bourdieu’s conceptualization 
of social capital defined as: 
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… durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of 
mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to 
membership in a group [caste, ethnic group] ((Bourdieu, 2011, p. 51) 
… 
… to illustrate how afno manche (one’s own people) and natabad-crypabad 
(favouring one’s relatives and close friends) were utilized as two more forms of 
social capital more by some social groups than the others to claim more access to 
vital resources such as land (Chapter Five).   
At this juncture, however, I want to clarify that I have considered the 
concept of food security and the bikase practice of trying to achieve food security 
only as an entry point to situate Dalits who are economically poor and socially 
and politically marginalised. Rather than focusing on how Dalit communities 
produced, accessed and consumed food my research closely scrutinised the 
changing social relations within which Dalits live their everyday lives, lives that 
I argue are increasingly affected by the practices of bikas and the discourses of 
democratic equality in the new Nepal (Gellner, 2016). I also approach the study 
of Dalits, not in isolation, but through their everyday interactions and relations 
with other non-Dalit caste and ethnic groups, state, non-state actors and markets 
to understand how and why these relations enhanced or inhibited their 
productive capacities and access to resources to secure decent dignified 
livelihoods. 
 As argued above the discourses of new Nepal are also narratives of 
equality and inclusion. Here ethnic and caste identities are being re-constructed 
not by the principle of Hindu caste hierarchy but through the politics of 
difference and social equivalence (Gellner, 2003; Gray, 2012; Taylor, 1994; Young, 
1990). Therefore, my research also had to deal with the ideas and ideals of 
equality. Although political philosophy is typically the discipline where debates 
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and discussions of equality/inequality occur, such discussions are usually 
accomplished via imaginative abstract tropes such as the “veil of ignorance“ or 
the “Original Position”(Rawls, 1971). However, the discipline of anthropology 
and its chosen methodology of ethnography (Atkinson, 2001) has allowed me to 
follow “interpersonal relations, reconstruct life histories, participate in social 
processes, and observe social interactions directly” (Tilly, 2001, p. 301) to  
… understand underlying … mechanisms through which hierarchy 
is translated … and inscribe this relationship into a broader historical 
and sociocultural framework (Nguyen & Peschard, 2003, p. 450). 
 Taking food insecure Nepalese populations as an entry point and 
considering that Dalits, the landless, near landless, women, certain Janajati 
groups and people residing in remote places are more vulnerable to food 
insecurity than others the first task was to identify the physical spaces where 
these groups resided.  While there are a number of researches studying food 
insecurity in remote districts (GON, 2012b, 2013b; USAID, 2010) and a number of 
multi-million dollar projects20 seeking to reduce food-insecurity, there is a 
paucity of studies focusing on understanding the food security and poverty 
vulnerabilities faced by the Dalits, who disproportionately constitute the 
majority of the landless and the near-landless in both remote and non-remote 
districts (Bennett, Tamang, Onta, & Thapa, 2006). Therefore, I was determined to 
choose a place that was not particularly remote from these national discourses. 
After a few rounds of consultation with my former colleagues at FAO, the 
World Food Programme (WFP) and the Ministry of Agriculture and after a few 
                                                          
20 The World Bank funded 58 US million dollar “Nepal Agriculture and Food Security Project 
(2013-2018)”, and USAID funded “Feed the Future Initiative Nepal” and Suaahara are a few of 
such initiatives. 
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pre-field trips, I finally selected a village (gau) called Patle Gau in Kavre-
Palanchowk (hereafter Kavre) district for my ethnographic research (Figure 2).  
Figure 2 Kavre-Palanchowk (Kavre) district (in red) in Nepal 
 
 
Kavre district has later been located in Province Number Three but during 
the time of my field work, Kavre was one of the hilly districts falling under the 
administrative territory of Central Development Region.  In the classificatory 
jargon used by the state, Kavre is labelled as a “commercial” districts on account 
Five Development Regions (Eastern to Far Western) and seventy-five districts of Nepal 
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of its fertile lands ranging in elevation from 300 to 3018 metres, providing climatic 
conditions ranging from subtropical to cool temperate suited for cultivating 
agronomic and vegetable crops and raising livestock of many kinds which are 
traded with other districts in Nepal and across the border with India (GON, 
2012a). Demographically 381,937 individuals (male: female = 0.99:1) populate 
Kavre residing in 80,720 households, 65% of whom pursue agricultural 
livelihoods (GON, 2012c).  
 Kavre’s population includes significant caste and ethnic diversity. The 
Tamangs are the most populous constituting about 35% of the district’s total 
population, followed by Bahuns at 23%, Newar at 14%, Chhetri at 14% and the 
Dalits at 13% with many other social groups such as Bhujel, Danuwar and Majhi 
of lesser percentages. About 62% of the population in Kavre follow the Hindu 
religion, 35% practice Buddhism (the religion followed predominantly by the 
Tamangs), 1.7% are Christians and smaller percentages follow other faiths. A 
recently completed highway, Arniko Highway, passes through Patle Gau 
connecting the district to urban centres to the east and west such that agri-
products can be exported while agricultural inputs such as chemical fertilisers 
and hybrid seeds, can be easily imported into the district.   
 Patle Gau literally translates to “thin village”, signifying the presence of 
only a few houses spread across a large area, but ironically it now has hundreds 
of houses far too many for me to research effectively. Hence, I deliberately 
demarcated an area within the larger Patle Gau where a number of poorer, 
landless or near-landless Dalit households were residing alongside non-Dalit 
social groups: Bahuns and Tamangs, so that I could minutely observe inter-
caste/ethnicity social relations. Defining three social groups (Bahuns, Dalits and 
Tamangs) in Patle Gau in a physical area demarcated for ease of research meant 
that administratively the interlocutors were residing in two different but 
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neighbouring Village Development Committees (VDCs)21, the smallest 
administrative units at the time of research. This meant that when I took 
information related to political and administrative structures I had to find 
information on both VDCs. Likewise, since I treat Patle Gau as “a flexible set of 
social relations … rather than a fixed point on a map” (Shneiderman, 2015, p. 319) 
I did not focus only on residents of Patle Gau, but also interacted closely with 
villagers, especially the social and political elite of the surrounding areas.   
 I identified the poor community within Patle Gau using a top-down as 
well as bottom-up process. Remaining cognizant of the methodological problems 
of measurement I did not use “scientific and objective” absolute definitions of 
poverty— such as national poverty line of NRs 19,261 per capita per year in 2011 
or the US$ 1 per day per person (ADB, 2012)—for the purposes of identifying the 
poor. Instead I used the relational and relative method by which the non-poor as 
well as the poor in larger Patle Gau identified the poor. The non-poor typically 
identified the poor by saying uniharu ko halat beegoj cha (their condition is 
miserable). The poor also identify themselves as not having anything (hamee 
sanga kehi chaina). I supplemented these relational and relative notions of poverty 
with my own visual impressions of house-types, and number and status of 
livestock keeping so that I could observe comparatively their relations with each 
other especially in terms of accessing resources such as land and money.  I started 
my PhD project in 2013 and went to Nepal for my field work in 2014. My time in 
the field was split between Patle Gau, neighbouring villages, towns, district 
headquarters and Kathmandu.  
                                                          
21 Current administrative units such as Village Development Committee, Municipality, 
Metropolis, and so on may or may not eventually change when the federal structure according 
to the new Constitution 2015 gets fully enacted. But during the time of my research I followed 
whatever administrative structure was in place. 
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Before I mention about the local residents of Patle Gau who aided me 
intitally to familiarize myself with the village and its residents and who supplied 
me with the bulk of the data that comprise my thesis, I want to discuss a little 
about the names and pseudonyms used. I have used pseudonyms to name all the 
Patle Gau residents to conceal their identities. I have used real names only of the 
government officials (e.g. Ganesh Bhatt), political activitists (e.g. Aahuti) and 
other interviewees who provided me with written consent. 
 Although Siromani Sapkota, a local Bahun elite, had provided me with a 
guided tour on my first visit to shape my understanding of Patle Gau, I later hired 
Suman Purkoti to assist me in my research. A local of Patle Gau, Suman was a 
Dalit adolescent who had failed level ten exams and was preparing re-take the 
exam the following year and thus had some time to help me connect with others 
in the village. In Patle Gau I conducted formal interviews with some and used 
semi-structured questions with most others, yet it was my informal chats with 
everyone that provided me with the most insight. I have tried to enrich my data 
by mixing the perspectives of men and women of different social groups and 
ages. While Patle Gau itself provided the bulk of data for my analysis, I also 
followed some of the Patle Gau residents to Bhaktapur, about one hour bus ride 
from Patle Gau and to Kathmandu, still further away. 
 Since bikas is one of the central problematics in my research I interviewed 
bikase agents in Patle Gau, at district headquarters (Dhulikhel) and at the centre 
(ministerial and department levels) in Kathmandu, some of whom have given 
me permission to quote them directly. To compare and contrast with local views 
in Patle Gau, I also formally interviewed Dalit activists like Aahuti and political 
Dalit leaders like Min Bishwakarma. In Kathmandu I participated in a few social 
science and bikase seminars and conferences to acquaint myself with the latest 
academic and bikase discourses in Nepal.  
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 When I was not formally interviewing my interlocutors in Patle, I spent 
much time drinking tea or sipping coke in local cheeyapasals (teashops). 
Cheeyapasals are a great place for ethnography since many people come there to 
gossip, eat and drink, get information or just to kill time (Putnam, 1975). Here, 
most people did not object to me taking notes which recorded events as directly 
as possible. When I was not in cheeyaspasals, collecting first-hand information 
through participant observation (Tedlock, 1991) I was in (i) agricultural farms 
(sometimes helping a little, sometimes just watching), (ii) meetings of school 
management committees or co-op management committees, and in (iii) local 
bazars where much illegal gambling took place, a field which I believe is highly 
under-researched in Nepal.  I also triangulated my field notes with “the extended 
case method” (Small, 2009) in which I talked with a number of interlocutors on 
the same subject until nothing new was emerging or when same or similar things 
were being repeated. 
 Because I was also interested in exploring changing social relations in my 
thesis, I have tried to draw upon relevant historical material. But since much of 
the written histories have, until recently, functioned ideologically to eulogise the 
kings, consolidate the powerful and other representatives of dominant cultures 
(Onta, 1996, 1997, 2006), I have tried to shape my understanding of Patle Gau 
through a number of oral histories. Highlighting the importance of oral histories, 
Theresa Hammond and Prem Sikka argue: 
… Oral histories are important because, first they focus on individual 
experiences, interpretations, reactions and aspirations … Oral 
histories' focus on the individual has the capacity to illuminate the 
dissension, resistance and accommodation that shapes the 
development of accounting … we call for the use of oral histories to 
give voice and visibility to those marginalised or otherwise adversely 
affected by accountancy. Oral history has the potential to give voice 
to the subordinated, and we consider the examination of axes of 
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power in accounting - especially along the lines of race, gender, and 
class [caste and ethnicity] - a crucial but long neglected area of 
research (Hammond & Sikka, 1996, pp. 79-80). 
I took oral histories from elderly people from all three social groups. I was 
fortunate that I found at least four men who were older than 80 to narrate for me 
what Patle Gau used to be like and how its social groups interacted with each 
other and accessed resources in the past.  
 In terms of my own positionality, I was perceived as an “educated” 
middle-class, urban Janajati touchable man studying in a bikashit (developed) 
country called Australia. This positionality facilitated my social acceptance and 
frequent interactions. Therefore, I was welcomed into the houses and kitchens of 
Bahuns, Dalits and Tamangs alike. Working in a caste-sensitive patriarchal 
society I do not know if I could say the same had I been a Dalit or a woman. 
Although caste-based discriminatory practices are still prevalent particularly in 
private spaces, I was never openly criticized for entering Dalit houses or 
interacting with them so often. I did not perceive any change in the behaviour of 
any Bahun or Tamang with who I interacted because of my close interation with 
Dalits. 
 At a time when the identity politics surrounding caste and ethnicity is at 
its peak, conducting an ethnography where the concept of caste is central is not 
without its challenges. In the current climate it is quite common to hear Nepalese 
say, “We were peaceful and suddenly these politicians have started talking about 
caste and ethnicity. We are disintegrating as a nation.” Because of this I never 
directly discussed caste or ethnicity, instead I observed what it meant to be a Dalit 
or a Bahun or a Tamang and how they saw and related to each other. However, 
while I never asked direct questions about caste and ethnicity, my interlocutors 
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themselves brought those topics into their conversations on general day-to-day 
living in the village.  
 Conducting an ethnography as a research student was also tricky. Some 
thought or wished that I were a bikase agent myself so that I could “bring” to 
them some bikase packages. Patle Gau, like any other village in Nepal, is also a 
site where different government agencies and non-government organisations 
(NGOs) continuously intervene to deliver a range of bikase projects, such as adult 
education, micro-finance, pit-latrine construction, bio-gas construction, trainings 
for commercial vegetable farming and so on. Because of this prior exposure many 
villagers also anticipated me to be a representative of one particular development 
project. Therefore, some people initially were very enthusiastic to talk with me 
only to recoil later after learning that I was only a research student. Some of these 
people would stop talking or talked less with me, but some with whom I was 
able to establish friendly bonds in time just continued to chat away.  
 On one occasion I was also mistaken for an undercover policeman. This 
happened while I was inquiring into what had transpired between a Tamang 
money-lending Saujee and a Dalit debtor (who was unable to return the money 
and had to forfeit some land to the money-lender).  After only a few minutes the 
Tamang money-lender just stopped talking. He then directly asked me if I was a 
policeman in civil dress to which I firmly said no. Yet, that did not entirely 
convince him. He then made some excuses and did not engage with me any 
further. This was despite my thoroughly informing him about my research 
project before the conversation and showing him my ANU Student Card. Thus 
some in Patle Gau assumed me to be a bikase agent, some believed me to be a 
policeman, and others may have even held out hope that I might bring bikase 
programmes to Patle Gau in the future. The analysis of this thesis and the 
evidence I have produced here are the result of a unique combination of my 
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positionality interacting with the positionalities of my diverse interlocutors in 
Patle Gau.    
 When I tried to follow a few Dalit families working in Bhaktapur or in 
Kathmandu, it turned out to be more difficult that I originally anticipated. Mobile 
and landline phones, taken for granted in modern economies of e-connectivity, 
are not necessarily available in Nepal, especially in villages amongst poor, 
illiterate peoples.  In Patle Gau it was only the more economically prosperous 
and literate people who could make use of such technologies. The matter was 
made worse by the fact that some Dalit individuals and families were frequently 
absent from Patle Gau and returned only to celebrate Dasain (a Hindu festival) or 
after seasonal work in brick kilns was completed. In any case I used the 
snowballing method to finally locate these Dalit families and individuals in 
Bhatkapur and Kathmandu.  
Limitation  
There are several limitations to my study related to applicability, my 
positionality, and the limited scope that I have been able to give to women.  
Situated close to the capital city (Kathmandu), Kavre district and Patle Gau 
located within Kavre are not comparatively remote areas. Yet this proximity to 
the largest metro and cosmopolitan city in the country does not make Patle Gau 
an urban space. Patle Gau’s economy and its socio-cultural setting remain very 
rural.  Due to this unique locational and socio-cultural circumstances, my 
findings will not be applicable to other regions in Nepal. That said, however, the 
findings may be generalised to other districts and villages like Kavre and Patle 
Gau in the Nepalese hills which are non-remote, proximate to cities and other 
urban areas but retain rural characteristics.  
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 I have tried to present the worldviews of the Dalits as far as I possibly can, 
but this has ultimately been limited by my positionality. There are several 
reasons for this. Firstly, my WFP colleague had obtained help from Siromani 
Sapkota, a local Bahun man, to host me in Patle Gau. In the very first meeting, 
Siromani immediately offered me a room in his house to stay. It was hard for me 
to reject as the house was only a couple of hundred metres away from the Dalit 
bastee (settlement). And secondly, since the Dalits had poor living conditions they 
could not offer me any space to live in their houses. Therefore, although I was 
not living with Dalits, I maintained frequent interactions with them to avoid 
adopting a “Brahmanical” worldview.  
 In order to broaden the comparative perspective by incorporating 
Tamangs into my research I also sought to interact with them as much as I could. 
I do not speak or understand Tamang language which they speak among 
themselves. However, most Tamangs speak Nepali so this was not a huge 
limitation, although I have to acknowledge that it was the younger and the better-
travelled amongst them who spoke fluent Nepali. Most Tamangs did not have 
the same fluency or the range of vocabulary in Nepali language as the Bahuns 
and the Dalits had which may have limited the precision and intensity of 
communication. All my research was thus conducted in either English or Nepali.  
I also want to concede that much literature on Tamangs also project them 
as being marginalised, excluded, economically poor, and vulnerable to food 
insecurity (Bennett, et al., 2006; GON, 2011, 2013b, 2014; Tamang, 2009; Tamang, 
1992). I do not want to dispute or challenge these findings. However, my 
evidence from Patle Gau suggests that in this particular locality they are 
comparatively richer, landed and have greater representation in the political 
circles at village and district level than Dalits, although they still have not 
assumed the leadership roles that Bahuns have. My findings on Tamangs thus 
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do not exactly correspond to their image in nation-wide discourses, yet this can 
probably be explained by their population strength in Kavre, where, they are the 
most populous ethnic group, ahead of any other caste or ethnic group. 
The other limitation of this study is that it has given only limited space to 
women. This thesis does not revolve around gender relations and I do not draw 
from feminist theory, although some of my interlocutors were women. A few of 
these women are actually powerful “change” and bikase agents in Patle Gau. 
However, I could spend only limited time with them learning about their work 
because it is not culturally accepted that I, a married man, befriend local women 
too much. I only had a few interviews with them, their time and local culture 
permitting. Still I have tried to discuss gender relations in the broader discussions 
of social relations, whenever feasible. 
 Finally, a few words on caste and ethnicity itself. Caste and ethnicity in 
Nepal is a complex structure. Caste-based relations operate in three spaces: two 
geographical (hills and Madhesh) and one cultural (Newar ethnic/caste group). 
Largely disassociated by geography, the hills and Madhesh have developed their 
own similar yet different caste-systems (the castes found in Madhesh are not 
necessarily found in the hills and vice-versa) and relations while the Newars 
living largely in hilly areas have their own internal (and even more elaborate and 
complicated) caste-system quite distinct from the other two. Because of the 
location of my field-site, my study excludes the Madhesh and Newar culture and 
is applicable to hill-based communities only. Another layer of sophistication in 
caste structure in Nepal is the hierarchy and “disunity” amongst Dalits 
themselves, wherein many Dalit sub-groups think that Bishwakarma (B.K.), the 
blacksmith, are the least marginalised among them22. In my site there were two 
                                                          
22 Personal communication with Min Bishowakarma, Member of the Central Working 
Committee of Nepali Congress. 
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sub-groups of Dalits, Pariyar (tailors) and Meejar (cobblers) but I have not looked 
deeply into intra-Dalit dynamics, and have instead mostly treated both sub-
groups as one Dalit group. 
Chapter Plan 
Since it is a large undertaking to analyse changing social relations among 
three caste and ethnic groups within the larger discourse of democratic equality, 
this thesis is organised into three sections. Chapters one to three contextualise my 
study before proceeding with my ethnography. Chapter One introduces my 
research topic, issues and gives a brief overview of the related theories, literature, 
methodology and limitations. Chapter Two critically reviews how since the 
inception of the nation-state of Nepal, leaders and bureaucrats have used social 
identities such as caste (jāt) and associated hierarchy in order to subjugate the 
“the other” and legitimise their authority to rule. Chapter Three argues that the 
discourse of bikas was used to distract the masses from existing power 
inequalities and inequities, sometimes in the name of nationalism, and other 
times in the names of being good citizens.  
 In the second section from Chapter Four through to Chapter Seven I 
provide ethnographic evidence to support my overall thesis. In Chapter Four I 
argue how caste and ethnic identity amongst the Bahuns, Dalits and Tamangs is 
expressed through language, ritual performance, endogamy, specific livestock 
keeping practices and the maintenance of physical distance. In Chapter Five I 
deal with economic disparities, looking most closely at how the legacies of Birta 
(land gift), Kipat (communal land), and the failed bikase program of distributive 
land reform led to (near) landlessness amongst the Dalits and resulted in 
economic inequalities almost exactly corresponding to caste hierarchy.  
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In Chapter Six I examine another area of bikas heavily influenced by neo-
liberalism - the mobilisation of co-operatives and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) to provide rural credit. Here I argue that the provision of 
credit through this mechanism has benefited the elite and non-poor, more than 
the poor. The Dalits, who are mostly poor, are bound to remain perpetually 
indebted to local money lenders for survival while even the richer Dalits do not 
attain the status symbol of a Saujee. In Chapter Seven I argue that while Bahuns 
and Tamangs migrate for economic advantage and prestige (through higher 
education) advancement, the Dalits migrate for survival and for caste-
anonymity. Finally, Chapter Eight presents the main research findings, their 
applicability to other similar socio-cultural settings and discusses scope for 
further research.  
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Chapter 2  
Creating a “New Nepal”: Dialectics of Cultural Politics 
In 1950 the Nepalese state managers had promised that they would deliver 
a Constitution written not by “experts” chosen by the king and the political elite 
but by the people’s representatives through a Constituent Assembly. But as I 
argued in the previous chapter when such a Constitution did get promulgated in 
September 2015, after a wait of 65 years, not all were happy - especially certain 
women’s groups, Janajatis and Madheshis. The andolan (movement) launched by 
the Madheshis immediately after the announcement of the promulgation of the 
new Constitution allegedly in September 2015 lead to the death of 57 people from 
violence in a few months (HRW, 2015).  
Ever since the nation-state of Nepal was formed in the eighteenth century, 
it has been the site of protests, movements, rebellions, and revolutions (Lawoti, 
2007). The most recent andolan is just one of many. The 1950s Jana Kranti (People’s 
Revolution) against the autocratic Ranas sought to establish parliamentary 
democracy. The introduction to Westminster-style democratic governance it 
introduced was brief, King Mahendra in 1960 dismissed it, and in 1962 
introduced his own Panchayat democracy. Panchayat Democracy (1962-1990) 
was itself ousted by Jana Andolan I (People’s Movement I) that gave 
parliamentary democracy a second chance in 1990. Yet, this did not stop the 
Maoists from launching a Jana Yudha (“People’s War”) in the name of Maoist 
Revolution (1996 – 2006) against the state in 1996 which cost tens of thousands of 
lives. When King Mahendra’s son King Gyanendra suspended the elected 
parliament in 2002 and assumed all direct powers in 2005, the Maoists and other 
political parties aligned together against him to initiate yet another andolan, Jana 
Andolan II (People’s Revolution II) in April 2006. Jana Andolan II successfully 
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abolished the monarchy and reinstated parliamentary democracy for the second 
time in 2006.  
 So why have there been so many andolans in Nepal? In order to understand 
these large-scale conflicts, which have occasionally been very bloody, it is 
necessary to have an overview of the politics of culture and governance shaping 
Nepal’s state building processes. Most commentators argue that because some 
groups have felt alienated and marginalised by processes of state making, and 
have thus—in the name of social inclusion and social justice— occasionally 
revolted against the dominant group (Gellner, 2007a, 2007b; Hangen, 2007;  
Hangen, 2009; Lawoti, 2007, 2010c; Vasily, 2009).  
 Judging by sheer numbers alone, no one particular caste or ethnic group 
is overwhelmingly the most dominant in Nepal. The “high castes” from hill 
origins comprise about 31% of the population, followed closely by Janajati at 27%, 
Dalits at 14% and so on (Dahal, 2014). Nonetheless, the dominance is perceived 
not in terms of numerical populations, but in terms of the widespread and 
disproportionate presence of the “high castes” of hill origins in leadership 
positions of important institutions such as political parties, parliament, civil 
bureaucracy, judiciary, universities and the armed forces. This access to ‘power’ 
has given these groups the privileged opportunity to shape and structure state-
mechanisms in their favour (Gurung, 1997, 2003, 2005; Gurung, 2012; Lawoti, 
2010c, 2012; Pradhan, 1991; Pradhan, 2002). They have advantageously utilised 
these powerful positions to manoeuvre cultural politics and control political, 
economic and governance structures which they have used to homogenise the 
otherwise multi-ethnic (which necessarily did not have Hindu religion-based 
caste hierarchy and the concept of pollution) into one ‘homogenous’ Hindu 
society. Doing so they were able to create hierarchy among traditionally non-
hierarchised ethnic groups for the purposes of legitimising their political, cultural 
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and economic dominance during the Shah and Rana rule until the 1950s (Gurung, 
2003; Hangen, 2009; Kymlicka, 1995, 2001; Lawoti, 2010b, 2010c; Lecomte-
Tilouine, 2009b).  
 By constructing the character of Nepali nation-state as wholly Hindu 
(which in fact it was not) these groups ethnocentrically defined Nepali 
nationalism in terms of “hill Hindu” values and customs during the Panchayat 
regime (1962-199) which enabled them to successfully acquire legitimate 
privileges while marginalising and excluding other socio-groups such as Dalits 
(in terms of caste rank), Janajati (culture), the Madhesis (geography) and women 
(gender) from nation-building state mechanisms (Gurung, 1985; Gurung, 1997, 
2003, 2005).  However, these manoeuvres have never been smooth or easy. They 
have constantly faced resistance, revolts and revolutions organised and executed 
by the very groups they sought to marginalise (Lawoti, 2007). A long history of 
tensions between dominant and marginalised communities is the source of the 
current state of affairs. My main objective in this chapter is to delve deeper into 
the conflictual dialectics of the politics of culture. Using broad strokes and a 
chronological approach I provide a succinct historical analysis of Nepal’s 
political history and changing configurations of power between different groups, 
in order to better understand the present. I believe such an understanding is 
crucial as it provides necessary contextual background to my ethnography.  
Historians of Nepal would like us believe that Nepal’s history can be 
divided into three periods: ancient, medieval and modern (Regmi, 1952; Shaha, 
1988). Yet considering that the “modern” period gave rise to the nation-state 
which we now know as Nepal, I shall take up that period to further discuss 
Nepal’s national and cultural politics. 
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Absolute Monarchical (Shah) Rule (1769-1845): Creation and 
Maintenance of Aslee Hindustan 
Historians contend that the territorial expansion of a princely state of 
Gorkha23 by its then king Prithvi Narayan Shah (hereafter P. N. Shah) in 1769 and 
by his immediate descendants thereafter marks the beginning of military 
conquests and political negotiations which eventually led to formation of the 
modern day nation-state of Nepal. Before that, however, a large number of non-
Hindu shamanistic and Buddhist tribal units were thriving side-by-side within 
numerous princely Hindu states ruled by “high caste” Thakuri24 elites such as the 
Shahs, Sens and Mallas of alleged (Indian) Rajput-origins. This Thakuri ruling 
elite had fled Muslim conquests in India and entered the Nepalese hills during 
the 16th century … (Bista, 1991; Gurung, 2003). Claiming “divine” powers to rule, 
these petty Hindu kings visualised constructing their small kingdoms as “pure” 
Hindu havens, safely protected from “impure” beef-eating Muslim and later 
equally “impure” Christian regimes in India (Hachhethu, 2007). Consequently, 
in the 17th century some of the Sen Rulers of the Nepalese hilly states began 
proclaiming themselves to be “Hindupati” (patriarchs of Hinduism) (Gurung, 
2005), an act that the Shah Kings later followed. In fact, Drabya Shah, an ancestor 
of P. N. Shah, replaced the name Liglig: a kingdom of the ethnic Gurungs, with 
Gorkha after he was able to defeat its non-Hindu tribal Gurung king in 1559 
(Krishna B Bhattachan, 2000). Some argue that the name Gorkha itself has its 
etymological origins in the Sanskrit word Goraksa, “protector of cow”25 – “gō” 
meaning cow and “rakshya” meaning to protect (Michaels, 1997).  
                                                          
23 Situated about 140 kms by road north-west of Kathmandu, the then Kingdom of Gorkha is 
now an administrative unit, a district, by the same name.  
24 Thakuri is supposed to be “high-caste” warrior Chhetri unlike other “common” Chhetri. 
Thakuri is “entitled” to be kings and are able to rule.  
25  Hindu mythology treats cow as a sacred animal which symbolises Laxmi, the goddess of 
wealth and prosperity. 
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It therefore comes as no surprise that P. N. Shah aspired to create aslee 
Hindustan (“real Hindustan” – pure land of the Hindus)26 in Nepal imposing 
isolationist form of governance to effectively close it to any outside influence 
(Regmi, 1978, 1999; Sever, 1996; Thapa, Timilsina, & Dahal, 1997). Using Hindu 
logic, P. N. Shah also classified Nepal’s residents into four varnas and 36 jāts. By 
four varnas  he referred to the classical four-fold Hindu caste system of Brahmin 
(Bahun), Kshatriya (Chhetri), Vaisya and Sudra, and by 36 jāts he symbolically 
signified a multitude of groups within these four varna groups (Hofer, 1979; 
Kansakar, 1977). To maintain Hindu “purity” P. N. Shah did not hesitate to expel 
Capuchin missionaries from Patan as soon as he conquered the Kathmandu 
Valley in 1769 (Gurung, 2003, 2005). He and his descendants also resolutely 
upheld the tradition of appointing a Dharmadhikari (authority on dharma)27, a 
Bahun priest well-versed in Vedas and other Hindu texts, to provide advice on 
jurisprudence (Hodgson, 1836; Michaels, 2004, 2005; Pradhan, 1991; Thapa, 2010).  
 In such a governance system, the monarch or his regent, as the source of 
all power, would sit at the top of the hierarchy and have power over 
representatives spread throughout the country in a pyramidal fashion (Burghart, 
1978; Dahal, 2014; Regmi, 1999; Stiller, 1976). Cleary the French political 
philosopher Baron de Montesquieu’s (1689 – 1755) suggestion that in order to 
check the state from being tyrannical its power should be divided into three 
different institutions - the legislative, the executive and the judiciary (De 
Montesquieu, 2004) - had not reached the Nepalese masses who were coaxed by 
the ruling elite into believing that in accordance with Hindu ideology they had 
the legitimate authority to rule over them in absolute terms (Hachhethu, 2007). 
                                                          
26 A collection of Prithvi Narayan Shah’s political advice to his loyalists are said to be preserved 
in Divya Upadesh (Divine Counsels of Prithvi Narayan Shah).  
27 Axel Michaels has discussed some of the duties of such a religious authority in his “The Price 
of Purity: the Religious Judge in the 19th Century Nepal” (Michaels, 2005). 
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Right below the monarch was a council of bhardars (comparable to a cabinet of 
ministers) led by a Mukhtiyar (equivalent to the post of a Prime Minister) who 
was invariably one of king’s close kin relatives such as a younger brother or a 
nephew. The Mukhtiyar was in turn assisted by Kajis (ministers) and Sardars 
(administrative chiefs). For maintenance of absolute power, and the preservation 
of dictatorial rule “hukumi raj” (rule by order), the king assured that the kajis, 
bhardars and sardars were men of Thakuri and Chhetri castes loyal to him, and 
whose performance and loyalty he would be able to directly monitor and 
supervise (Regmi, 1995).  
 Administratively Nepal was divided into four territorial divisions which 
were further divided into several districts that oversaw numerous villages. Men 
from royalist Bahun, Thakuri and Chhetri castes would head the division and 
district administrations. Peasants in the villages would pay taxes to the local 
chiefs and tax collectors (subbas) who were either non-Hindu ethnic village elites 
(Gurung, Limbu, Magar, Tamang, etc.) who had colluded with the imperial 
centre, or were royalist Bahun, Chhetris, and Thakuris who had slowly but surely 
taken over the territorial authority by receiving large tracts of tax-free “land gifts” 
from the state in the form of Birta lands (Caplan, 1970; Pradhan, 1991).  
 In the largely agrarian economy of the time, the Shah Kings used land as 
a political tool for state-building and sustenance.  The political economy was 
geared towards extracting tax from the peasants in the form of grains, free labour 
or even coins, which were collected by royals, bhardars, kajis, sardars, village 
headmen, and the army, who did little to provide any services in return 
(Burghart, 1978; M. Joshi & Mason, 2011; Maskey & Deschene, 2008; Regmi, 1976, 
1978; Sever, 1996; Shakya, 2012; Stiller, 1976). It is not that the gifting of Birta lands 
as a political tool was a political invention of the Shahs, it had existed under 
previous dynasties like the Mallas, but such a practice had been intensified under 
 40 
Shah Rule (Pradhan, 1991). And, since the monarch could also unconditionally 
nullify Birta land grants contingent upon the results of the annual pajani 
(performance revision), the landowning elite never felt obliged to protect and 
defend the peasants working their lands but were rather concerned solely with 
appropriating maximum benefit (Stiller, 1976). The peasants, however, had no 
sphere in which to voice their complaints about unjust taxes, and hence 
expressed a “silent cry” (Stiller, 1976). Under such repressive circumstances the 
peasants and people of various ethnic groups occasionally came together to 
organise local small-scale resistances and revolts against this oppressive 
feudalistic system. Yet the more powerful state actors could effectively and easily 
suppress these efforts (Lawoti, 2007; Muni, 2010; Pradhan, 1991; Regmi, 1999).  
Autocratic Rana Rule (1846 – 1951): Hinduisation and Official 
Hierarchisation of Nepalese Society 
An unexpected bloody coup in 1846, through which Jung Bahadur 
Kunwar (1816 – 1877), a man from an “insignificant” Chhetri group (Kunwar) 
achieved the status of Mukhtiyar (Prime Minister) marked the end of direct Shah 
monarchical rule. Reducing the Shah monarch to a titular figure head only, Jung 
Bahadur began to rule with an iron fist. His ambition to be the king of Nepal was 
halted only by the disapproval of the influential British in India, his closest ally 
at the time. Because Jung Bahadur was a Chhetri he sought to raise his caste status 
from that of a Chhetri (warrior caste) to that of Thakuri (ruling and warrior caste). 
In order to gain acceptance from the masses he produced fake documents linking 
his lineage to a Rajput (royal) family in Jaipur, India (Kumar, 1967). Although 
Jung Bahadur fell short of becoming the king himself he nonetheless abandoned 
his meagre Chhetri Kunwar surname to adopt the Rajput-royal title of “Rana”, 
and began calling himself Jung Bahadur Rana. With Jung Bahadur Rana, the 
Rana dictatorship effectively supplanted the Shah dictatorship. Instituting a 
 41 
hereditary system for the post of all-powerful Prime Minister, which deemed that 
such a position was to be passed from one male Rana to another in accordance 
with a roll of succession decided by the Ranas themselves. 
 It is vital to note there that adventurous Jung Bahadur also happened to 
be the first high-ranking Nepalese official to have ever crossed the kala pani28 to 
reach Europe in 1850. Upon his return in 1851, thoroughly impressed with French 
and English systems of governance, Jung Bahadur sought to emulate these 
systems and establish some kind of “written and modern” administrative and 
judiciary system in Nepal. To bring about political and social unification of the 
diverse populations of Nepal of the time, Jung Bahadur and his assistants had to 
assimilate three social groups into one “homogeneous” order: (a) the Newars of 
Kathmandu Valley who had their own modified and elaborate version of caste 
system, (b) the various, largely non-Hindu, ethnic groups residing in hills and 
mountains, and (c) the Hindu and non-Hindu groups of Madhesh (Gurung, 2003, 
2005). To do this Jung hired a number of consultants, the bhattas (academic 
experts on Hindu religious texts) from India29 who helped to draft the 
comprehensive and totalising Muluki Ain (National Code 1854) that imposed 
“uniformity,” and in the name of “unity” organised all of the Nepalese society 
under one Hindu ideology (Pradhan, 2002) (Figure 3).  
 The design of the Muluki Ain was inspired by the Vedic Varna system but 
was not an exact replica because the Vaisya Varna (business community), a vital 
part of Hindu caste system, is conspicuously absent. Nonetheless, it was still 
based around the notion of ritual purity and impurity (Dumont, 1980). Therefore, 
all the five categories of castes and sub-castes first fell into two broad categories: 
                                                          
28 Seas were referred to as Kala pani (black waters) as there was a belief that crossing them 
would make one come in contact with other non-Hindu “impure” castes to lose one’s caste and 
consequently become “impure.” 
29 Personal communication with Aahuti, Dalit intellectual and activist in Nepal. 
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“pure” and “impure”. The “pure” castes were further divided into two: “wearers 
of holy cord”30 (Bahun, Thakuri, Chhetris and Sanyasis in the order of rank) 
ranked above the “pure” matwali (alcohol drinking).  
 The Muluki Ain 1854 also privileged Bahuns, Thakuri and Chhetris coming 
from hill areas (parbat or pahad) placing them above the Bahuns originating in 
Madhesh, although in a strict Vedic sense any Bahun is always ritually ranked 
above Chhetri and Thakuri. This came about because Gorkha and later the whole 
of Nepal had for a long time been ruled by “high-caste” men originating in the 
hills. Additionally, Terai (plains) Bahun were said to have entered Nepal from 
Northern Indian relatively recently and were considered “inferior” and thus not 
“originally Nepali” by hill residents. It is also interesting to note that the matwali 
were further sub-divided into two: “non-enslaveable” and “enslaveable.” Those 
matwali caste groups who were subjugated by the Gorkhai Empire (Regmi, 1999) 
in the early phase of its expansion and who had been fairly thoroughly 
Hinduised and given semi-important posts in the governance system were 
labelled as “non-enslaveable”, while those who were not, were tagged 
“enslaveable”, and used to provide free labour and services to the state and its 
managers (Pradhan, 2002).  
 The group “impure castes” was also divided into two: (i) impure but 
touchable, and (ii) impure and untouchable. The first category consisted of some 
occupational Newar caste groups, Muslims and Europeans with whom 
commensality was forbidden but bodily touch did not require any religious 
                                                          
30 According to Hindu belief system one has to be first born into a certain jat (caste). That is the 
first birth. But to enter into the so called “higher casts” (Bahun, Thakuri, Chhetri, Sanyasi), the 
male children have to perform a particular ritual (bratabandha) by which they are made eligible 
to wear a specific janai (“holy cord”) which signifies their second birth into the “upper castes”. 
Only after this ritual do they become full legitimate members of “high Hindu upper castes” able 
to perform rituals reserved for them only. Because of this, they are also called “twice-born” and 
“tagadhari” (wearer of holy cord).  
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purification. Below this group at the very bottom were the “impure and 
untouchable” caste groups from whose hands any food or water was 
unacceptable and bodily contact with whom required ritual purification 
(elaborate processes led by a Bahun priest in the past but “cleansing” with water 
“purified” by sprinkling with gold and silver in more recent times) to restore 
“lost” caste status. 
 The Muluki Ain 1854 also legislated caste-based and discriminatory 
punishment rules to different castes for the breach of its provisions in matters of 
private and public affairs such as marriage, sexual relationships, dress and 
commensality. In all these matters “high-castes” faced the least penalties and the 
“untouchables” endured the toughest punishments (Gellner, 2009; Pradhan, 
2002). It is true that caste-based discriminatory practices were already socially 
accepted and practiced in Nepal prior to the proclamation of Muluki Ain 1854. 
Yet, it is essential to note that Muluki Ain 1854 gave such practices legal “teeth”, 
as it was the first written official document that legalised caste status and 
legitimised the caste-based discriminatory practices. This in turn cemented such 
practices in society, eventually laying the foundation for institutionalised “high-
caste” privilege (Bahun, Thakuri, Chhetri and Sanyansi), with people of hill 
origins at the top of social hierarchy. (Gellner, 2001; Gurung, 2003; Whelpton, 
1983, 2005). 
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Figure 3 Ranking of castes according to Muluki Ain 1854                                      
[Source: (Hofer, 1979; Figure 3)] 
Pure castes (Cokho jat) or 
“water-acceptable 
castes” (pani chalnya jat) 
1) Wearers of the hold cord (Tagadhari) 
(i) Upadhyaya Bahun (“pure blood”) 
(ii) Thakuri (Rajput) (“royal warrior” caste 
higher than “warrior Chhetri”, no. vi) e.g. 
Malla, Shaha, Bom,  
(iii) Jaisi Bahun (“impure blood” – children 
from the union of an Upadhyaya man 
with (i) Bahun woman married without 
following necessary religious rituals or (ii) 
Bahun widow or (iii) a divorced Bahun 
woman 
(iv) Newar Bahuns 
(v) Terai Bahuns (Bahuns of Indian origin) 
(vi) Chhetri (“warrior”), etc. 
 
2) Non-enslaveable Alcohol-Drinkers: 
(i) Magar 
(ii) Gurung, etc. 
 
3) Enslaveable Alcohol-Drinkers: 
(i) Tamang 
(ii) Chepang, etc. 
Impure castes (water-
unacceptable jat) 
(pani nachalnya jat) 
 
4) Impure but touchable castes  
(i) Kasai (butchers) 
(ii) Kusle (Newar musicians) 
(iii) Muslim 
(iv) European, etc. 
 
5) Impure and untouchable castes: 
(i) Kami (blacksmiths) 
(ii) Sarki (cobblers, shoemakers, tanners, 
leatherworkers) 
(iii) Damai (tailors and musicians), etc. 
 
 To strengthen and deepen the processes of Hinduisation of Nepalese 
society, the Muluki Ain 1854 also proscribed the death penalty for cow-killing and 
beef-eating, practices that were not taboo among many non-Hindu ethnic groups 
(now named “Matwali”) (Michaels, 1997; R. Pradhan, 2002). These state-
sponsored acts of Hinduisation, were also enabled by the elites of some non-
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Hindu ethnic groups who began celebrating Hindu festivals, used Bahun priests 
and began speaking Nepali language. Nepali language which until early 20th 
century was called Khas kura (“Khas speak” signifying Khas region which is now 
in Western Nepal where the language originated) or Gorkhali bhasa (“Gorkhali” 
language – the language spoken in the Gorkha kingdom) was declared an official 
language only in 1930 (Pradhan, 2002).  
 The Ranas wanted to consolidate caste-based hierarchies and structures of 
discrimination, yet they also needed to continue to legitimise this authoritarian 
position. To accomplish this a certain reformist Rana Prime Minister by the name 
Dev Shumsher Jung Bahadur Rana in a bid to gain widespread popularity in 1901 
allowed members of the so called “lower castes” to attend his residence to 
participate in Bhardari Sabha (Counsellors Meeting) in the name of social inclusion 
(Rana, 1978). Attempted at a time when the achhyuts (“untouchables” as they 
were called in those times) did not even dare to enter the house of any “higher” 
caste this “unpopular populist” practice was severely criticised by most high-
caste elites. Consequently, the subsequent Rana rulers after Dev Shumsher 
Rana’s short 144-day rule quickly abandoned this practice, solidifying caste-
based discriminatory practices at the top levels, in the process setting precedents 
for others to follow. 
 The oppressive Ranas regime started to falter in the late 1940s, unsteadied 
by a wave of movements for independence from colonial states that spread 
around the world after the Second World War. The departure of their ally, the 
British, from India, and the desire for Nepal’s democratisation by the new Indian 
government further undermined the Rana regime. In order to secure their 
position, one of the last Rana Prime Ministers announced a reformist 
Constitution of Nepal in 1948 which bestowed the Nepalese citizens with civil 
rights and liberties to exercise freedom of speech, expression and religion for the 
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first time (Joshi & Rose, 1966).  As a symbolic gesture towards terminating the 
top-down central approach to governance wherein all major positions even at the 
lower levels of governance were appointed by the Prime Minister or his 
delegates, the Constitution (1948) prescribed that the members of the grassroots-
level gram panchayat (village council)31 and nagar panchayat (town council) were 
to be elected. These gram and nagar panchayats in turn were to elect a jilla panchayat 
(district council). The constitution also stipulated that the Legislature was to be 
constituted of two houses: the Bhardari Sabha (Council of Nobles), consisting of 
twenty to thirty nominated members, functioning as an Upper House and a 
Rastra Sabha (National Council) as the Lower House with forty-two elected and 
twenty-eight nominated members. For legal purposes, a judicial committee was 
to act as the Supreme Court with branches spread out to the district levels.  
 Nevertheless, true to the despotic nature of the Rana rule, the constitution 
provisioned that the Prime Minister was to chair all branches of government. In 
any case, none of the provisions of this Constitution (1948) ever got implemented 
as it was nullified almost as soon as it was promulgated. Such a conservative 
move by the Ranas only further encouraged the Nepalese masses of all castes and 
regions to unite and organise massive political movements against them. At the 
time, the three major oppositional forces - the social democrats led by the 
Nepalese Congress, the communists led by the United Marxist Leninist, and the 
Shah King himself who had been self-exiled in India – started to mobilise against 
the Ranas, drawing together dissatisfied Nepalese people as well as the hundreds 
of thousands of Europe-returnee Nepalese soldiers who had seen “other forms 
of government” while fighting for the British in Second World War. This violent 
opposition against the Ranas was referred to as Jana Kranti (People’s Revolution). 
                                                          
31 Village councils were to have five to fifteen elected members representing at least one village 
and town councils were to have ten to fifty elected members and district council were to have 
fifteen to twenty members (Joshi & Rose, 1966). 
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Unable to forcefully subdue the Jana Kranti, the Ranas finally submitted and were 
conclusively removed from power in 1951.32  
First Experiments with Parliamentary Democracy (1951- 1962): 
Trialling Social Inclusion at the Center 
With the autocratic Ranas securely out of the political way, the Shah King 
of the time, Tribhuvan Shah, the Nepali Congress and the United Marxist 
Leninist Party secretly agreed in 1950 in India to the “Delhi compromise.” This 
agreement bound them to holding elections for a Constituent Assembly that was 
to draft a new constitution with the hope of administering the Nepalese state in 
more democratic terms (Kumar, 1967; Rana, 1978). Yet, at least in part because 
the king and the social democrats were paranoid that the Nepalese communists 
wanted to establish a “secular republic” in the “only Hindu Kingdom of the 
world” of the time, they colluded to convince the communists to have both the 
Interim Nepal Constitution 1951 and the Nepal Constitution 1959 be written by 
a team of “experts.” As a result both these Constitutions, however democratic, 
still reserved a privileged position for the King enabling him to dissolve both the 
parliament and the executive government if he judged that certain acts were 
“unconstitutional” (Maskey & Deschene, 2008).  
 The “democratic” government headed by Nepalese Congress that was 
formed right after the expulsion of the Ranas in 1951 also was the site of the first 
practices of “inclusionary politics”, with representatives from ethnic groups such 
as Gurung, Thulung, and a representative from Madhesh included in the 
Ministerial Cabinet (Sever, 1996). Yet, no woman or member of the Dalit 
community were given any position.  This phase also saw intra-party personality 
                                                          
32  Many authors have written profusely on the Ranas but Andrian Sever’s “Nepal under the 
Ranas” (1993), Pramod S. J. B. Rana’s “Rana Nepal: an insider’s view” (1978) and E. E. Jaina’s 
“The emergence of a new aristocracy in Nepal” (1973) provide analytical perspectives on the 
rise and fall of the Ranas (Jaina, 1972; Rana, 1978; Sever, 1993). 
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clashes between political leaders and inter-party ideological clashes 
(communism versus social democracies) between political parties, at time 
reminiscent of previous family feuds amongst the Ranas. These squabbles meant 
that the governments formed during this period had very short lives. The masses 
who believed that “democratic” governments should show greater responsibility 
towards them than the dictatorial Ranas, became constantly disillusioned with 
the lack of services and bikase programmes intended for their welfare (Whelpton, 
2005). Even the implementation of the first land reform programme in 1950/1951 
that aimed at providing “land to the tillers” by abolishing Birta (gift) land grants 
was firmly resisted by powerful landed elite who sided with the ambitious 
monarch, Mahendra Shah. Utilising a clause provided by the Constitution of 
Nepal 1959 and with the support of the army that was still led by royalist men of 
Chhetri and Thakuri caste groups, and the landed elite composed largely of 
“high-caste” men, Mahendra was able to direct a bloodless coup to firmly 
suspend the democratically elected parliament. He then rejected the 
parliamentary democracy as a “foreign practice unsuited to Nepalese soils” that 
had provided zero bikas (Adhikary, 1995; Onta, 1996). With the intent of running 
the whole nation in a dictatorial fashion camouflaged under the rhetoric of the 
swift deliverance of bikas, many political leaders were locked up in jails or exiled 
to India, and Mahendra “gifted” a new type of “home grown democracy” 
Panchayati prajatantra (Panchayat democracy) in 1962 (Adhikary, 1995; Onta, 
1996). 
Return of the Absolute Monarchy in Panchayat Democracy (1962 – 
1990): Suppression of Multi-culturalism 
Another phase of powerful cultural politics in Nepal begins with 
Mahendra. For Mahendra democracy simply meant that the masses could enjoy 
the right to vote. This right to vote, however, according to Mahendra, could not 
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be employed with the idea of self-rule to elect political parties33 guided by 
ideologies like liberalism, socialism or communism but could only be utilised for 
electing politicians who showed their complete allegiance to the idea of the 
Panchayat system. The Panchayat system of governance differed little from the 
previous despotic Rana and Shah rulers, as Mahendra placed himself at the helm 
of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. Mahendra achieved this not 
through the interpretation of Hindu texts as his ancestors had, but by invoking 
the more modern tool of a Constitution – the Nepal Constitution of 1962.  
 With most powers firmly in his hand Mahendra then began a state-led 
project of assimilation that sought to homogenise the otherwise heterogeneous 
Nepalese populations and provide it with a “common” identity by declaring that 
Nepal was a “Hindu State.” Hidden under this agenda of “national integration” 
he denied cultural and religious pluralism and imposed a monolithic concept of 
one nation (Nepal), one language (Nepali – mainly spoken by Hindus of the 
hills), one culture (the Hindu-based caste system), one religion (Hindu) and one 
national identity (hill-based Hindu identity). Consequently, Nepali language 
become the primary mode of communication for formal education and 
government correspondences at the expense of hundreds of other languages 
locally spoken (Onta, 1996, 1997). Similarly, the dress worn by the hill-based 
Hindu group was defined as the national dress, ignoring many other local forms 
of dress. Other Hindu symbols were also used to essentialise a Nepalese national 
identity: simrik (deep red)34 became the national colour and the cow became the 
national animal.  To influence the psyche of young children “standardised” 
national school textbooks used to glorify hill-originated Hindu culture and 
“brave” Hindu men who “united” Nepal (Onta, 1996, 1997). Assessing the 
                                                          
33 Political parties as well as associations of many kinds were banned during the period of 
Panchayat democracy. 
34 Hindu colour for victory and prosperity. 
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Panchayat period to be one of hegemonic dominance (Gramsci, 1992) by the 
Hindu elite, it is clear that under the leadership of Mahendra power and 
knowledge-production were intimately intertwined (Foucault, 1980), Om 
Gurung writes: 
… cultural elements of unity were proclaimed by suppressing the 
differences. Any claim to ethnic identity was reduced to political 
rebellion … because it was considered to be a threat to nationalism 
(O. Gurung, 2012, p. 195).  
The panchayat democracy had four tiers of governance - village, district, 
zonal and national – whose executive posts were taken mostly by the royalist hill 
Hindu elites. The villages and towns were administered by gau panchayat (village 
council) and nagar panchayat (town council) respectively. The Rastriya Panchayat 
(national council or “parliament”) that served as the unicameral national 
legislature sat at the top. Despite the fact that the executives of both the district 
level and village level bodies were elected, the king still exercised a massive 
amount of power at the local levels through the middle-level Zonal Chiefs, 
fourteen in total, who were directly appointed by him.     
 But the Panchayati era did not last forever. Yet during this period the 
monarch, his family members, and many of his loyalist allies amassed immense 
wealth by running big businesses such as five-star hotels, major manufacturing 
companies and by rent-seeking from state-owned enterprises (which produced a 
range of commodities from agricultural products to cigarettes) (Shakya, 2012). 
The general public, unfortunately, largely stayed poor and hungry. Since many 
Nepalese people felt disappointed and frustrated with the continuation of 
“Gareeb desh ko dhani raja (Rich king of a poor nation)” under the Panchayat 
administration they began to think that perhaps the multi-party parliamentary 
system of the 1950s was not given adequate opportunity. Hence peoples of all 
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castes and creed united together to initiate a popular People’s Movement I (Jana 
Andolan I) against the Panchayat regime. The global movements for liberal 
democracies around the world, especially in the communist states, only helped 
the Jana Andolan I to topple the Panchayat system for the restoration of multiparty 
democracy under constitutional monarchy in 1990.  
Revival of the Multi-party Parliamentary Democracy (1990 - 2005): 
Assertion for Multi-Culturalism  
With the reinstatement of multi-party parliamentary democracy in 1990, 
Nepalese people started enjoying unprecedented political freedoms, including 
freedom of expression and freedom of formation of social and political 
organisations. The Constitution of Nepal 1990 itself, although retaining a Hindu 
identity for the nation, for the first time recognised Nepalese peoples’ cultural 
heterogeneity by acknowledging that Nepal was a “multi-ethnic” and “multi-
lingual” nation (GON, 1990).  
 Post-1990 there was an upsurge of the politics of recognition (Taylor, 1994) 
and the politics of difference (Young, 1990), as various cultural groups started 
asserting their self-created identities and discarding categories imposed on them 
by the erstwhile Hindu elite. The so called matawaali (alcohol drinking) peoples 
rejected this state-given derogatory identity which had placed them in second 
and third positions in traditional Hindu hierarchical ranking. The activists and 
intellectuals amongst them began giving themselves a new identity: the Janajati 
(nationalities) (Gellner, 2001; Gurung, 2005; Onta, 2006; Wimmer, 2008). The 
word Janajati itself is not a recent invention as it customarily meant “peoples of 
different kinds” (Sharma, 1975) but Nepal Janajati Mahasangh (Nepal Federation 
of Nationalities)35 founded in 1990 gave it a new meaning using it to signify the 
                                                          
35  Presently called Nepal Adhivashi Janajati Mahasangh (Nepal Federation of Indigenous 
Nationalities (NFIN). 
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non-Hindu nationalities who were outside of the Hindu caste system and had 
their own distinct languages (other than Nepali), traditions, religions (other than 
Hinduism such as Buddhism, Kirant, Bon, etc.) and cultures (other than hill-
based Hindu culture). This group identity excluded all Hindu groups (both from 
the hills and from Terai) including the former “untouchables.” Members of this 
group even began to boycott Dasain, the largest Hindu festival, to assert their 
non-Hinduness and distinct ethnic identity (Hangen, 2009). Some even publicly 
burnt pieces of literature in which they felt they had been portrayed in negative 
light by Bahun authors (Hutt, 2003).  
 The former “untouchables” started to use the identity marker Dalit (the 
oppressed)36 more profusely than ever before, and in the process abandoned 
forever the derogatory achhyut (impure, untouchable) identity. This was in part 
because of a feeling that Dalit was a political identity which could be corrected 
democratically while achhyut was an identity so deeply tied to religion and 
culture that change would be too slow to occur. Seeking equality Dalits also 
began asserting their right to be free from caste-based discrimination, through 
hundreds of government and non-government agencies (Vasily, 2009).  People 
from Madhesh also proudly started identifying themselves as Madheshi rejecting 
the derogatory and insulting Madhise used by the hill-based Nepalese 
populations. 
 However, the democracy of 1990, increasingly started looking more like 
the democracy of 1951. Political instability and corruption became rampant 
compelling many political observers to use the term “democrazy.” While the 1990 
parliamentary democracy had limited the power of the monarch and had 
                                                          
36 A term introduced to them in 1956 by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar of India. Ambedkar was one of the 
main architects of Constitution of India and founder of the Republican Party of India (later 
named Bahujan Samaj Party). 
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separated the powers of the state, it had made only minor cosmetic alterations to 
the political administration. The fourteen zones were dissolved but the seventy-
five districts retained the same size, shape and name. Gram Panchayat, Nagar 
Panchayat and District Panchayat were renamed Gau Bikas Samitee (Village 
Development Committee), Nagar Bikas Samitee (Municipal Development 
Committee) and Jilla Bikas Sameetee (District Development Committee) with 
responsibility for the same administrative territories (Joshi & Rose, 1966). Just 
like the failure of earlier experiments with democracy in the 1950s and the project 
of Panchayat democracy, post 1990 practices of democracy saw high levels of 
corruption, political instability, and growing economic inequalities (Lawoti, 
2010a, 2010b; Panday, 1999; Panday & Tamang, 2011).  
 Traditionally marginalised groups such as the matwalis, (now Janajātis), 
achhyut (now Dalits), women, Madhesis, and peoples residing in rural and 
remote areas continued feeling excluded politically and economically. They 
thought that the fruits of bikas, if there were any, were not being equitably 
distributed. The rich and powerful of the Panchayat regime both at the centre 
and in rural areas were no longer Panches (defenders of Panchayat system) but 
took new avatars as allies of the mainstream political parties, most with the 
Nepalese Congress and some with United Marxist Leninist parties (Nepal, 2003).  
These elites thus continued enjoying profit and power disproportionately, mostly 
through illegal means. The great aspirations of the general masses for 
parliamentary democracy soon turned into huge disappointments (Joshi, 2009; 
Lawoti, 2010a; Lecomte-Tilouine, 2009a; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2004; D. Thapa, 2004, 
2012).  
 In the mid-1990s, these disappointed people were quickly and 
convincingly romanticised by the Maoist ideology propagated by the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) which promised a society devoid of 
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exploitation and assured “land to the tiller.” This attracted massive numbers of 
the poor, the landless, and the marginalised, especially in the rural areas where 
poverty was widespread, who believed that perhaps an alternative future where 
things were more prosperous, more egalitarian, and more inclusive was possible 
(Pattanaik, 2002). The Maoists claimed that in order to dismantle Nepal’s 
(semi)feudal social relations and build a more egalitarian society, the country 
needed a people-centred constitutional framework drafted by people’s 
representatives elected to the Constituent Assembly rather than by a group of so 
called “experts” as had been the case thus far (Thapa, 2004). But the 
parliamentary governments’ persistent rejection of these Maoist demands37 and 
the denial by the Election Commission to allow this party to contest the 1994 
parliamentary elections only further incited them to rebel against the state. 
Surprisingly, this was also at a time when communism had collapsed globally 
and was being replaced by Western liberal democracies, in a stage Fukuyama 
referred to as “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1989). The Nepalese Maoist revolution 
was thus indeed a rare phenomenon (Nickson, 1992). Yet it has to be understood 
that the 1990 revolution had mostly been an urban event led by urban elites with 
support from the urban masses (Nepal, 2003). It remained disconnected from the 
80% of Nepalese that lived in rural areas (Shneiderman & Turin, 2004). However, 
the Maoists understood this, and speaking directly to the frustrations and 
grievances of these marginalised social groups, assured them social, political and 
economic inclusion, in return for joining them in an armed uprising against the 
state (Lawoti, 2012; Mishra, 2004; Shakya, 2012; Thapa, 2012). The Maoists 
promised autonomous “states” to various Janajati and Madhesi groups and 
                                                          
37 Of their 40 point demands the following were the most significant: a new Constitution to be 
drafted by the people’s elected representatives; declaration of Nepal as a secular state; all 
languages in Nepal to receive equal treatment; the establishment of ethnic and regional-based 
autonomous regions; all forms of caste, ethnic, regional and gender based discrimination to be 
ended; and special policies to be formulated for the promotion of the interests of Dalits and 
women. 
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initiated the discourse of creating a “New Nepal” free from caste, in order to 
persuade Dalits to fight for their cause (Hachhethu, 2009; Lawoti, 2010a; Muni, 
2010; Nayak, 2008; Thapa, 2004, 2012). Although a few Bahun men with the 
support of some Janajati men held the Maoist leadership positions, the bodies 
who were ready to kill and be killed were composed mostly of women and 
members of Janajati and Dalit groups (Pettigrew, 2012). Thinking they could win 
against the state, the Maoists in 1996 declared a Jana Yudha (People’s War) with 
arms and ammunition against the state.  
 The Maoists strategically chose a district in mid-west Nepal 
geographically far from Kathmandu as their headquarters and utilised the 
emotions and bodies of the marginalised ethnic group (Magar) residing in this 
region as inputs for their army. The ruthless but unsuccessful state terror to 
contain initial Maoist struggles not only encouraged other similarly marginalised 
communities to support the Maoists, but triggered efforts by Nepalese diaspora 
sympathetic to them to start pouring in financial aid (Nayak, 2008; Pattanaik, 
2002; Thapa, 2004). In no time what the state thought to be an ordinary “law and 
order” problem in a remote village became a nation-wide revolutionary war. 
Supported by ideological and programmatic contacts with the Indian Naxalites38, 
the Peruvian communist Shining Path (Nayak, 2008) and the Revolutionary 
International Movement (RIM)39 (Pattanaik, 2002) the Maoists created a roadmap 
that shaped Nepalese nationalism based not on hill Hindu values and mores but 
on an ideology that sought to stand up against global (typically American), 
regional (typically Indian) imperialism, as well as local feudalism in Nepal 
(Hachhethu, 2009; Muni, 2010; Nickson, 1992; Pattanaik, 2002; Thapa, 2002). This 
                                                          
38 The members of the Communist Party of India (Maoists) who were able to mobilise peasants 
and economically poor tribal groups against the local landlords in an armed struggle in 
Naxalbari, West Bengal, India since the 1960s are called Naxalites. 
39 Founded in 1984, The RIM is an international Communist (Maoist) organisation.  
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ideology successfully touched hearts of many who were ready to endanger their 
bodies in the hope of crafting a more egalitarian society (Gellner, 2003; Muni, 
2010; Nickson, 1992). The Maoists’ violent methods of executing exploitative 
moneylenders and landlords —their “class enemies”—in some villages (Joshi, 
2009; Lawoti, 2010a; Thapa, 2004, 2012) and the ruthless retaliation by the state 
meant that by the end of the war more than 13 thousand lives were lost (Lawoti 
& Pahari, 2010; OHCHR, 2012). At the height of the insurgency, the Maoist 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) boasted 35,000 armed soldiers against the 
Nepalese state’s 100,000 military personnel (Hachhethu, 2009). During this time, 
the Maoists had succeeded in pushing the state back to the extent that they were 
running parallel governance structures such as jana sarkar (people’s government) 
and jana adalat (people’s court) in most rural areas. The state’s police and 
administrative units could only fully function in the capital city and town centres. 
This absence of functional government which was increasingly failing to “deliver 
positive political goods” to its peoples (Rotberg, 2010; p. 1) had provoked some 
to label Nepal a “failing/failed state” (Economist, 2004; Riaz & Basu, 2007). 
 In the midst of the “People’s War” something terrible happened in the 
royal palace on June 1, 2001. The incumbent king, queen, crown prince and nine 
other immediate royal family members were killed in a massacre that was 
“officially” reported to be the deed of the crown prince. This meant that the 
younger brother Gyanendra Shah of the King Birendra Shah had to be crowned 
as the new king. The ambitious new king Gyanendra Shah, in less than a year on 
the throne, following the tactics employed by his father Mahendra’s in the late 
1950s, dismissed the popularly elected government and suspended multiparty 
democracy in October 2002. He did this by claiming that the democratically 
elected parties were unable to contain the violent acts committed by the Maoist 
“terrorists” (a label given by the Nepalese state). Encouraged by international 
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partners to fight terrorism in a post 9/11 era, Gyanendra insisted on the use of 
brutal state force to suppress the Maoist revolution. Unfortunately for him, his 
confrontational approach proved to be fatal to the monarchy. The mainstream 
political parties, who he had thrown out of office, teamed up with the Maoists to 
incite the Jana Andolan II (People’s Revolution II) that effectively forced the 
monarch to reinstate the democratically elected parliament in April 2006.  
Inclusive Social Democracy (2006 – date): Rhetoric of a More 
Egalitarian Federated ‘New Nepal’ 
The year 2006 is thus another milestone in Nepal’s political history. It was 
the year that democratically elected parties and the Maoists were successful in 
joining forces to strip the monarch of his major executive powers and re-instate 
the parliament that the king had suspended. The Maoists also signed a peace 
treaty with the Government of Nepal giving up their arms to participate in 
competitive parliamentary democracy, an occurrence happening only once in 
every three civil wars since 1940 (Walter, 2002). The end of this decade-long 
domestic war also paved the way for holding elections for the Constituent 
Assembly, an event which had been hoped for more than sixty years.  Many 
describe this point in time as the dawn of “New Nepal”, an idea that was 
politically constructed by the Maoists during the People’s War to justify their 
armed struggle against the state (Greenland & Skuse, 2015; Hangen, 2007). The 
politically conscious also started calling this new found political condition 
without a monarchy ganatantra or loktantra rather than prajatantra. “Praja” of 
“prajatantra” meant subjects to a king and not peoples of a nation (Hangen, 2009; 
p. 164). The English translation remained the same: democracy (or democrazy, 
however one preferred).  
 Constructing a new Nepal also necessitated the abandonment of the old 
constitution of 1990, which was inconsistent with new ideas and ideals. Hence 
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the Interim Constitution of secular of Nepal, promulgated in 15 January 2007 
stated in its Preamble: 
We, the sovereignty and state authority inherent people of Nepal … 
pledging to accomplish the progressive restructuring of the State in 
order to solve the problems existing in the country relating to class, 
ethnicity, region and gender (UNDP-Nepal, 2009). 
It further went on to acknowledge that Nepal is a “… sovereign, secular, inclusive 
and fully democratic State” having a character that is “multiethnic, multilingual, 
multi-religious and multicultural.” It included provisions that the Nepalese 
state’s existing unitary structure would be changed to a “federal democratic 
republic state.” Accordingly, the previous state actors’ attempt to maintain Nepal 
as the “only Hindu kingdom” in the world were shattered as Nepal became “the 
last Hindu kingdom” in 2007. Additionally, many other state-level symbolic and 
structural changes were also made. Since the previous national anthem was 
fundamentally a tribute to the monarchy, it was replaced by a new one that 
celebrated “diversity” of the Nepalese peoples. Acknowledging Nepal’s multi-
religiosity new public holidays were added to recognise the festivals of Janajatis, 
Madheshis, Buddhists, Christians and Muslims, although public holidays still 
overwhelmingly favoured hill-based Hindu festivities. Even the roster of 
national heroes and martyrs who were generally Hindu men from the hills now 
included a few Janajati men and women. To provide a social space where caste-
based discrimination was absent and caste groups could relate to each other 
equally, the government even declared Nepal an “untouchability and caste-
based discrimination free” nation and made any acts of caste-based 
discrimination a legal offence for the first time. 
 The latest Constitution of Nepal promulgated on September 20, 2015 has 
replaced the interim constitution of 2007 while retaining many of the progressive 
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and inclusive provisions already present in the interim one. However, various 
social and political groups are still arguing over the boundaries of delineated 
states/provinces and other citizenship-related issues. The politics of difference 
and recognition that arose with the 1990 democracy only intensified with the 
secular republicanism of 2006. And so as various Janajati and Madheshi groups 
began asserting their different social identities and claims of indigeneity (to be 
Adivasi) after the re-establishment of parliamentary democracy in 1990 to access 
various resources from the policies and programmes of affirmative action, the 
traditional high castes usually referred to as “Bahun-Chhetri” or “Chhetri-
Bahun” also adopted, through the latest Constitution of 2015, the new social 
identity “Khas Arya” (Gellner, 2016). Khas-Arya identity maintains both claims 
to indigeneity and “superior” Aryan civilisation.  Some historians have claimed 
that Chhetris were previously Khasans who had been living in Khas region (Mid 
and Far Western regions of Nepal) almost as long as other Janajati groups 
(Adhikari, 1988; Bista, 1991) Alternatively, Arya culture signifies the millennia-
old Hindu culture.    
 Although everyday lives in Nepal can be affected by the notions of caste-
based ranking, post 1990 with the reinstatement of multi-party parliamentary 
democracy recognising the multiplicity and heterogeneity of Nepalese peoples’ 
castes, ethnicities, cultures and languages (GON, 1990) and with the discourse of 
equality, egalitarianism and social justice during the Maoist Revolution (1996-
2006) Nepalese have entered new socio-cultural and political environments. 
Working in these environments members of previously “medium” to “low” 
ranked social groups are now busy re-writing and re-creating histories and their 
own identities. (Des Chene, 1996; Gellner, 2001; Gurung, 2005; Hangen, 2007, 
2009; Onta, 2006; Schlemmer, 2004; Wimmer, 2008) Likewise, the dominant 
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groups have also forged a new identity in a bid to stress their claims to 
indigeneity and access to political resources.  
 Nepal has come a long way since the time when it was ruled by one person 
on absolute terms, to now embracing inclusive multi-culturalism with more 
democratic egalitarian values (Hachhethu & Gellner, 2010). The discourses of a 
new Nepal have provided the traditionally marginalised groups with 
unprecedented political spaces to overcome marginality of all sorts. 
Conclusion 
Ever since the formation of the nation-state called Nepal, social identities 
such as caste have been constructed and reconstructed by state-actors to relegate 
“the other” to subjugated positions, in order to legitimise their authority to rule. 
The rulers and politically most dominant social groups namely the so called high 
Hindu castes of the hills in Nepal have often used the rhetoric of Hindu ideology 
and Nepalese nationalism to ethnocentrically build pan-Nepal values, customs 
and culture. They successfully did so until the end of the autocratic monarchical 
Panchayat rule. However, as soon as the marginalised were able to attain some 
form of expanded civil and political liberties, they challenged and rejected these 
elite social, cultural and political constructions. Both through the largely urban-
based revolution of 1990 and through the rural-based Maoist revolution, the 
marginalised have fought against the state and its mechanisms with the hope of 
creating a Nepalese society and governance structures which are progressively 
more equal. Towards that end, they have rejected the social identities given by 
the state and have striven to give themselves new names and identities which 
they feel are more dignified. Many caste or ethnic groups now carry these newly 
created identities not with shame but with pride and dignity.  Hence, the former 
Matwalis are now (Adivasi) Janajatis, the former achhyut (untouchables) are the 
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Dalits and former Madhises40 are now Madheshi. But the former “high castes” 
Bahun-Chhetri group have also retaliated by forging themselves the new identity 
of Khas-Arya, thereby preserving their distinction while simultaneously laying 
claim to indigeneity (Gellner, 2016). 
 This modulation of creation and re-creation of social identities and the 
related efforts at undoing marginalisation by some social groups and the 
retention of distinction by others have occurred on various scales and in various 
fields. At the constitutional level, the character of the country is no longer 
homogenously Hindu but is secular, multicultural and multilingual. Although 
the state still retains a few national symbols that represent Hinduism, many such 
symbols have also been dismantled. The macro-political governance system itself 
has metamorphosed from an absolute monarchy, to a parliamentary democracy, 
to a federated inclusive democracy. Even the electorate system has now been 
modified to let various social groups (caste, ethnic groups, women and people 
living in remote districts) be proportionally represented in the parliament and 
government. But equality attained on paper and in the discourses of 
egalitarianism does not necessarily translate easily and readily into equal social 
relations and practices. In their everyday lives peoples can draw from tradition, 
customs, generally accepted ways of doing and being rather from legal 
frameworks. And in the coming chapters I unravel exactly the everyday tensions 
between the status quo and these purported changes. 
 
                                                          
40 Madhise is a perceived as a derogatory term to refer to Madheshi. 
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Chapter 3 
Investigating Development: Bikas Discourses and Their 
Discontents 
The discourse of bikas (development) permeates every walk of life in 
Nepal. Although the word bikas means “improvement”, “growth” it is not simply 
a neologism of modern times. Nanda R. Shrestha contends that its meaning as a 
“status” and as a “goal” to be achieved, gained “currency” only after the 
overthrow of the Ranas in the 1950s (Hachhethu, 2007; N. R. Shrestha, 1997). As 
the nation-state of Nepal undertook the project of “modernisation”, bikas 
emerged as so ubiquitous that it quickly became “one of the most commonly used 
terms in the Nepali vocabulary” (Shrestha, 1993, p. 9). Therefore, it is no wonder 
that even everyday Nepali colloquialisms are replete with bikas. Bikashe mal41 
(developed fertiliser) refers to chemical fertilisers first introduced in the early 
1950s by USAID; bikashe biu (developed seed) signifies hybrid seeds which unlike 
local indigenous seeds are more productive for one generation but cannot 
reproduce because of their inherent sterility; bikashe karyakarta (development 
worker/practitioner); bikashe sanstha (development organisations) and bikaseh 
adda (development office) are some of the bikase terms routinely heard in formal 
and informal conversations. 
 Houses deep in villages or in the heart of town centres stand side by side 
with offices displaying signs like Women’s Development Co-operative, Farmer 
Development NGO, Agriculture Development Office, Livestock Development 
Office, Local Development Office, and the like. Even the capital city of the 
                                                          
41 These chemical fertilizers were termed bikase mal (development-inducing fertilizer) as the 
discourses around development equated them with things more modern and more efficient 
than the local and the indigenous, in this case the organic farmyard manure. Bikase mal is also 
colloquially referred to as Desi Mal as they were imported from India through the 
Madhesh/Terai of Nepal. 
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country, Kathmandu, is full of government, non-government, bilateral and 
multi-lateral offices dedicated to the “development” Nepal. Bikas is present in the 
rhetoric of the Government of Nepal and its development partners both in 
written and spoken words. Bikas not only regularly appears in development 
plans, policies, strategies, and project agreements, but is also a topic of discussion 
in newspapers, television and radio.  
 Bikas is prominent not only in normal times but even in times of disaster. 
So even in the ruins of the disastrous earthquakes of 25 April and 12 May 2015 
which claimed nearly 9,000 lives and injured and displaced many more, Pitamber 
Sharma, former Vice-Chair of the National Planning Commission of Nepal, saw 
opportunities for bikas, when he said, “Bipatko jug ma tekere bikasma fadko marau!  
(Let us leap forward in development on the foundation of distress!).”42 Agreeing 
with Sharma many leaders and masses alike from all walks of life— from political 
parties to civil society to non-resident Nepalese community— voiced the 
desperate need to achieve bikas.  
Yet in its ubiquity, bikas is also elusive. Even after more than sixty years, 
many think that bikas has not been attained. Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, former Prime 
Minister and former Second in Command of the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist Centre), established a new political party with a perennially fresh 
sounding name Naya Shakti Nepal (New Force Nepal) in June 2016 promising that 
the party will make Nepal the most “prosperous and developed” country in 
twenty-five years’ time. Dr. Bhattarai claims that Nepalese people have had 
democratic revolutions through the Jana Yudha (People’s War), Jana Andolan 
(People’s Movement), Madhesh Andolan, Tharu-hut Andolan, Janajati Andolan and 
                                                          
42 Full interview published on May 24, 2015 and accessed on 25 May 2015 from 
http://www.ekantipur.com/np/2072/2/10/full-story/409552.html  
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other andolans, and now it is time for an economic revolution through which 
Nepal will transform into a bikashit (developed) country.43 
 Reflecting on the above narrative it is only logical to ask why, despite 
decades of bikas, do many think that bikas has failed in Nepal? Since bikas’s 
presence has been felt in this country for so long, what is it about its nature that 
makes many feel that it has not been realised? And, despite this why do national 
leaders keep promising to deliver it? These questions, full of contradictions, are 
what I seek to answer in this chapter.  
 In order to answer these questions, I first engage critically with the 
scholarship on bikas and its international counterpart “development”. Depending 
on the context I alternately use bikas or development to mean nearly the same 
thing. While “development” shall refer to a particular concept that global 
economic and political institutions have forwarded, bikas shall refer to its local 
Nepalese interpretations. I argued in the previous chapter that Nepalese state-
managers’ hegemonic efforts at organising and constructing Nepalese society 
and Nepalese identity in ways that favoured and privileged high-caste Hindus, 
particularly of the hills, have consistently been challenged and resisted by 
marginalised groups through various andolans. In this chapter, I argue how the 
Nepalese state’s efforts at implementing the seemingly high-sounding bikas have 
failed to meet the aspirations and expectations of many, especially the 
marginalised.  
 The concept of bikas, while reflecting much of the global discourse of 
“development”, has its own “genealogy”, a term explained by Foucault: 
… combination of erudite knowledge and what people know … 
coupling together of scholarly erudition and local memories, which 
                                                          
43 http://nayashaktinepal.org 
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allows us to constitute a historical knowledge of struggles and to 
make use of that knowledge in contemporary tactics (Foucault, 2003, 
p. 8). 
It is outside the scope of this chapter to extensively survey theories of 
development and their critiques (Greig, Hulme, & Turner, 2007; Larraín, 1989; 
Peet & Hartwick, 1999; Preston, 1982; Ziai, 2007) but I hope to locate bikas 
discourses within these theories while attempting to theorise bikas itself.  
Bikas: The Rhetoric 
Most academics agree that bikas entered Nepal in the 1950s following the 
downfall of the Ranas. Although late compared to other countries, the Ranas did 
abolish the practice of sati44 in 1920 and slavery45 in 1924. It could perhaps be said 
that bikas began during this period, if bikas is understood as progress not only in 
economic and material terms but in the social as well (Whyte, 1998). On the 
material front the Ranas had also constructed some all-weather road-networks, 
laid a few telephone pipe-lines, supplied clean drinking water to the Kathmandu 
Valley and established circular granaries at strategic locations for food security 
purposes. Additionally, they drew up a development plan and initiated the 
negotiation of the Point Four46 Agreement with the United States of America 
                                                          
44 The practice of Sati, wherein widows immolate themselves on their husbands’ pyres, had 
already been terminated in 1829 in India, more than 90 years before its termination in Nepal. 
45 Of the total 5.6 million Nepalese people in 1924, only 51,419 (0.01%) were slaves and Chandra 
Shumsher, the then Rana Prime Minister had paid 15% of the kingdom’s annual revenue to 
15,719 slave owners for compensation (Sever, 1993; p. 275-76) p 275, 276). Comparatively Britain 
and the USA had already been abolished slavery about hundred years before Nepal did: Britain 
in 1833 in Britain and USA in 1865. 
46 Point Four Programme was so named because it was the fourth point of US President Harry 
S. Truman’s 1949 inaugural address explicating U.S. policy of technical assistance and economic 
aid to underdeveloped countries, which many argue was the first historic point in time for the 
creation of “underdeveloped” and “developed” nations (Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/466343/Point-Four-Program). 
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(USA) (Mihaly, 1965). But this remained at the level of rhetoric and was never 
implemented.  
 Whatever small socio-economic reforms the Ranas made were 
overwhelmingly overshadowed by their political atrocities and the material 
excesses of their lifestyles. While their children attended the Darbar (Palace) 
School, the general masses were largely denied education. When they were not 
busy scheming against each other to access and preserve their political power, 
they were either enjoying themselves in the harems of their magnificent 
European-style palaces, or were riding around in Rolls Royce cars which had 
been carried into Kathmandu valley on the back of porters (mainly of 
“enslavable” Tamang ethnic group) (Raj, 1979; Whelpton, 2005). Consequently, 
when the Nepalese people got tired of paying taxes to fund the Rana’s 
overindulgences and permanently removed them from power, Nepal was left 
with little physical infrastructure, education or health facilities, and almost non-
existent “educated” human resources. About 98 percent of Nepal’s eight million 
people at the time were illiterate, the entire country had only 300 college 
graduates (Isaacson, Skerry, Moran, & Kalavan, 2001, p. 6) and could thus 
provide only one doctor per half million of its population (Raj, 1979, p. 8).  
After the feudalistic Ranas— who were never really interested in the 
welfare of the masses— were toppled the Nepalese people assumed that the new 
democratic government would build roads, distribute land to the tillers, bring 
drinking water to their homes, light their houses, provide modern medical 
facilities, and create opportunities for their children to be educated (Shaha, 1990). 
But the political parties forming the democratically elected governments that 
assumed power after the Ranas were so busy squabbling with each other that 
little bikas was happening.  King Mahendra rode on the “frustrated sentiments” 
of the masses to sack the “foreign” parliamentarian democracy and introduced 
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his “Nepali soil suited” Panchayat democracy for delivering bikas (Adhikary, 
1995; Onta, 1996).47  
 Since Nepal had virtually no modern systems of governance and 
structures of physical infrastructure until the end of the Rana rule, the Panchayat 
regime had an opportunity to develop these. Such a situation, Tatsuro Fujikura 
argues, provided a “textbook case” of a “pristine primitive society” suitable for 
“the hand of development planning” (Fujikura, 2001, p. 285). And so Mahendra 
utilised the Planning Board (now National Planning Commission) set up in 1955 
to manage bikas (Pant, 1965). Guided by liberal political philosophy and heavily 
influenced by the modernisation principles of W. W. Rostow (Rostow, 1990) and 
W. Arthur Lewis (Lewis, 1954) Mahendra had the support of many Western 
countries who pledged aid (technological, financial, and advisory) to improve 
Nepal’s “underdeveloped” status.48  Mahendra believed that Nepal could 
                                                          
47 Mahendra had launched his party-less authoritarian Panchayat system of governance after 
having the most influential political leaders arrested and put behind bars, or exiled in India. 
Except for India, the global and regional powers were happy to consider Mahendra’s coup to be 
an “internal matter” since both the democratic and communist aspirations of certain segments 
of the Nepali society had been successfully supressed (Khadka, 1991, 1997; Mihaly, 1965; 
Mojumdar, 1973).  
48 Nepal, like many other former colonies, were for the first time collectively referred to as 
“underdeveloped countries” by the President of the USA, Harry Truman in his inaugural 
speech in 1949. World War II had ended and an ideological Cold War had begun between a 
group of capitalistic nations (differently named as the First World, Western World, Developed 
Countries or the Global North) led by the USA and the communist bloc (variously named as the 
Second World or the Eastern Bloc) led by the then United Soviet Republic of Russia (USSR). The 
Nepalese political elite opted not to join the Cold War and remained “neutral” by joining the 
Non-Aligned Movement led by India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (Baral, 2012). But 
Nepal’s strategic location between two regional powers, democratic India and communist 
China, meant that it received continuous attention from the global powers, the USA and the 
USSR. These powers hastened to utilise various forms of aid to “modernise” and “develop” 
Nepal, projects that concealed the real motive of undermining each other’s influence in the 
region. The US made the first move by launching the “Village Development Program” in 1952 
(Fujikura, 2013; Mihaly, 1965; N. R. Shrestha, 1993). India quickly became second providing 
assistance for road construction, and was followed by China, which in 1956 granted Nepal US$ 
4.2 million cash (plus US$ 8.4 million worth commodities) which Nepal could utilise entirely 
according to its own discretion (Mihaly, 1965, p. 96). As a matter of fact, India, China, and USA 
(in descending order of financial contribution) actually financed 56% of the total budget of the 
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develop according to an evolutionary paradigm and attain a higher status of 
development if capital, technology and the right values were transferred to it 
from “developed countries”(Escobar, 1995, 2007). Consequently, with support 
from other countries and using this techno-rational approach Mahendra claimed 
he was going to make Nepal bikashit (developed). To supply bikas, Mahendra also 
infused bikase discourses with discourses of nationalism. The national songs, 
school textbooks, and political rhetoric tried to condition Nepalese people to see 
“true” Nepalese citizenship as obediently working with the government to 
unleash the “fountain” of development (bikasko mul phutaau) (Adhikary, 1995).  
 With the intent of modernising land-tenure systems he converted 
remaining systems of tax-free land tenure such as Rakam/Bekh and Kipat into the 
Raikar system in 1963 and 1964. This meant that only the state could directly 
collect revenues from such lands (Karan, Ishii, Kobayashi, & Pauer, 1994;  Regmi, 
1963, 1976; Wily, Chapagain, & Sharma, 2008).49 Accompanying these land-
reform programmes and pre-occupied with the discourse of bikas as economic 
growth, Mahendra also re-distributed populations from the hills, which then had 
high human-land ratios and less productive lands, to the southern plains 
(Madhesh, Terai). The plains had been made hospitable after the “eradication” of 
malaria and had a relatively low human-land ratio with more productive fertile 
lands, which he hoped would increase agricultural production and feed the 
growing Nepalese population (Kansakar, 1985). Thousands of state-aided 
families resettled from the hills to Madhesh during this time, while thousands 
more voluntarily migrated clearing tracts of forests for residential and farming 
                                                          
first five-year development plan (1956 – 1961) (Pant, 1965, p. 78). The Soviets also did not delay 
completing the construction of a fully equipped fifty-bed hospital in Kathmandu. The geo-
politics of foreign aid in Nepal is dealt in much greater detail in works of other scholars (Jha, 
2014; Khadka, 1991, 1997; Mihaly, 1965; Panday & Tamang, 2011; Sharma, 2014).  
49 The Nepalese state had already abolished Jagir, Birta, and Rajya, land tenure systems in 1952, 
1959, and 1961 respectively (Zaman, 1973). 
 69 
purposes (N. R. Shrestha, 1990). The agrarian sector equipped with new fertile 
lands and human resources also introduced for the first time modern farming 
techniques like farm mechanisation, chemical fertilisers (bikase mal), high-
yielding improved seeds (bikase biu) and livestock breeds, which drastically 
improved agricultural production and productivity (Isaacson, et al., 2001).  
 With so much aid flowing into Nepal and so many areas for intervention, 
some bikas was felt during Mahendra’s and later Birendra’s (Mahendra’s son) 
Panchayat democracy (1962-1990). The literacy level of five% in 1950s improved 
to 40% by 1991, infant mortality rate dropped from 20 to 10% in the same period 
due to the extension of health services and improved knowledge of basic 
sanitation (Whelpton, 2005, p. 137). A road network of only 276 kilometres at the 
end of the Rana rule was expanded to 7330 kilometres by the end of 1990 
connecting many previously unconnected districts (Whelpton, 2005, p. 137). 
Nepal had no airport until 1949 ( Raj, 1979, p. 99) but by 1990 it boasted tens of 
them (Isaacson, et al., 2001). 
 Yet such bikase (bikas-related) statistics were overshowed by the lack of 
bikas in other fields: unequal economic growth and retribution, and widespread 
political and social repression. King, royals, political and bureaucratic elite were 
looting the country by seeking rents from state-managed companies (five-star 
hotels, production factories, airlines companies, etc.) and lands such as forests, 
using corrupt and nepotistic strategies (Bista, 1991). Consequently, green forests 
perceived to be Nepal’s wealth (Hariyo ban, Nepalko dhan) speedily depleted. But 
poverty persisted and in general Nepalese felt that they were not catching up 
with the rest of the world as promised (Shakya, 2002, 2012). This 
underachievement by bikas was even made worse when surrounded by poor 
masses the Nepalese monarchs were known as gareeb desh ko dhani raja (rich king 
of poor country) (Shakya, 2002, 2012). Nepal had not made much progress in the 
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30 years of Panchayat’s promise of delivering bikas as noted by the Eight Plan, 
the first plan of the democratic government post 1990: 
… the average annual growth in GDP was 3.4 precent whereas the 
growth in per capita income was a mere 0.8 percent. In absolute 
terms, the per capita income reached Rs. 1,605 in 1989/90 as against 
Rs. 1,304 in 1964/65. Thus, in a period of 26 years, the increase in per 
capita income was merely Rs. 301 at 1974/75 prices. As a result of the 
low growth rate in per capita income, Nepal happened to stand low 
even among the poorest nations of the world (GON, 1992, p. 1) 
Even this poor economic growth showed geographic and regional inequalities. 
In 1989 the poverty rate in rural areas at 40% was much higher than in urban 
areas where it stood at only 15% (Panday, 1999, p. 73). Similarly, Far Western 
Nepal had a much higher poverty rate of 65% compared to Central Nepal at 34% 
(Panday, 1999, p. 74). Rishikesh Shaha also notes poor economic performances 
between 1960 and 1982 in which Nepal was the only the country in South Asia to 
record an average negative growth rate, that of -0.1% (Shaha, 1990, p. 47). 
 Theodore Riccardi Jnr, Emeritus Professor of Indology at Columbia 
University and a keen observer of Nepal’s politics and bikas says similar things, 
in a more direct and dramatic fashion, to Thomas Bell in their conversation about 
bikas in Nepal: 
The Panchayat did nothing for this country. The Panchayat was a 
fraud. The programme was so … so … what shall we say? Inelegant. 
So clearly meant to keep power in the hands of those who already 
had it, and the most outrageous thing is that from the time of the 
victory of Prithvi Narayan Shah over this country to King Mahendra 
the government did nothing, nothing, to change the lives of these 
people. Nothing! (Bell, 2014, p. 278 - original emphasis) 
These poor economic performances are not the only reason why many think 
that bikas failed in Nepal during the Panchayat democracy. Politically a lot of 
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Nepalese thought that to enjoy political freedom and civic liberties, including the 
right to free speech were also part of bikas, and thus became highly frustrated. 
Mahendra’s rhetoric of bikas was so tied to nationalism, that anyone challenging 
the ideas and practices of bikas was thought to be not only bikas-virodhi (anti-
development) but also a desh-virodhi (anti-national). This effectively controlled 
people’s freedom while projecting an image of the Panchayat governance system 
as a great benefactor (Adhikary, 1995). Any political dissenter could easily be 
imprisoned during the Panchayat regime (Adhikary, 1995). It was as if Panchayat 
democracy was trying to deliver bikas in an environment of “cowardice” (Bell, 
2014, p. 277). 
 Panchayat democracy also alienated many marginalised communities 
such as Dalits, Janajatis and Madheshis. The Panchayat regime’s intention to 
“homogenise” and “assimilate” Nepalese populations by propagating a 
discourse of an “ethnicity-less” mono-cultural Hindu Nepalese society was 
ultimately not a rhetoric intended to deliver bikas but to legitimise the Hindu 
monarch’s “divine” status to rule (Hachhethu, 2007). During this period, the state 
did not allow the collection of ethnicity-based or caste-based statistics (Bista, 
1991). An attempt to record such statistics by Gopal Gurung, a Janajati man, in 
his book “Hidden Facts in Nepali Politics” (Gurung, 1985) resulted in the 
government imprisoning him in 1988 (Gellner, 2007a). 
 Nepalese people increasingly imagined bikas not only in terms of its 
materiality (with which they were also totally dissatisfied with as Panchayat 
government had delivered little infrastructure) but also in terms of social and 
political freedoms. In light of these considerations they saw Panchayat 
democracy as a failure of bikas. Riccardi Jnr assessed Panchayat’s bikas as a fraud, 
a fake (Bell, 2014). Overall, the Panchayat period (1962-1990) was not a period for 
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delivering bikas, it was a project of ethnocentric monolithic hill-based Hindu 
nationalism aimed at consolidating the power of the already powerful.   
Bikas: The Divisive, the Biased 
The democratic governments newly formed after the downfall of the 
Panchayat system in 1990 promised to deliver bikas not led by the big hands of 
the state, but by the invisible hand of the market, through what David Harvey 
would call “neo-liberalism” (Harvey, 2005). So, while the government provided 
all sorts of political and civil freedoms, it started de-regulating the economy by 
privatising many previously government-owned companies and corporations 
and loosening barriers to trade and commerce (Shakya, 2002, 2012). Although 
Nepal had already participated in a structural adjustment programme in 1985/86, 
the pursuance of neo-liberal policies was accelerated and intensified in Nepal 
after 1990 (Shakya, 2002, 2012). Obediently taking the advice of the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Nepalese state aggressively began 
cutting back on its own bureaucratic reach and retracted its patronising stance to 
let the free market do more to realise economic growth in the name of bikas 
(Rankin, 2001, 2004).  
 This neo-liberal discourse of bikas, which sought to let the “efficient” 
private sector lead the way, resulted in the privitisation or complete dissolution 
of many state-owned companies. Subsidies to provide fertiliser and natural fuels 
were removed, however some were later restored. State-owned companies such 
as Agriculture Input Co-operation which supplied subsidised agriculture inputs 
such as chemical fertilisers, seeds and equipment were dismantled, and given 
over to private ownership with the belief that the “free” markets and the private 
sectors would efficiently deliver bikas. Sectors such as airlines, finance companies, 
banking, insurance and hydro-power were partially or fully privatised, and a 
 73 
number of private companies began to compete in these economic sectors like 
never before (Shakya, 2002). The first plan of the Nepalese government after 
regaining parliamentary democracy, the Eight Plan (1992-97) accepted the 
private sector, community and non-government organisations (NGOs) as the 
powerful agents of bikas capable of transforming rural areas in Nepal and 
increase economic growth: 
It is evident that the private and non-government organisations are 
more effective in carrying out development programmes from the 
view point of flexibility, cost-effectiveness and initiative. In the 
present democratic context, His Majesty’s Government will seek to 
encourage the participation of private, community or other non-
government organisations in rural development works. The 
government will formulate appropriate rules and regulations and 
create a conducive environment in order to increase the participation 
of private, community and non-government organisations (GON, 
1992, p. 390). 
This adoption of neo-liberal policies whereby the state takes a back seat operating 
only as a regulator and law-enforcer, meant that rural areas— where the private 
sector was not well developed or did not identify any opportunities for profit-
making—were not supported by the state but were supposed to be aided by the 
“third” sector: co-operatives and non-government organisations (NGOs) 
(Sugden, 2009). Master Plans and guiding documents such as The Eight Plan 
(1992-97) and the Agriculture Perspective Plan (1995-2015) stated that the role of 
state was to provide only a conducive environment, with minimal interference 
so that the private sector, co-ops and NGOs could “freely” function to 
commercialise the agriculture sector and transform the rural economy from a site 
of impoverishment to one of wealth (GON, 1992, 1995; Sugden, 2009).  
 Consequently, in addition to bikashe sarkari adda (development-oriented 
government bodies) massive numbers of co-ops and NGOs became the new 
 74 
agents, translators and brokers of bikas all over Nepal (D. Lewis & Mosse, 2006). 
These organisations tried to and implement development projects, applying the 
buzzword-like concepts “participatory”, “bottom-up” and the like (Cornwall & 
Brock, 2005). Consequently, the number of NGOs rapidly increased from 144 in 
1990 to about 25,000 in 2010 sprawling all over the country, although many of 
them ceased to exist after a few years of operation.  These NGOs were not only 
implementing development programmes such as helping the rural (poor) to 
construct pit latrines, kitchen gardens, but were also sometimes being used as 
bharti kendra (employment centres) by political parties to provide employment 
opportunities to their party supporters (Mishra, 1997).  
 Like the Panchayat period the neo-liberal era after 1990 did see some 
progress in bikas. In a country where motorable road was virtually non-existent 
before 1950, by 2014 70,000 kms of road network sprawled throughout the 
country and only two districts remained to be linked by road (GoN, 2016a). To 
provide better health services, the number of hospitals jumped from 111 in 1990 
to more than 500 in 2012, including private hospitals, with more than 800 health 
posts (GoN, 2016a). These extended health facilities, coupled with better services 
reduced the infant mortality rate, per 1,000 live births, from 108 in 1990 to 46 in 
2013, and the under-five mortality rate, per 1,000 live births, from 162 to 61 in 
same period (GON, 2013a, p. 39). Due to increased formal and informal education 
facilities the literacy level itself rose from 40% in 1990 to 65.9% in 2011 (GON, 
1992, 2016a). There was some progress also in the state’s efforts at alleviating 
poverty, the percentage of population below the national poverty line decreased 
from 42 in 1990 to 23.82 in 2013 (GON & UNCTN, 2013, p. 9). The productivity 
measured in tonnes per hectare increased from 0.9 in 1990 to 1.14 in 2013 for 
agronomic crops, and from 0.794 to 1.07 for pulse crops in the same period (GON, 
2013c). 
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 Despite such achievements in bikas, massive inequalities were registered 
across caste, ethnicity, gender and geographic lines. The traditional “high-castes” 
were still over-represented in political and social leadership roles (Lawoti, 2007, 
2010c). They still enjoyed the longest life, highest income, highest human 
development index (HDI) highest literacy rates and so on compared to Janajati 
and Dalits (Figure 4). In terms of gender, men did much better than women in 
most development indicators (Figure 5) as women continued to suffer from 
marginalisation (Tamang, 2009, 2011).  
Figure 4 Human Development by caste and ethnicity in 1996                                    
Source: [UNDP-Nepal, 1998, Annex 3.7]  
Caste/Ethnicity Life 
expectancy 
Adult literacy 
rate (%) 
Per Capita 
Income (NRs.) 
HDI 
Nepal 55.0 36.72 7,673 0.325 
Bahun 60.8 58.00 9,921 0.441 
Janajati 53.0 35.20 6,607 0.299 
Dalit 50.3 23.80 4,940 0.239 
 
Figure 5 Human Development by gender in 1996                                                                
Source: [UNDP-Nepal, 1998, Annexes 3.10 & 3.12] 
Human 
development 
indicator 
Men Women 
Life expectancy 55.00 52.40 
Adult literacy (%) 54.32 21.33 
Seats held in 
parliament 
96.59 3.41 
Professional and 
technical workers 
90.70 9.30 
 
 Yet people in the rural areas (ridiculed as pakhe, gaule)50 were never given 
much agency and largely remained “objects” that needed to be “developed” 
(Pigg, 1992, 1993; N. Shrestha, 1995; N. R. Shrestha, 1997). Cities and urban areas 
                                                          
50 Around 80% of the Nepalese people live in rural areas (Dahal, 2014). 
 76 
such as Kathmandu, Pokhara, Biratnagar, Nepalgung, and Bhairahawa which 
had been receiving “disproportionately higher measures of public utility and 
services such as electricity, piped water” (Shaha, 1990, p. 48) and the like since 
the Panchayat era continued receiving disproportionate assistance. This further 
deprived the peoples of the rural and more remote areas from receiving facilities 
and services, resulting in increasingly inequality in bikas outcomes for rural and 
urban areas (Figure 6).  
Figure 6 Human Development by geography in 1996                                                                
Source: [UNDP-Nepal, 1998, Annex 3.5] 
Region Life 
expectancy 
Adult literacy 
rate (%) 
Per Capita 
Income (NRs.) 
HDI 
Nepal 55.00 36.72 7,673 0.325 
Urban 63.20 63.50 15,900 0.518 
Rural 53.70 34.50 7,072 0.306 
 
 Due to ineffective and inequitable food distribution systems, about 35% of 
the population was undernourished in late 1990s (GON, 2011/12, 2014). This was 
worsened by the fact that about 6% of population did not own enough land to 
even construct a shelter and around 20% of the population did not own any land 
to cultivate (Deuja, 2008; p. 245). Caste and ethnicity based inequalities were stark 
as Dalits and Janajatis overwhelmingly comprised both groups of landless and 
near-landless. But the issue of providing a decent means of living to these 
landless and land-poor groups by redistributing lands, a major bikase issue since 
the 1950s, was never resolved as democracy post 1990 failed to deliver any 
successful land reform programmes. This frustrated many landless and near 
landless peoples.  
 Many populations, especially the members of indigenous (Adivasi) and 
Janajati groups, actually had their livelihoods threatened in the name of bikas. 
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Instead of benefiting through employment opportunities and better living 
conditions in bikase projects, they found themselves the “victims” of bikas. 
Displaced from their native villages to make space for the construction of mega-
hydrodams or bio-diversity and wildlife conservation national parks, these 
groups were not adequately and properly compensated for their unique social, 
cultural, and economic needs (Lord, 2014; McLean & Straede, 2003; Tauli-
Corpuz, 2010). For them bikas was not bikas, bikas was in fact binas (destruction).  
 Neo-liberal bikas post 1990 led by the democratically elected governments 
with advice from the global and regional financial institutions like the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank disregarded many traditionally 
marginalised social groups such as Janajatis, Madheshis, Dalits, rural 
populations and women, all of whom were excluded them from the political, 
cultural, and economic processes of bikas. Bikas post 1990 just like post 1951 not 
only created political instability but also increased unemployment, poverty and 
rural-urban inequality (Gellner, 2003, 2007a; Lawoti, 2010c; Muni, 2010; Shakya, 
2002; Sharma, 2006a, 2006b; Thapa, 2002, 2004, 2012). This unequal sharing of 
bikase fruits across caste, ethnicity, gender and geography was one of the major 
reasons marginalised and disgruntled groups joined the Maoist Revolution, 
believing their alternative strategies would produce equalities.  
 Post 2006 when Nepal entered a politically and socially new space and 
time, as a secular, federal and republic, political leaders, parties, governments of 
Nepal, and multitudes of aid partners continued to remain in the business of 
developing a new Nepal that would one day be bikashit.  
Bikas: Locating the Proximate Causes of its Failure 
Numerous scholars have tried to theorise the failure of bikas in the 
Nepalese case. They, however, have not proposed a Nepal-specific solution but 
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have rather followed the lead of the international scholars to apply their models 
to the Nepalese case. For instance, Piers Blaikie, John Cameron and David 
Seddon have applied the Core-Periphery Theory advocated by Hans Singer, Raul 
Prebish, Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin.51 
Accordingly, they treat India as the centre and Nepal as the periphery, and West 
Nepal as the periphery and Kathmandu the centre to argue that Nepal’s 
(economic) dependency on India since the mid-19th century and the similar 
dependency by West Nepal on Kathmandu is the cause of underdevelopment in 
Nepal (Blaikie, Cameron, & Seddon, 1980). Jagannath Adhikari has used the 
same approach to explain the failure of bikas in the form of food insecurity in 
Karnali area (J. Adhikari, 2008).  
 Yet Dor Bahadur Bista rejects such economistic arguments and following 
the approach taken by Max Weber52, Bista suggests that the rigid hierarchical 
Hindu caste system has been detrimental to attaining bikas. According to this 
system people believed in fatalism, where “one has no personal control over 
one’s life circumstances, which are determined through a divine or powerful 
                                                          
51According to core-periphery theory, modernisation theory is tainted with ethnocentrism 
which accords an unwarranted higher position to Western values and undermines the unequal 
international power-relations while neglecting the pervasive inequalities between and within 
countries (Black, 1991; Greig, et al., 2007; Isbister, 1991). It further proposes that the failure of 
“development” is not due to insufficient capital, technological transfer or misplaced cultural 
values as modernisation theorists suggested, but rather is due to the continuation of unequal 
power relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries (Amin, 1978; Frank, 
1967; Wallerstein, 1979). Therefore, even after the collapse of colonisation, the 
underdevelopment of the former colonies continues because the terms of trade between “former 
colonial powers (developed)” and “former colonies (underdeveloped)” are biased towards the 
former: the less developed (periphery) are selling cheap primary products to the more 
developed nations (core/centre) which sell them back the more expensive processed or products 
(Escobar, 2007). This, according to core-periphery theory meant that developed countries 
continue to get richer and the poor ones even poorer. The solution out of this quagmire is to 
sever this unequal trade relation, and pursue economic relations only between less developed 
countries.  
52 In 1905 Max Weber linked religion to capitalism to suggest that Protestant work ethic led to 
the development of the spirit of capitalism (Weber, 1992). 
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external agency” (Bista, 1991, p. 4). These beliefs justified practices such as chakari 
(sycophancy): pleasing powerful people (like worshipping gods) in order to 
receive rewards without hard work. Practicing work ethics that value hard work 
and reject the fatalistic sycophantic mind-set, Bista argues, would make Nepal 
bikashit (developed). 
 A nationally well-known development economist and a diplomat, 
Devendra Raj Panday has his own views on the subject.  In his aptly titled book, 
“Nepal’s Failed Development: Reflections on the mission and the maladies” he 
suggests that it was not the core-dependency theory, nor was it cultural values 
like fatalism and chakari (sycophancy) as Bista suggested, but rather the poor 
governance practices of rampant corruption and the donor community’s 
excessive pre-occupation with “aid conditionality” that are the real causes of 
Nepal’s failed development (Panday, 1999). Providing different arguments using 
different theoretical approaches, Blackie, Bista, and Panday all yearn for bikas, 
and are only debating the causes and means to achieve it.  
 However, Nanda R. Shrestha for one dislikes bikas, especially the kind that 
has been aided by international partners. In doing so he closely aligns his views 
with “post-development”, “beyond development” or “anti-development” 
theories (Escobar, 2007). Collectively these theories propose that the rise of global 
poverty, inequality and environmental damage are attributable to development 
which in fact is merely another form of the cultural hegemony of the West 
imposing “homogenising materialist values”, idealising “rational-scientific 
power” to create “unprecedented levels of environmental destruction” (D. Lewis, 
2005, p. 475, 476)53. Nanda R. Shrestha, therefore, sees bikas as the continuation of 
                                                          
53 Limited by space I mention only the most eminent academics with similar voices (in no 
specific order) being Wolfgang Sachs, Ivan Illich, Gustavo Esteva, Gilbert Rist, Arturo Escobar, 
Ashis Nandy, Majid Rahnema and Vandana Shiva. 
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the ethnocentric projection of European colonialism, which only increased 
inequalities and created rigid dichotomies such as rural/urban, 
illiterate/educated, manual labour/non-manual labour, domestic/import wherein 
the former is to be “developed (bikashit)” into the latter (Shrestha, 1993, 1997). 
Shrestha does not argue that the past feudal-religious tyrannical heritages (such 
as the Rana regime or Panchayat system) be restored but seeks to “free ourselves 
from the trappings of Westernised development fetishism” for more self-reliant 
indigenous economic systems (Shrestha, 1995, p. 277 ): 
Everywhere there is social and moral disintegration … I still firmly 
believe that the best path for Nepal, under these circumstances, is a 
Gandhian vision of non-violent change and pursuit of simple and 
self-reliant development … But none of this will be possible unless 
foreign aid is removed first. It has to go, for it is not designed to 
serve Nepal and its masses irrespective of its claims … As much as I 
believe in simple and self-reliant development and in a non-violent 
path to societal change, I do not foresee much hope for them to 
materialise under the Westernised development ideology that grips 
Nepal, that its ruling elites have adopted as their new religion 
(Shrestha, 1997, pp. 212-213). 
Theodore Riccardi Jnr., also suggests the same thing when he says the following 
to Thomas Bell in a conversation between them on bikas in Nepal:   
Where were these aid givers coming from? What the hell did they 
know about this place when they got here? Nothing. They could not 
speak one word of the language. They thought they were right on 
everything … But all the [bikas] stuff - [King] Mahendra was reading 
this, Mahendra reading that. And all these blueprints [of bikas] for 
the future being handed to him, or handed to somebody. This was all 
a way of making the West think that Nepal, or countries like Nepal, 
would do what they wanted them to do (Bell, 2014, pp. 277-278 - 
original emphasis). 
 Yet, Jan Nederveen Pieterse argues that such “post-development/anti-
development” theorising while it may articulate meaningful sensibilities, often 
 81 
lacks concrete future plan (Pieterse, 1998). And so, to Shrestha’s and Riccardi’s 
dislike, foreign aid did not stop flowing into Nepal nor did the Nepalese people 
choose a non-violent path to societal change. The Maoists actually capitalised on 
the frustrations and resentment of the traditionally marginalised—who 
continued feeling excluded from the processes of bikas even after the 1990 
democracy— to launch a bloody war against the state (Thapa, 2012).  
 Yet even during the Maoist Revolution, people were longing for bikas. 
They desired the war to stop as soon as it could, and once shanti (peace) prevailed, 
to get on with the job of acquiring bikas. In her ethnography of women in the 
Gorkha district – a Maoist stronghold of the time - during the Maoist Revolution, 
Lauren Leve writes: 
When I asked women what they hoped to see happen in their 
communities in upcoming years, the number two answer-after 
"peace"-was development [bikas] … almost everyone expressed the 
desire to see roads, bridges, electricity, schools, and hospitals and 
more income-generating activities come to their area. At least in the 
language game that we played together, no one challenged the 
modernisation ideal. On some level, all of this is simply obvious. Just 
as one doesn't need elaborate social theory to explain why women 
who work twelve-hour days might wish to lead an easier life, it 
doesn't take much imagination to understand why farmers in an 
inaccessible rural district might want their children to have access to 
a modern hospital. Who wouldn’t? (Leve, 2007, pp. 158-159) 
And so, after the peaceful ending of the bloody Maoist revolution and the 
placement of inclusive political framework through Constitutions of 2006 and 
2015, the government of Nepal and its major development partners did not give 
up pursuing bikas and its “modernisation ideals” (Leve, 2007, p. 159). 
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Bikas: Still an Unfinished Agenda 
Perhaps it is because of the failures of development the world over that 
Wolfgang Sachs wrote more than twenty years ago: “The last forty years can be 
called the age of development. This epoch is coming to an end. The time is ripe 
to write its obituary” (Sachs, 1992, p. 16). However, development (bikas) is very 
much alive in Nepal; it “continues to survive” (Rist, 2008, p. 257). Even after more 
than sixty years of pursuing it, the constant failure to attain bikas has only made 
it more palpable in its absence. The “obsession with bikas” in Nepal that Timothy 
Whyte (Whyte, 1998, p. 320) observed in the 1990s, endures.  
 The lure of the ideal of modernisation remains in the minds of Nepal’s 
national planners. Despite all the criticisms of Maoists and post-structuralists 
(Escobar, 2007; Ziai, 2007), the Nepalese planning elite still embraces the 
modernisation ideal. The National Planning Commission, the top national 
government body, which co-ordinates all the agencies and efforts at 
“developing” Nepal floods its website with slogans such as “policy reforms for 
growth take-off”, “connecting communities with markets”, “entrepreneurial 
farmers, productive farms”, “building infrastructure, creating jobs”, and “gender 
equality with conscious, empowered women” (GON, 2016c). The planning elite 
dreams of graduating from the least developed status to middle-income country 
by 2030. Envisioning Nepal 2030 states:  
Nepal also aims to graduate from the LDC status by 2022, achieve the 
SDGs, and become a middle–income country by 2030. This is, therefore, 
an opportune moment to embark on formulating a long–term 
development vision and an implementable strategy aimed at 
achieving socio–economic transformation of the country (GON, 
2016b, p. xi - my emphasis) 
However, this “envisioning” strangely juxtaposes the pristine-looking 
village located in the serene mountains untouched by “bikas” with the symbols 
 83 
of modernity such tall modern buildings, mechanised agriculture, and industrial 
factories supplied with power generated by eco-friendly wind-mills and electric 
grids (Figure 7). This juxtaposition symbolises the unintentionally confused but 
continued obsession with bikas in Nepal. 
Figure 7 Cover of Government of Nepal's "Envisioning Nepal 2030" 
 
In order to address the criticism that bikas was urban-biased, poor-
neglecting, non-inclusive (of caste, ethnicity and gender) and sometimes anti-
democratic as in the case of Panchayat regime, bikas has now taken a discursive 
twist to accommodate these criticisms by inserting buzz-words like 
“participation”, “empowerment”, “inclusion”, “sustainability”, “equitable” and 
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so on in its discourses (Cornwall & Brock, 2005). While there were some “targeted 
programmes” to link traditionally marginalised groups to markets for increased 
income-generating opportunities as per the government plans published 
between 1990 and 2006, after 2006 in the new political and social environment the 
inclusion of such communities was explicitly spelt out in the preface of the 
Government of Nepal’s Three Year Interim Plan (2007/08 – 2009/10): 
Special attention has been given to women, Dalit, Adivasi, Janajati, 
the Madheshi community, low-income groups, and extremely 
remote areas including Karnali, which so far have been excluded 
from the economic, social and regional development processes of the 
country (GON, 2007, p. 5 ) … lay a foundation for a Prosperous, 
Modern and Just Nepal (GON, 2007, p. 6 - original emphasis). 
Unlike previous plans, the national development plans since 2006 have 
included expanded chapters on “Inclusive Development” and pioneer 
programmes for affirmative action in different spheres of the economy and 
governance.54  
Accordingly, Envisioning Nepal 2030 also asserts:   
Nepal has adopted a new Constitution that enshrines the democratic 
and fundamental rights of its people. The focus is now on empowering 
the people and ensuring higher, sustainable and equitable growth 
(GON, 2016b, p. xi - my emphasis). 
While the sectoral Agricultural Development Strategy (ADS) (2015-2035) of 
the Government of Nepal for developing agriculture in Nepal regards markets 
as the supreme mechanism, in accordance with the discourses of neo-liberal bikas, 
to encourage competition for agricultural commercialisation and growth, it 
                                                          
54 In order not to deprive totally deprive the members of “high-caste” Bahun Chhetri 
communities from opportunities created by affirmative action, the Fourteenth Plan (2016/17 – 
2019/20) also included economically poor members of Khas Arya (neologism for Bahun Chhetri) 
group in the list of the marginalised excluded groups. 
 85 
strives to accommodate the aspirations of the poor, the marginalised and the 
neglected by utilising words like “inclusiveness” and “sustainability”: 
In order to achieve the vision the ADS will accelerate agricultural 
sector growth through four strategic components including 
governance, productivity, profitable commercialisation, and 
competitiveness while promoting inclusiveness (both social and 
geographic), sustainability (both natural resources and economic), 
development of private sector and cooperative sector, and 
connectivity to market infrastructure (e.g. agricultural roads, 
collection centres, packing houses, market centres), information 
infrastructure and ICT, and power infrastructure (e.g. rural 
electrification, renewable and alternative energy sources). The 
acceleration of inclusive, sustainable, multi-sector, and connectivity-
based growth is expected to result in increased food and nutrition 
security, poverty reduction, agricultural trade competitiveness, 
higher and more equitable income of rural households, and 
strengthened farmers’ rights (GON, 2014, p. 57 - my emphasis) 
The pursuit of bikas is still ongoing in Nepal. In its essence, the discourses 
of bikas strives to achieve the elusive ideal of modernisation through neo-liberal 
mechanisms, yet in order to to accommodate strong criticisms it has also 
attempted to reform itself with concepts of participation, inclusion, 
sustainability, equity, empowerment and so on. Only time will tell if bikas is 
realised in this manner.  
Conclusion  
Almost three quarters of a century have elapsed since the first discourses 
of bikas were disseminated. In whatever fashion academics, politicians, 
bureaucrats and laypersons try to create discourses around bikas, the subject is 
now dealt with much sophistication and disagreement, although all can seem to 
agree that it “means different things to different people” (Greig, et al., 2007, p. 
251). It is the guiding light at the heart of national periodic plans, a misguiding 
“illusion” for those who fail to share in its fruits (Greig, et al., 2007, pp. 252-53), 
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and even binas (destruction) when it threatens environments and livelihoods. 
Nonetheless, its legacy remains as strong as it was more than half a century ago. 
It entered Nepal in the 1950s, and it is not going away anytime soon. Projects like 
the Millennium Development Goals, and the Sustainable Development Goals 
generated by international players such as the United Nations (UN, 2016) in 
which Nepal willingly and happily participates, only add more impetus to the 
discourse bikas.  
 Most, however, agree that bikas thus far has not been delivered, at least not 
in a fashion satisfying to the masses. Mahendra’s Panchayat used it only as a 
rhetoric to conceal his ulterior motive of authoritatively ruling Nepal. And while 
the royals, political and bureaucratic elites got richer through bikas, the conditions 
for the masses did not improve and the culturally and politically marginalised 
caste, ethnic and gender groups became increasingly disillusioned with bikas.  
The actions of state managers taken in the name of the discourses of bikas 
ironically did not deliver. They did not alleviate poverty, reduce inequalities of 
all sorts, or secure food to the most vulnerable.  
 Even with the democratic focus since 1990, bikas still somehow went 
missing. Some physical infrastructure was built but even these were not 
equitably distributed. As different kinds of inequalities increased as measured 
by HDI, per capita income, literacy rate, provision of public services and so on, 
marginalised groups, rural communities and those living far from Kathmandu 
felt that they could neither participate fully in the processes and mechanisms 
guiding bikas nor share in its benefits. And so, after more than sixty years of 
pursuing bikas, Nepal still remains one of the poorest countries of the world with 
GDP per capita at $479 (GON & UNCTN, 2013). An attention to poverty itself 
reveals massive inequalities within the country across ethnic and caste groups 
with the Dalits suffering the severest and most intense forms of poverty, food 
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insecurity and landlessness compared to other social groups (Gellner, 2007a; 
GON, 2013a, 2013b; Lawoti, 2010b, 2012; Pradhan, 2002).  
 It is difficult to locate the exact cause of failure of bikas in Nepal. Whether 
it is due to the adoption of incorrect values and practices by Nepalese leaders and 
international aid players as proposed by Bista (Bista, 1991) and Panday (Panday, 
1999); or whether it is the unequal “core-periphery” power-relations between 
India and Nepal, and between Kathmandu and remote districts as Blaikie et al. 
and Adhikari argue (J. Adhikari, 2008; Blaikie, et al., 1980); or whether it is the 
project of bikas itself that Nepalese find so slippery (N. R. Shrestha, 1997) is 
debatable. But what is not debatable is that most academics, intellectuals, national 
leaders, and political elite in Nepal still want the Nepalese masses to believe that 
bikas, however elusive, is still achievable. They continue arguing that the idea of 
bikas is still a worthwhile goal. It is conditional only on the right mechanisms in 
the form of inclusion, sustainability, democratic participation, empowerment, 
equity being in place.  
 So bikas continues to dominate policies in Nepal, as Stacy Leigh Pigg 
rightly puts it, “Development is now a historical fact in Nepal. It will not be 
dismantled by wishing it away” (Pigg, 1993, p. 45). Rather than focusing on 
“unmaking of development (bikas)” (Fujikura, 2013, p. 14) and treating it only as 
a “depoliticising” or “anti-politics” machine (Ferguson, 1994) as James Ferguson 
suggests, we should instead, argues Fujikura, treat bikas like “freedom”, “justice”, 
and “solidarity” as a signifier with no necessary attachment to any precise 
content while rejecting it as an evolutionary process (Fujikura, 2013). Drawing 
inspiration from the successful efforts by a local NGO Backward Society 
Education (BASE) to emancipate “bonded labourers” in Nepal, Fujikura urges us 
to explore:  
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… the limits and possibilities of individual and collective actions for 
personal and societal transformations within a terrain already 
reconfigured by the activities of development [bikas] (Fujikura, 2013, p. 
14 - original emphasis).  
… and to describe: 
… individual and collective actions in Nepal … made possible by 
some of the cognitive and institutional resources made available 
through the project of development [bikas] (Fujikura, 2013, pp. 13 - 
14). 
Since bikas is already written in the souls of the Nepalese government, state-
managers, non-state actors and general public, instead of arguing for and against 
it, we should, according to Pigg: 
… understand the complexities of its effects, the magnitude of its 
influences, and the significance of its directions (Pigg, 1993, p. 45). 
It is within these theoretical debates and the complex discursive webs around 
bikas that I intend to discuss the practices of two of the most common 
contemporary bikas discourses: access to productive resources (e.g. land) for food 
security, commercial agriculture production and status; and (micro)-finance (for 
poverty alleviation and rural commercialisation). In beginning to unravel the 
practices of bikas in Patle Gau, the site of my ethnography, within the larger 
discourse of egalitarian, democratic, secular, new Nepal, my analysis remains 
fully cognisant of the embeddedness of social actors from Bahun, Dalit and 
Tamang groups in national as well as local histories, cultural politics and power-
relationships.   
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Chapter 4  
The Socio-cultural Politics of Patle Gau 
Patle Gau (Patle village), my field site, is in the middle of Kavre district 
(Figure 8). It is about two hours drive east from Kathmandu. Although Patle Gau 
is well-connected to near-by towns like Dhulikhel and Nepalthok by the east-
west Arniko Highway, that was fully completed only several few years ago, it 
mostly exhibits rural characteristics. Situated in Nepal’s mid-hills Patle Gau’s 
slopes are used for terraced farming. Due to absence of irrigation facilities, rice, 
the most popular agronomic crop, is not grown here. Instead farmers cultivate 
wheat, maize, barley, mustard and vegetables. 
 Arniko Highway is the only all-weather motorable road in the village. 
Only the houses built alongside this highway and some other houses close to the 
one or two half-built fair-weather roads are the only houses accessible by road. 
The rest can be accessed using walking trails only. Families living alongside 
Arniko Highway run small rural-businesses like dairies, kirana pasal (shops)55, 
cheeyapasal (teashops), bhattees (local pubs), poultries (selling live chickens mostly 
in urban areas) and the like. Yet even these families are involved in farming, 
either fully or partially as land-holders or as agricultural labourers. 
Administratively, at the time of my research the territory of Patle Gau, although 
understood to be one social entity, fell under two VDCs – Fulbari and Bela – for 
state administrative purposes.   
 
                                                          
55 Kirana pasals are small shops by the side of a road where essential food items (rice, lentils, oil, 
salt, sugar, etc.) and household items (toothpaste, soaps, etc.) needed for daily consumption are 
sold. The kirana pasals, often but not always, can also provide tea and snacks and do can double 
as a teashop.  
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Figure 8 A view of Patle Gau from the North West (Photo by author) 
 
 Two weeks into my fieldwork after a few transact walks I could only 
describe the basic physical features of Patle Gau. My vague sense of the social 
residential pattern in the village was not fully developed. I understood that the 
main resident social groups in Patle Gau were Bahun, Dalit and Tamang.56 I also 
had an imprecise sense of which groups lived in which cluster of the village. And 
so, in the third week I asked Siromani Sapkota, a local elite and a frequent 
interlocutor, to provide me with a guided tour of the village, to which he readily 
agreed. Before walking me directly into the village, Siromani took me to a 
vantage point by the side of the Arniko highway, saying: 
Listen Rai jee (Mr Rai), people identifying with different jat, jati live 
in and around Patle Gau. You see here? This is a Damai57 tole 
(cluster), that one is Meejar58. You may be aware that they are now 
                                                          
56 I have used this sequence with no particular order in mind except for the alphabetical one. 
57 Damai, a Dalit sub-group is also referred to as Darjee. They have traditionally been tailors and 
perform music in various social rituals like marriage.  In Patle Gau this group mostly has Pariyar 
as their surname. Some, I later learnt, also had Katuwal as their surname. Since some people find 
the name Damai derogatory I have chosen the surname Pariyar to denote this group. 
58 Meejar, a sub-group within the Dalit community is also widely called Sarkee. Traditionally 
they have worked to remove carcass and make items such as shoes using the leather from the 
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collectively referred to as Dalits. Over there towards the west, you 
see a Tamang bastee (a village settlement). They are now one of the 
Janajatis, aren’t they? And right over there towards the east, are the 
Pathaks. They are Bahuns but they are Kumai Bahuns. And half a 
kilometre west from the Pathaks, you can see my house in the 
Sapkota bastee. We are also Bahuns but Purbia Bahuns. Other Purbia 
Bahuns like Dhakal, Timilsina, and Acharya reside by the side of this 
main road along with a few other Tamang families (Figure 9). 
Figure 9 Patle Gau residential segregation according to caste and ethnicity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
carcass. Most of this group in Patle Gau have Purkoti as their surname; some have Dhalkoti. As 
with the case of the term “Damai”, I prefer to use the term Meejar to refer to this group rather 
than the more derogatorily perceived termed “Sarkee”. I use the phrase “the Dalits” to refer to 
both these groups. 
N 
E 
Kumai 
Bahuns 
Legends: 
            Dalit (Pariyar) house  
              Dalit (Meejar) house 
              Tamang house 
             Bahun (Purbia) house 
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 I understood from Siromani’s description that like most other human 
settlements in the hills of Nepal, Patle Gau too is spatially segregated into various 
bastees and toles along the lines of caste and ethnicity which Siromani referred to 
as jat, jati (Figures 8 and 9). Given the vastness, complexities, and fluidity of caste 
and ethnicity (Fisher, 2012; Gellner, 2012) the complexity and dynamics of which 
have only intensified after the re-instatement of democracy in 1990, I do not 
intend to theorise what caste and ethnicity actually mean, but rather I intend to 
show how these ideas are practiced in everyday lives.  I propose to explore these 
concepts as a “cultural core” affecting social relations, particularly the practice of 
“untouchability” which is profoundly associated with notions of caste purity, 
impurity and pollution.  Even though critical assessment of theories related to 
caste and ethnicity is not necessarily my objective, it is, however, important to 
briefly note the divergent views the scholars studying caste-conscious societies 
have proposed. As I shall demonstrate later, each of them has some bearing on 
caste-conscious societies like Patle Gau.  
 Louis Dumont proposes that such societies are mainly governed by the 
binary oppositions of purity and pollution – where Bahuns are the purest and 
Dalits the most impure (Dumont, 1980). Frederick G. Bailey proposes that like 
any other society these ideas are enmeshed within matrices of political and 
economic powers, such that political and economic power are directly correlated 
to caste status (Bailey, 1957). Other scholars, like Richard Burghart, suggest that 
caste-conscious societies are characterised by contextual hierarchical superiority: 
Bahuns, ritually the highest, Sanyasi (Bahuns who desire to renounce the world 
to attain Moksha), religiously the highest, and the Thakuris (the rulers among the 
Chhetris), administratively the highest (Burghart, 1978). Rather than attempting 
to identify which of these relations fundamentally represents caste-conscious 
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rural society I rather investigate how caste and ethnicity is practiced, performed 
and altered, taking Patle Gau as my referent.  
 Although I do not treat Patle Gau as a solid point on a map but in terms 
of flexible social relations (Shneiderman, 2015), the 51 households (15 Bahun, 23 
Dalit and 13 Tamang), who provided me with the bulk of the ethnographic, 
interview and survey data, can actually be plotted on a map representing Patle 
Gau (Figure 9). Likewise, although the central aim of this chapter is to recount 
the dynamic cultural practices in Patle Gau with particular reference to the 
cultural politics influencing practices of untouchability, I first want to focus on 
the residential patterns of Patle Gau, that provide the necessary context for this 
chapter.  
 Notions of purity, impurity and pollution (Dumont, 1980) combined with 
the cultural differences of language, religion, customs, traditions (Young, 1990), 
boundaries (Barth, 1998) and distinctions (Bourdieu, 1984) make the three social 
groups of Patle Gau reside in adjacent but separate locations. The houses built by 
the side of the Arniko Highway belong mostly to Bahuns and some to Tamangs. 
It is difficult to ascertain precisely whether the Arniko highway itself was 
planned to pass through these Bahun and Tamang settlements or whether these 
two groups later shifted their residences closer to it. Some Tamangs also live 
further away from the highway but no Dalit resides close to the highway, a 
subject I analyse in depth in the next chapter. Dalits, segregated into their sub-
caste groups live in close but separate spaces. Meejar or Sarkee (cobblers) dwell 
tens of metres away from the Damai or Pariyar (tailors and musicians).  
 The practice of living in segregated spaces is so crucial that a formerly 
(Acharya) Bahun settlement has now turned into a Dalit bastee after Tikaram 
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Dhalkoti59, a Dalit, bought three houses and surrounding lands from Acharya 
Bahuns a few decades ago. These Acharya Bahuns sold Tikaram these properties 
in order to move to more commercially connected places. After Tikaram’s 
occupation of the former Bahun houses, no other Bahun would move their 
residences closer to him. Rather other Dalit Meejars slowly started living closer 
to Tikaram, transforming the previous Acharya houses into part of a larger Dalit 
Meejar tole.  
 The spatial segregation of residences is also marked by material 
differences between the residences themselves. The residential houses display a 
pattern that shows different economic conditions (Figures 10 to 13). The Dalits 
possess less material prosperity in comparison to the other two groups. The 
houses belonging to Bahuns and Tamangs by the side of Arniko Highway are 
generally two or three-storeyed with cemented brick walls, concrete roofs or 
artfully sloped tiled roofs. These houses are far more expensive to build than the 
ones in which most Dalits reside and are suitable enough to be called ghar 
(houses). These ghars have proper doors and windows with a number of rooms 
allocated to different family members. Most houses in which Dalits reside are so 
poorly built that the richer amongst the Bahuns and Tamangs would call them 
chapras (slum like dwellings). These chapras are neither made up of cemented 
walls nor do they have concrete roofs or artfully angled tin sheets covered 
beautifully with tiles.  Instead, a single layer of tin sheeting is placed on top of 
four walls and is held down by stones, wooden logs or by heavier things to keep 
                                                          
59 Tikaram Dhalkoti is the one of the very few Dalits who possess more wealth than the rest of 
his community. Tikaram had left his village when he was only fourteen to try his luck in India. 
Fortunately, he found a “technical” job with Indian Railways.  When he returned to Nepal after 
working with the Indian Railways for twenty years, he was able to spend a considerable 
amount of money buying lands and houses in Patle Gau. 
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the tin sheet in place and protect it from being blown away by the wind especially 
during the windy months of April and May.  
 The insides of ghars and chapras are also strikingly different from each 
other. The bigger houses of Bahuns and Tamangs have a number of rooms 
allocated for various purposes – rooms for cooking and eating, and rooms for 
sleeping. The inside of chapras are typically just a single space used for cooking, 
eating and sleeping. If the Dalits keep livestock such as pigs, buffaloes, cows, 
goats or chickens, a portion of this singular space is also used to keep animals 
during the night as they lack the capital to build animal sheds. Bahuns and 
Tamangs normally have a low-cost shed for keeping livestock, especially the 
larger animals. 
Figure 10 Bahun houses (Photos by author) 
 
Figure 11 Tamang houses (Photo by author) 
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Figure 12 Dalit (Pariyar) houses (Photo by author) 
 
Figure 13 Dalit (Meejar) house (Photo by author) 
 
The System of Caste 
Since residential segregation as well as housing types can be analysed 
using the lens of caste and ethnicity, it is important that I discuss the caste system 
and ethnicity as it is applicable to the Nepalese case. I have argued in the previous 
chapters that the past greatly influences the present. It is thus crucial to remind 
ourselves that in the past Nepalese state managers used caste as the primary unit 
of organising and governing the whole of Nepal. As previously discussed, this 
mode of governance in Nepal was prevalent from the eighteenth century60 until 
                                                          
60 Although caste-based societal organisation and governance is much older than the time 
period I have chosen, this particular time period is applicable to the “modern” nation-state of 
Nepal.  
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about the middle of twentieth century and was first legally instituted by Muluki 
Ain 1854 (national code 1954).  
 The national code of 1854 categorised the whole of Nepalese society into 
two basic groups, the “pure” and the “impure” (Figure 14). The segregation 
between these two groups was so vital that “pure” castes were not only supposed 
not to accept water and food from the “impure” castes, but were required to 
undertake necessary ritual cleansing to “restore” lost caste status if they had been 
in bodily contact with “impure” groups. The Tagadharis, wearers of the holy cord 
(Janai) - which symbolised their “higher caste” status and was thus denied to the 
other caste groups— sat at the top of this caste hierarchy. Social groups such as 
Bahun, Chhetri, Thakuri and Sanyasi (Bahun-Chhetri or Chhetri-Bahun in 
colloquialism and Khas-Arya in present formal political lingua) made up the 
Tagadhari caste group. Just below them were the “pure” Matwalis (alcohol-
drinking) caste groups who were again internally divided into two: enslavable 
(e.g. Tamang, Chepang, etc.) and non-enslavable (e.g. Gurung, Magar, Rai, 
Limbu, etc.). At the very bottom sat the most “impure”, bodily contact with 
whom required ritual cleansing.  
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Figure 14 Caste hierarchy according to Muluki Ain 1854, [source: (Hofer, 1979, p. 22)]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such a hierarchical caste system can also be understood in terms of distinctions, 
as John Gray puts it: 
Each caste’s existence and characteristics are defined by a series of 
distinctions that differentiate it simultaneously from all other castes. 
So, a Brahman [Bahun] is defined by a series of distinctions that 
result in being simultaneously a wearer of the sacred thread 
(tagadhari), non-enslavable, water-acceptable and non-untouchable 
and differentiated from all castes that are non-Brahmin [non-Bahun], 
alcohol drinker, enslavable, water-unacceptable and untouchable. 
This same series of distinctions – water acceptable vs. water 
unacceptable, wearer of sacred thread vs. alcohol drinker; enslavable 
vs. unenslavable; touchable vs. untouchable – is used to define and 
characterise all other caste and caste groups (Gray, 2012, p.127). 
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 The rules pertaining to the acceptance of cooked rice to mark the caste 
distinction is another dimension through which a caste system operates at a 
village level (Gray, 2012; Hofer, 1979). From a perspective of a high-caste person 
such as a Bahun or a Chhetri, the world can be viewed as composed of caste 
groups from which not only water but also cooked rice can or cannot be accepted. 
Those from whom cooked rice can be accepted are considered to be “equals”, and 
those from whom it cannot be accepted are “inferior” (Figure 15). 
Figure 15 Caste heierarchy as seen by a high-caste in a village, [source: (Gray, 2012; 
figure 2)] 
  
 
 
 
 
 
So according to Figure 15, a Bahun or Chhetri would accept “cooked rice” 
from another Bahun or Chhetri but not from Matwaalis like a Magar or a Tamang. 
Although Matwaalis were considered “pure,” people from whom water could be 
accepted and bodily contact with whom was not taken to be “polluting” it was 
not acceptable to take cooked rice from them. Yet, both Bahun-Chhetri and 
Matwaalis would not accept either water, cooked rice or anything for direct 
consumption from the “water unacceptable castes”, who in Nepal are the Dalits. 
 To fully appreciate how and why distinctions— often taking the form of 
caste-based discrimination practices, especially in relation to “untouchability”— 
are enacted, modified and resisted in Patle Gau in particular, and in Nepal in 
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general, we first need to closely study the three social groups - Bahuns, Dalits 
and Tamangs. These three social groups need to be studied not in isolation but 
embedded within broader national politics of difference and social identity. Let 
us first start with Bahuns. 
Bahuns in Patle Gau 
The Bahuns in Patle Gau, just like elsewhere else in Nepal, have a notion 
of birth-ascribed “purity.”61 Among the Bahun group, Upadhyaya Bahuns are 
considered to be the purest. Generally, Upadhyaya Bahuns are deemed “pure 
enough” to perform priestly works, conducting rituals marking social events like 
marriage, birth and death, and invoking and worshipping the gods. Some also 
specialise in astrology. Their “purity” is based upon their lineage and is polluted 
by any breach of prescribed marital relations. Only a legitimate marriage 
between an Upadhyaya Bahun man and Upadhyaya Bahun woman produces 
descendants who are also Upadhyaya Bahun. The union between an Upadhyaya 
Bahun man and (i) an illegitimately married Upadyaya Bahun woman (for 
instance, due to elopement or the marriage not taking place according to the 
required rituals), or (ii) a Bahun widow or (iii) another Bahun man’s wife 
produces descendants who “lose” the highest status of ritual purity. These 
descendants are not considered Upadhyaya Bahuns but are named Jaisi Bahun 
ranking just below Upadhyaya Bahuns. Jaisi Bahuns can study astrology, an 
occupation traditionally reserved for the Bahuns, but are disallowed from 
functioning as priests. Similarly, any descendant from the union of an 
Upadhyaya or a Jaisi Bahun man and any other “lower caste” woman entirely 
“loses” Bahunhood and is demoted to the status of Khatri Chhetri. Khatri here 
referring to “Khaseko” or degraded. But the degradation is not too polluting and 
                                                          
61 Demographically, Bahuns altogether comprise 12.2% of the current Nepalese population 
(Dahal, 2014). 
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as such all these different groups of Bahuns do not necessarily live in segregated 
spaces.  Since the lineage is also defined by patriarchy whereby descendants 
carry father’s surnames62, both the Jaisi and Upadhaya Bahuns possess the same 
surnames making it difficult to distinguish one from the other purely by taking 
note of surnames.  
 Unlike the Bahuns in India who are referred to as Brahmins, Bahuns in 
Nepal are not only ranked in terms of ritual purity but also differentiated in terms 
of the geographic origins of their entry point into Nepal.  Historians contend that 
the Bahuns entered Nepal from India through two routes [the East (Purba) and 
the West (Paschim)] to escape Muslim invaders. Those coming from East have 
been labelled “Purbia (Eastern) Bahun” (Bista, 1973)63 and those from the West, 
specifically from Kumau and Garwal regions of the present day India, are 
labelled as “Kumai Bahun”.64 In and around Patle village, Bahuns carrying 
surnames such as Acharya, Dhakal, Sapkota and Timilsina are thought to be 
Purbia Bahun. Pathaks, however, are Kumai Bahuns (Figure 16).  
 In the game of maintaining distinction and self-acclaimed superior caste 
status the Purbia and Kumai Bahuns in Patle Gau used to engage in the politics 
                                                          
62 In Nepal, typically caste and ethnicity is easily identifiable by the surname. Besides the 
Bahuns, Chhetris and Newars, who use their sub-caste group as their surnames, the rest of the 
caste and ethnic groups generally use a common caste or ethnicity surname signifying their 
social identity.   
63 Those carrying the following surnames representing the thar (sub-caste) are Purbia Bahuns: 
Acharya, Adhikari, Baral, Banskota, Banstola, Bhandari, Bhattarai, Chaulagai, Chapagain, 
Dahal, Dhakal, Devkota, Dhugel, Ghimire, Guragain, Humagain, Khanal, Koirala, Lamsal, 
Nepal, Pokharel, Poudel, Sapkota, Rijal, Sigdel, Sanjel and Timilsina.  
64 Awasthi, Bhatta, Bhetwal, Gyawali, Joshi, Kandel, Kharel, Lohani, Mainali, Oli, Pandey, Paneru, 
Panta, Pathak, Prasai, Regmi, Sangraula, Sedhai, Shiwakoti, Simkhada, Situaula, Thapaliya, and 
Upreti are surnames of Kumai Bahun. Pathak, in particular, is one such Kumai Bahun living close 
to Patle Gau. 
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of difference. Bhoj Raj Sapkota, an eighty-year old Purbia Bahun, recalls those 
days: 
In the old days, we, the Purbia, would not associate with these 
Pathaks, the Kumais, so much. Of course, they were not 
“untouchable” or anything. For sure. But we avoided accepting 
cooked rice (bhat) from them. They also did not accept cooked rice 
from us. We also did not inter-marry between us. But for quite some 
decades now, things have changed. We don’t feel we are too 
different from each other. Both Bahun Bahun (chuckles). 
Besides Bhoj Raj Sapkota other Bahuns I talked with also felt that the claims of 
superiority and difference between the two have long vanished. However, as I 
demonstrate in the coming pages, together as a Bahun group, the Bahuns in Patle 
Gau continue performing distinctive practices in order to retain their Bahun 
standing. Other groups such as the Dalits and Tamangs in Patle Gau do not 
always acknowledge the difference between the Purbia and Kumai Bahuns 
although on a few occasions I have heard Tamangs refer to Pathak Bahuns as 
Kumai.  
 It is important to note that post 1990 there was an unprecedented rise in 
identity politics specifically in relation to caste, ethnicity and indigeneity. This 
primarily resulted from new forms of competition for political power and access 
to government institutions because of new quota systems under programmes of 
affirmative action. Consequently, the (formerly) “high-caste” groups felt the 
threat of being gradually destabilised from their traditional dominant position 
(Adhikari & Gellner, 2016; Pariyar, 2016). They countered these anxieties by 
shedding their previous “cultural” Tagadhari identity to re-name themselves 
“Khas Arya”, an identity legally recognised by the 2015 Constitution of Nepal. 
This fulfilled two purposes. It provided them with legitimate “first settler” claims 
to the Khas region (currently Mid and Far Western Regions of Nepal) and it also 
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maintained the “superiority distinction” through claims to the “great” Aryan 
(later Hindu) culture (Adhikari, 1988; Bista, 1991).     
 However, such engagements with naming and renaming caste identities 
solidify rather than dilute caste differences. Patle Gau is so close to Kathmandu 
yet so far it seems, Bahuns in this village have not taken up this new caste-less 
identity created at the power-centre. Perhaps “trickling-down” takes time, or 
perhaps the Bahuns in Patle Gau do not feel the need to don this new identity. 
Whatever the reason, none of them, educated or illiterate, old or young, man or 
woman, have started calling themselves Khas-Arya. So while the new Bahun 
identity (Khas-Arya) has not yet been adopted by locals in Patle Gau, it is also 
worth noting that perhaps due current discourses of egalitarianism which 
peaked during and after the Maoist Revolution, most locals do not refer to 
Bahuns as “Thulo jat” (Upper/Bigger/Higher caste), a term routinely used even in 
academic literature until a few decades ago. This is possibly an indication that 
vertical caste hierarchy is not only politically rejected but also socially rejected, 
nonetheless a horizontal identity of difference continues.   
Dalits in Patle Gau 
The Sanskrit linguistic roots of the term Dalit is dalan which means 
oppression. A Dalit is thus anyone feeling oppressed. Although quite commonly 
used in India since its independence, Dalit as a linguistic marker is relatively new 
to Nepal. It was first introduced to Nepal in 1956 by Dr B. R. Ambedkar, a famous 
Indian “untouchable”/Dalit himself and one of the chief writers of the Indian 
Constitution. The term was officially recognised in Nepal with the establishment 
of the Rastriya Nepal Dalit Jana Vikash Parishad (Nepal National Dalit Development 
Council) in 1967. Nepalese Dalit leaders and intellectuals accepted Dalit identity 
because it denoted their political powerlessness and economic marginalisation. 
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Additionally, by engaging with the language of citizenship, rather than a 
primordial outcast status burdened by religious connotations of bodily impurity, 
it contained the possibility change (Aahuti, 2010). Although it is still debated as 
to which social groups can be considered to be Dalits, it is generally understood 
to be those groups from whom water and food were previously not accepted and 
physical contact with whom required ritual cleansing (Pani nachalnya choya chito 
halnu parne) according to the Muluki Ain 1854 (Cameron, 2010; Folmar, 2007; 
Kharel, 2010).  
 Established in 2002 the National Dalit Commission is a state body which 
draws on the Marxist idea of class in defining Dalit to include all social groups 
who have been marginalised on the basis of socio-economic status, state politics, 
education, and religion65 not just the former “untouchables.” However, the final 
list of 33 groups66 produced by this organisation contains groups largely taken 
from the previous “Pani nachalnya choya chito halnu parne” (water from whom 
cannot be accepted and bodily contact with whom requires ritual cleansing) 
group.67 The term Dalit, therefore, is now understood to refer to those previously 
called achhut (untouchable), pani nachalne (from whom water cannot be accepted) 
and sano jat (small-caste/low-caste) (A. P. Caplan, 1972). In Patle Gau, Dalits are 
people whose surnames are Purkoti and Dhalkoti representing the Sarkee/Meejar 
and Pariyar representing the Damai. Interestingly, Dalits also happen to share 
                                                          
65 These are the objectives stated by the National Dalit Commission on their website 
(http://ndc.gov.np): (a)To increase the active participation of socially, economically, politically, 
educationally most backward Dalit Community in the mainstream of national development by 
preserving and augmenting their fundamental rights provisioned in the prevalent law and 
constitution, and (b) To create an environment favourable to Dalit community to enjoy the 
equal rights, self-esteem, services and privileges as equal as other social groups in the Nepal’s 
Human Development Index. 
66 Seven from the hills and 26 from the Terai. 
67 Nation-wide in 2011 Terai and hill Dalits comprised about 4.5% and 8.1% of Nepalese 
population respectively.   
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many surnames such as Acharya, Adhikary, Karki, and Ghimire with Bahuns 
and Chhetris making it difficult to distinguish the social groups from surnames 
only. The surname Katuwal used by some Pariyar Dalits, who otherwise carry 
Pariyar as a surname, is one such commonly shared surname.  
 In Patle Gau, the politically conscious or more literate Dalits, Bahuns and 
Tamangs use the term Dalit. Dalit women such as Meena Purkoti and Durga B. 
K. who engage actively in bikas activities in Patle Gau and more educated Dalit 
men and women describe themselves as “haamee Dalit” (we Dalits). Older, 
illiterate and not so politically conscious Dalits do not call themselves Dalits but 
use Sarkee or Damai labels frequently in sentences like, “Damai ho, damai ko kaam 
garne” (We are Damai so we do Damai’s work – tailoring). Similarly, politically 
sensitised Bahuns and Tamangs refer to these groups as Dalits, but the less 
sensitised refer to them just by their surnames: Dhalkoti, Purkoti or Pariyar; or 
by categorical names such as Damai and Sarkee. These days in Patle Gau hardly 
anyone uses identifiers such as achhut (untouchable), pani nachalne (from whom 
water cannot be accepted) or sano jat (small caste).  
Tamangs in Patle Gau 
Slightly older than the marker Dalit but not as old as the identifier Bahun, 
Tamang is a social identity marker coined in 1932 by a Rana Prime Minister to 
refer to social groups who until then had been known as Bhote, Lama, Murmi, 
Sain, Yolmo, Kagate, Ishang and so on (M Tamang, 2009). Along with ethnic 
groups like Magar, Tharu and Newar, the Tamangs are one of the most numerous 
groups in Nepal comprising 5.8% of Nepal’s total population (Dahal, 2014, p. 11). 
Mostly populating districts around the Kathmandu city, Tamangs have their own 
language and perform rituals based on their religion which is predominantly 
Buddhism. Although quite numerous in Kavre and politically quite active 
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judging by their participation and leadership positions in political parties in 
present times, the Tamangs are nonetheless one of Nepal’s marginalised groups 
(Tamang, 1992). Categorised as “enslavable” by the Ranas, Tamangs were the 
porters who carried the Rolls Royce cars for several days into Kathmandu valley. 
Unlike the four “martial” ethnic groups - Rai, Limbu, Magar and Gurung - the 
Tamangs were not recruited by the British, Indian or even Nepalese Army. The 
only post they were given in the Nepalese army was that of Peepa (one of the 
lowest ranks). Incidentally, Autar Singh Lama, an eighty-one-year-old Tamang 
man from Patle Gau, had served the Nepal Army as a Peepa for a few years 
during the Rana administration.  
 Narrating the processes of “othering” and “exclusion” by the state, 
Tamang intellectuals and activists like Mukta Singh Tamang contend that the 
official discourse of the state, which sometimes referred to Tamangs as Bhotya 
failed to recognise their roots in Nepal by associating them with Tibetans (Tibet 
is called Bhot and Tibetans are called Bhotes or Bhotya in Nepali language). 
Tibetans on the other hand excluded Tamangs by referring to them as rong-pa, 
mon-pa, or se-mon (M Tamang, 2009). Recently, however, gaining motivation 
from new-found political freedom in 1990, Tamang intellectuals are re-writing 
Nepalese history to evoke a sense of territoriality and historical consciousness by 
asserting themselves as indigenous Himalayan peoples, who had their own kings 
and chiefs before the “political unification” of Nepal by the Shah Kings (Tamang, 
2009).  
 In the most recent social and political Nepali lexicon, Tamangs identify 
themselves as one of the Janajatis. The social identity Janajāti itself is not a 
neologism since it customarily meant “peoples of different kinds” (Sharma, 
1975). However, Janajati is an identity adopted by the ethnic groups who want to 
rid themselves of the label Matwali (alcohol drinkers). This label was given by the 
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state and indexes forms of caste hierarchy. Therefore, the Nepal Janajati 
Mahasangh (Nepal Federation of Nationalities)68 founded in 1990, defines 
Janajati as referring to all non-Hindu nationalities who are outside the Hindu 
caste system and have their own distinct languages, traditions, religions and 
cultures. Thus, this identity excludes both the Hindu “upper” (Bahun/Chhetri) 
and “lower” castes (the Dalits). Like the marker Dalit, the identifier Janajati 
although gaining increasing acceptance particularly in official and academic 
usages, is not so widely used by the commoners in Patle Gau. No confusion is 
generated when Tamangs in Patle Gau are referred to by the surname Tamang 
or occasionally by the surname Lama (although Lama itself is an honorific title 
given to Buddhist priests). While the Tamangs in Patle Gau assert themselves to 
be Dhong Tamang, different from other “kinds” of Tamang elsewhere, not 
everyone uses the term Janajati as an identifier.  Yet the more educated and 
politically conscious amongst them have begun to use Janajati to stress their 
belonging to the larger indigenous Janajati group, and in turn emphasise their 
ethnicity rather than their hierarchised status (Figure 16).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68 Presently called Nepal Adhivashi Janajāti Mahasangh (Nepal Federation of Indigenous 
Nationalities (NFIN). 
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Figure 16 Three caste and ethnic groups in Patle Gau 
 
Having given a brief general introduction to the three social groups in 
Patle Gau, I now present their main socio-cultural practices including language, 
religion, marriage rules, specific rituals, occupations and the like in 
configurations that demonstrate concurrent overlaps and distinctions which in 
turn are undergoing constant modifications within the shifting discourse of 
politics and economy. 
Dynamism of Socio-cultural Practices in Patle Gau 
Of more than 100 languages spoken in Nepal, only two are spoken in Patle 
Gau: Nepali and Tamang (Yadava, 2014).69 Nepali, a Sanskrit-derived Indo-Aryan 
language has little in common with Tamang a member of Tibeto-Burman 
language family (Yadava, 2014). Bahuns and the Dalits speak Nepali in Patle Gau 
and most of them, if not all, do not speak Tamang. However, almost all Tamangs 
in Patle Gau are bi-lingual and thus are able to speak both Nepali and Tamang. 
                                                          
69 Nepali language (previously known as Khas, Parbatiya or Gorkhali based on their geographic 
origins) is now the lingua franca after its status was raised to that of a national language in 1930. 
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Nepali is used for everyday conversations and is the medium of official 
instruction in schools, but the Tamang language is preserved by the Tamang 
community through inter-generational transmission.70 I also noticed that the 
more educated and better travelled amongst the Tamangs, especially the younger 
generation, are more fluent in the use of Nepali language than their older 
counterparts who tend to struggle with both fluency and the vocabulary of the 
Nepali language. 
 Nepalese follow a number of religions. Hinduism has the largest following 
(81%), followed by Buddhism (9%), Islam (4.3%), Kirant (3%), Christianity (1.4%) 
and so on (Dahal, 2014). Patle Gau, because of the substantial presence of 
Tamangs and Dalits exhibits a different configuration: Hindu 63%, Buddhists 
25% and Christians 12%.71 Although I was told that a few Bahuns in adjacent 
villages have recently converted to Christianity, almost all the Bahuns in and 
around Patle Gau are Hindus. It is interesting to note that although sections of 
many ethnic communities such as Gurung, Magar, Sunuwar, and Danuwar have 
been completely Hinduised and perform rituals using Bahun priests, Tamangs 
have somehow managed to retain their own religion, Buddhism. Tamangs, using 
Buddhist Lamas (priests) from nearby monasteries perform life cycle rituals such 
as “child name giving”, “first rice feeding”, and other rituals related to marriage 
and death (Michaels, 1997). Tamangs, therefore, in Patle Gau are exclusively 
Buddhists. It is the Dalits who show the most diversity in religious affiliation. 
None of them are Buddhists since they were traditionally Hindus, but in recent 
years, especially after the restoration of democracy in 1990, and even more so 
                                                          
70 Once Nepal gets fully federated education policy may be amended to accommodate many local 
languages as languages for official correspondences and formal education at province levels. 
71 Based on my own survey data. 
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after the declaration of Nepal as a secular state in 2006, a number of them have 
converted to Christianity.  
 More than any other life cycle ritual the bratabandha (coming of age) ritual 
is the single most distinctive ritual practice performed by “high-caste” Hindus72 
( Parish, 1996; Toffin, 1978; von Fürer-Haimendorf, 1956). Signifying a second 
birth, only the bratabandha makes a male member eligible to wear a janai (holy 
cord) providing him with full legitimate “high-caste” status, and enabling him to 
perform rituals including marriage (Pyakuryal & Suvedi, 2000).  In Patle Gau, the 
Bahuns religiously wear janai everyday, this contrasts with urban “high-caste’ 
Hindu men who no longer observe such a strict practice. This is not to suggest 
that they have given up wearing it altogether but their attitude towards it is much 
more relaxed. They go about their daily businesses without donning it, putting it 
back on when it becomes religiously “mandatory.” 
 Endogamy is taken to be one of the practices which reproduces and 
conserves caste status (Shah, 2002), yet inter-caste or mixed marriages, especially 
between non-Dalit castes, are no longer as rare as they used to be (Kohn, 1998). 
However, a marriage between a Dalit and a non-Dalit is still not a common 
phenomenon (Biswakarma, 2013). Only as recently as March 2015, a national 
daily newspaper reported that a Dalit boy had splashed acid onto the face of a 
non-Dalit girl he loved, who also seemed to have loved him back, but had 
rejected him having “discovered” him caste status. He had committed this 
heinous vengeful act after he was almost beaten to death by the girl’s male 
defenders for having “dared” to have thought of marrying a girl from a “high-
caste”. Perhaps in an effort to unite Nepalese society and reduce the stigma 
attached to marriage between a Dalit and a non-Dalit, the state of Nepal provides 
                                                          
72 As an exception Newar, an ethnic group, also performs Bratabandha wherein a boy child 
becomes a Buddhist monk for four days.  
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a cash incentive of NRs 100,000 (Australian Dollar 1300) for any marriage 
between a Dalit and a non-Dalit within 30 days of the date of marriage 
registration. This policy follows on from an earlier policy instituted by the 
formerly revolutionary, and later reformist Maoist-led, Government in 2009. The 
results of this social policy have not yet been published, and at least in Patle Gau 
the three social groups predominantly follow endogamous marital practices. 
Even the Dalits who are internally divided into two (Meejar and Pariyar) do not 
inter-marry: members of Pariyars and Meejars marry members from their own 
respective caste communities from nearby villages or districts. Once when I was 
sipping tea in a local cheeyapasal (teashop), I overheard a woman passing 
judgement to other women about a recent elopement between Dalit woman and 
a Tamang man in nearby village: 
What times have come? How could this be? Should not marriage be 
only between similar castes? … This world is full of surprises. 
But when she felt that I, an outsider, could have overheard the conversation, she 
quickly added: 
But then again, the Maoist say there are only two castes: man and 
woman … What to say? 
Despite the predominant endogamous practices in Patle Gau, a historical 
“first” occurred in 2014.  The younger second wife of an elderly Bahun man 
eloped with a Tamang man who already had a Tamang wife.73 Due to social 
pressure the Tamang man was “made” to keep his second (Bahun) wife in 
Kathmandu and was told never to bring her back to the village. Besides such an 
                                                          
73 Although polygamy is not a usual practice, it is also not totally absent either. Two generations 
ago, Shyam Hari Pathak, an elite Bahun, raised his family from four wives. Presently, a Dalit 
man lives with two wives: his first wife was “arranged” for him by his parents and he wedded 
his second wife while working in the Indian Railways in Calcutta. 
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anomaly my ethnography and survey results suggest that endogamy still is the 
norm in Patle Gau. 
 Since Patle Gau is predominantly a rural economy, all the residents in 
Patle Gau have some relationship with farming, either by directly producing 
crops and vegetables, as labourers in farms or by running agro-enterprises. Crop 
and vegetable farming, as it is, does not seem to be affected by the notion of purity 
and hence can be thought of as a caste-less practice. But the same cannot be said 
for livestock-keeping and meat consumption, especially for Bahuns.  For them, 
these practices are very much guided by the principal Hindu notions of “purity” 
and “impurity”. Although livestock plays an important role in providing 
nutrition (milk/meat/eggs), fertiliser (manure) and draft power (for ploughing 
fields), these animals are labelled as either “clean” or “unclean” labels, that affect 
husbandry and consumption practices. Therefore, according to a Bahun in Patle 
Gau, cows symbolise the goddess Laxmi (goddess of wealth) and are thought to 
be “pure” and “respectable” with the consequence that the Bahuns neither 
slaughter them nor consume their meat.74 Buffaloes are “clean enough” for 
keeping and producing milk products, but their meat is unfit for consumption. 
Goats which feed on fresh leaves are thought to be “clean” both for keeping and 
consumption.75  Therefore, Bahuns keep cows and buffaloes for milk and manure, 
and goats for meat. Since the state in Nepal prohibits cow slaughtering, the 
Bahuns sell unproductive cattle to traders who resell them in India for 
slaughtering and consumption. Buffaloes can be sold directly to locals such as 
Tamangs, Dalits or other buffalo eating ethnic communities. Chickens which 
scavenge and eat anything including human and animal excreta used to be 
                                                          
74 Cow-slaughter is prohibited by the state in Nepal. The hide from the same cattle, however, may 
later get imported in the form of shoes, belts, wallet, bags, purses and other leather products. 
75 The high-castes sometimes freely consume buffalo meat but mostly avoid beef. I have 
personally witnessed some of them eating beef, not only in diasporic conditions but also in some 
selective restaurants and hotels in Kathmandu. As a norm, though, they do not. 
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considered “filthy” by Bahuns and thus unsuitable for raising and eating. Yet 
now that chickens get raised largely in confinement and are provided with 
supervised feed, they have lost their “filth” status. Bahuns now have poultry 
farms and do consume chicken. A middle-aged Bahun man reflected on the 
changing attitudes towards chicken: 
When we were kids, we did not even “touch” chicken. Slowly we 
started eating them elsewhere but not in or near our homes. Then we 
began cooking them just outside our homes. These days with the 
onset of commercial poultry where the chickens are raised in 
captivity and fed on feed, I guess it has lost it “dirty” status for us. 
We freely cook it at home and eat it.  
If Bahuns have slowly changed their attitude towards raising and 
consuming chicken, similar changes in attitude have not occurred in regard to 
pigs and pork. Pig is still considered so “filthy” that it is fit neither for keeping 
nor for consumption. No Bahun in Patle Gau raises pigs or eats pork.76 Tamangs 
and Dalits do not organise their livestock keeping and dietary practices according 
to the principles of “purity” or “pollution”. Therefore, contingent upon capital, 
space and interest they are quite free to keep whichever livestock in whatever 
number (Figure 17).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76 Again, I emphasise that large sections of urban and “modern high-caste” Hindus do consume 
pork elsewhere in Nepal and in the diaspora. Interestingly, wild boar, biologically related to pig, 
is a status symbol to be eaten with pride in public.   
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Figure 17 Soci-economic practices of three social groups in Patle Gau 
Socio economic 
field 
Bahun Dalit Tamang 
Language 
(mother- tongue) 
Nepali (Indo-
Arya) 
Nepali (Indo-
arya) 
Tamang (Sino-
Tibetan) 
Religion Hindu Hindu and 
Christian 
Buddhist 
Bratabandha Performed Not performed Not performed 
Matrimonial 
practice 
Endogamy Endogamy Endogamy 
Livestock 
keeping 
Cattle, Buffalo, 
Goat 
Cattle, buffalo, 
goat, chicken, 
pig 
Cattle, buffalo, 
goat, chicken, 
pig 
 
If language (Nepali) and religion (originally Hindu) are things that bind 
Bahuns and Dalits together in some cultural sense, then it is caste-status, the line 
of “untouchability” that binds Bahun and Tamangs together and separates them 
from Dalits. Even attitudes and practices of untouchability—which when 
“breached” were legally punishable before Nepal started to modernise— are 
undergoing changes in Nepal. Patle Gau is no exception. Since the practice of 
untouchability influences almost every relationship that exists in Patle Gau, I 
dedicate the rest of the chapter to analysing it. 
Practices of Untouchability 
The many social groups divided along caste and ethnic identities in Nepal 
may differ from each other in terms of language, religion, ritual, customs and 
tradition but it is the hundreds of years of state-enforced untouchability that 
drastically separates Dalits from non-Dalits. Any non-Dalit group whether 
Bahun or Chhetri, Tamang or Gurung, no matter how low or how high, ranked 
above the Dalits and therefore irrespective their status practiced the 
discriminatory practice of untouchability. To this day, the practice of 
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untouchability, therefore, continues to confound many, particularly those alien 
to such a culture. Therefore, it was fairly predictable that a British expatriate 
would make the following remark in a national seminar on bikas which I attended 
in Kathmandu during my fieldwork period:  
I find Nepal to be such an interesting country full of amazing 
contradictions. On one hand, it is on its way to issuing citizenship 
certificates and passports that legally recognises the status of third 
gender77. How many progressive countries around the world are 
doing that? And on the other, women in mid and far western regions 
spend the time of their menstruation period living with animals in 
sheds as they are considered to be “impure” and “untouchable” 
during that period. 
The issue of untouchability that this expat found nearly unfathomable is so 
persistent in present-day Nepal that I am reminded of two remarks made in an 
annual conference organised by Social Science Baha78 in July 2014. In the first 
case, rejecting the argument of one of the presenters who had argued that Nepal’s 
political elite (high-caste hill men) are to be blamed for the constitutional 
instability in Nepal, a young man in his mid-twenties claimed that social 
identities such as caste and ethnicity actually do not exist at all since all humans 
are just “homo sapiens”. But later the in the same day in a question-answer session 
of a paper presented on the dynamics of caste-based discrimination in Nepal, a 
participant, a Bahun man, judging by his full name and physical appearances, 
confronted the whole audience by asking if any one of them had ever let a Dalit 
into his/her kitchen. This Bahun man made this disparaging remark probably 
thinking that no Dalit was attending such a “high academic” conference, as 
                                                          
77 In September 2015 as one of the firsts, Kailash Shrestha (man), who prefers to be known as 
Bhumika Shrestha (woman), received a citizenship certificate under the “other” category instead 
of male or female. http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2015-09-07/bhumika-receives-
citizenship-under-o-category.html (Downloaded in 10 December 2015). 
78 “The Social Science Baha is an independent, non-profit organisation set up with the objective 
of promoting and enhancing the study of and research in the social sciences in Nepal” from 
http://www.soscbaha.org/. 
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national statistics suggest that Dalits are the least represented group in higher 
education and academic circles.  Or perhaps he assumed that practices of 
“untouchability” are a fact of life in Nepal. So strong is the stigma attached to the 
Dalit identity and associated “untouchability” that Aahuti, a Marxist Dalit 
intellectual and an activist, once told me:  
When I was a kid they used to lie to us about why Dalits could not 
“improve” by themselves since Karl Marx’s father himself was a 
Dalit, a cobbler. Even if he were, he was probably a cobbler by 
profession. He was surely not a sarkee by birth. 
It therefore is not surprising that even scholars admit: 
When I discuss Nepal’s caste system and untouchability with a 
variety of people, I usually come away with one of two impressions. 
Either they find the practice so incomprehensible that they are 
compelled to dismiss it. Or, they regard it as an archaic tradition 
which has yet to be corrected by South Asian democracies, but soon 
will be. (Cameron, 2002, pp. 308, 309) 
Yet the idea of “untouchability” remains a central core of Hinduism. 
Hinduism is a way of life and a religion that dominates most spheres of life in 
Nepal. Everyone is jutho (impure, polluted) and hence “untouchable” at least 
once in a lifetime. For instance, members of a mourning family of a deceased 
person are considered to be impure normally for thirteen days during which time 
they do not visit temples, eat certain kinds of food, and remain “untouched” by 
others.79 Likewise, a menstruating woman, a woman who has just delivered a 
child, and even widows are thought to be “impure” and hence become 
“untouchable” for varying periods of time. Except for the status of widows, the 
attitude towards which is also changing for the better in recent times, most 
                                                          
79 The mourning period spent in white dress by the male descendants can last up to a year. But in 
modern times many accommodations have been made to greatly shorten this strict adherence to 
dharmic principles.  
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conditions of “impurity” and “untouchability” are temporary lasting for a a 
period ranging from a few days to few weeks. However, for Dalits this condition 
is permanent.  
 It is helpful at this point to note that Nepal’s experiments with modernity 
since 1950s have sought to make Nepal modern and progressive by discouraging 
the practice of untouchability. Article 10 of the Constitution of Nepal 1962 under 
the Right of Equality reads: “No discrimination shall be made against any citizen 
in the application of general laws on the grounds of religion, race, sex, caste, tribe 
or any of them” (HMGN, 1962).  But since the same constitution also declares 
Nepal to be a “Hindu” state, dominance of Hindu values and culture including 
the practices of untouchability persisted (Bennett, 2005; Krishna B Bhattachan, et 
al., 2009; Khanal, et al., 2012). A country like India which is similar to Nepal in 
cultural make-up had already abolished— at least in legal terms— the practice of 
“untouchability” in its founding Constitution of 1949 (Article 17 under 
Fundamental Rights) (GOI, 2007): 
The practice of untouchability will now onwards be considered as a 
social crime and the government will enact laws in such a way that 
the inhuman and discriminatory practice is more punishable. 
Yet it took more than half a century after India had made such an 
announcement and more than 152 years since the Muluki Ain had legalised the 
caste system in Nepal before the Interim Parliament — formed immediately after 
the peaceful ending of the Maoist Revolution — declared Nepal an 
“untouchability and caste-based discrimination free” nation on June 4, 2006. This 
government also criminalised the act and practices of caste-based discrimination 
in private and public spaces through the Caste-based Discrimination and 
Untouchability Act of 2011 which stipulated punishments and penalties against 
specific offences. However, political declarations and the institution of law is one 
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thing, and everyday practices are something else (Cameron, 2010; Vasily, 2009). 
In the remainder of this chapter, I seek to analyse this contradiction relying 
mostly on evidence drawn from experiences in Patle Gau, but also where 
appropriate supplemented by my lived experiences elsewhere. 
 Any in-depth exploration of the practice of untouchability is best done 
through the observation of everyday lives, in everyday spaces. Normally spaces 
are categorized into public and private where social actions are performed in the 
former and intimate actions performed in the latter. However, spaces are not 
always neatly divided into such categories. Hence, I have chosen four spaces - 
commercial spaces, public spaces, quasi-private spaces and private spaces 
(explained more in the related sections below) for the examination of practices of 
untouchability.  
Commercial Spaces: Least Contested but Covert Operation 
In Patle Gau grocery shops, local cheeyapasal (tea shops) and bhattees (pubs) 
are the local commercial spaces. I have shown earlier that “untouchability” is 
largely associated not only with bodily contact but also with exchanges of food, 
and thus cheeyapasals and bhattees where direct consumption of food and drink 
take place provide excellent ethnographic sites to observe caste practices. As I 
observed during my fieldwork these spaces seem to be the least contested. Here 
the logic of commerce takes over from the logic of religion or tradition. Here the 
language of money is spoken and understood more than any other language. As 
long as a customer is “willing and able to buy”, to borrow a phrase from the field 
of economics, she is treated like any other customer.   
 During most of my field work I was assisted by a local young Dalit man, 
Sujan Purkoti. There were several places where we regularly went together. 
During breaks we used to drink tea and snacks in the local cheeyapasals. In these 
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instances, never did I feel that Sujan, a Dalit, was treated in any differently than 
I, a non-Dalit. I also noticed that other Dalits easily came and drank tea like any 
other non-Dalit. The Dalits could also drink jānd (beer) and rakshi (alcohol) in 
bhattees. I detected no tension regarding the practice of “untouchability” in such 
commercial places. The Dalit customers easily entered shops, ate and drank from 
the same glasses, cups and utensils like any other customer. And they did not 
have to wash their dishes after eating and drinking, a practice which according 
to some Dalits was something that they, unlike any other non-Dalit, had to 
perform in the past.   
 It is not only physical commercial space like tea-shops and bhattees which 
looked mostly “casteless” and “untouchability free”, the local dairy industry 
seemed to be the same. Each morning Bahuns, Dalits and Tamangs who raised 
cattle or buffalo and wanted to sell their milk came to milk collection centres run 
by “Dairy Masters.”80 The Dairy Master did not discriminate according to the 
caste of the seller, and the milk was all mixed together, to be sold in town centres 
like Dhulikhel and even Kathmandu where the customers would not know or 
care about the origins of the milk.  
 The commercial spaces that I have described seem caste-free at the surface 
but a little bit of scratching reveals that they are not entirely free from caste-
consciousness. The notion of purity is still in play here, covertly. Although Dalits 
are treated as equals as customers, all the cheeyapasals in Patle Gau are either run 
by Bahun or by Tamangs. None of them are run by a Dalit. It seems that Dalits 
cannot sell tea or food-items because a non-Dalit tacitly refuses to accept food 
from them. The arena of the cheeyapasal does not seem to have changed much 
since April M. Putman observed it in 1975: 
                                                          
80 Anyone running a milk collection centre is called a “dairy master” as it were in English. There 
is no Nepali translation to this.  
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Since tea shop is virtually neutral in terms of ritual purity, all 
caste/ethnic groups will drink tea prepared by any “touchable caste” 
(Nepali: pani chalne jat) (Putnam, 1975, p. 11)  
Similarly, since Bahuns in Patle Gau do not openly consume alcohol, they keep a 
safe distance from it. None of them is involved in bhatee businesses81. It is a choice 
they have made for maintenance of distinction. Tamangs and the Dalits freely 
consume alcohol, but only Tamangs produce and sell it, either from their homes 
or in bhattees. No bhattee is operated by a Dalit. The same principle of purity is in 
operation here too. Similarly, even though Dalits sell milk to Dairy Masters, none 
of them sell directly to the Bahuns or Tamangs in Patle Gau. Since most of the 
Bahuns and Tamangs keep one or more cows or buffaloes, their demand is 
already met from within their respective communities. All the Dairy Masters who 
mix milk and work as “sellers” are either from the Bahun or Tamang community, 
none are Dalits. In this way, it seems that a whole segment of the food-based rural 
economy is still blocked to the Dalits by an “invisible wall,” here they can 
participate equally as customers, as spenders but not as entrepreneurs or money-
makers. 
 Perhaps this “invisible wall” is “visible” to Tikaram Dhalkoti, a Dalit man 
who possesses considerably more wealth than his fellow Dalits. He has two 
houses. While he lives in the house amongst the other Dalits, he has rented out 
the second one by the side of the highway to a Tamang family. That Tamang 
family runs a “hotel”82 there. If it were not for the “invisible wall” perhaps 
Tikaram Dhalkoti would have run this lucrative “hotel” himself.  
                                                          
81 I was told that Bahuns and Chhetris of nearby villages freely consume alcohol in bhattees. 
And, in cities and in diaspora alcohol consumption amongst “high-caste” peoples is widely 
accepted. 
82 “Hotel”, a western word and concept, in rural Nepal is not a hotel in the sense imagined by a 
more urban-centred person. “Hotel” in Patle Gau is not at all like a hotel in Kathmandu or 
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Public spaces: Increasingly More Egalitarian 
Public spaces such as schools, meeting halls, co-operative buildings, 
government and non-government office premises are also purportedly 
discrimination-free areas (Figure 18). Dalit children sit alongside the non-Dalit 
ones to learn, play and eat together (Figure 19). Adult Dalits participate without 
any physical discrimination in meeting halls of co-operative buildings and in the 
premises of government and non-government offices. 
Figure 18 Women of different caste and ethnic groups sit together to conduct the 
monthly meeting of a women’s co-operative (Photo by author) 
 
Figure 19 Children of different caste and ethnic groups learn together in a local pre-
primary school (Photo by author) 
 
                                                          
Western cities. Instead it is similar to a restaurant where alcoholic, non-alcoholic drinks, 
breakfast, lunch, snacks and dinner can be served with or without room accommodations.  
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But it was not always like this. Dalits have suffered from discrimination 
in accessing common resources such as forests and drinking water. A glimpse of 
such a past was narrated to me by Durga Bishwakarma (B. K.), a Dalit woman in 
her late 30s.  
 After acquiring Durga’s contact details from my field assistant Sujan 
Purkoti, I first met Durga B.K. in Kathmandu in April 2014. In late 1990s, she was 
married into the village, just next to Patle Gau, from a town called Banepa, a one-
hour drive from Patle Gau. Ever since her husband found a job as a murtikar 
(sculptor of small metal statues) in Kathmandu some years back, Durga divides 
her time almost equally between Kathmandu, where her husband lives and Patle 
Gau, where her children and in-laws continue to stay. Formally educated only 
up to eighth standard, Durga is gifted with needar (brave) qualities. She is not any 
aimai (a colloquial and almost disrespectful reference to woman) or even a mahila 
(a more respectful reference to woman). For me she most closely resembles a 
naree (an honorific reference to a woman who is empowered with leadership 
qualities). These qualities are largely the reason she is now an advisor to a 
woman’s co-operative group which was established through her pivotal efforts.  
One day, talking about caste relations in Patle Gau, Durga said:   
As Dalits we have had our share of struggle here. A few days after 
my marriage I collected some fuelwood and fodder from the forest 
close to my home. But in the evening a ban heralu (forest overseer) 
came to my house to warn me not to do it anymore. He even took 
away the tools and equipment I had used to make the collection. I 
asked my family members why that was happening. They told me 
that they had been told that the forest belonged to a group of 
Humagain Bahuns. I then asked where our own community forest 
was. They said they had none. So, they had been “stealing” fuelwood 
and fodder from the same forest during night or early dawn. Since 
they happened to collect only a little, the “stealing” was never 
exposed.  
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Curious to learn more about the forest, I started to investigate by 
consulting Shyam Kuikel and Narayan Kuikel, both Bahun men who 
were associated with Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist 
Leninist), and Narayan Sharma, another Bahun man and the 
Principal of a local public school. All three told me that the forest had 
grown not on private but on public land. In my inquiry, I found that 
Shasheedhar Humagain, a Bahun man who also happened to be a 
former Pradhan Pancha83 had actually mobilised the thirty Dalit 
families84 to donate their labour to plant trees there in exchange for 
the use of water coming from a natural spring in the forest. 
Shasheedhar Humagain along with other Bahun thula bada (big men) 
however, did not let the Dalits harvest the forest, especially for 
fuelwood purposes. This occurred around the mid-1980s during the 
Panchayat era. Shasheedhar and the gang knew that the forest was 
created in a public place but had somehow managed to keep the 
Dalits in dark. But then in those times even if the Dalits knew, what 
could they do?  After the end of authoritative Panchayat regime in 
1990, Shasheedhar quickly shifted his loyalty from the king to the 
new political power of the time, the Nepali Congress. But since it was 
a time of competitive parliamentary democracy I began consulting 
with other local (Bahun) leaders but associated with the communist 
thoughts and were opposing Sasheedhar Humagain. All of them 
confirmed that the forest was built on a public land and those 
residing closest to it had the right to manage it and benefit from it if 
it could be registered as a community forest.  
With this knowledge I sought help from a bolna sakne Tamangni didi (a 
Tamang sister who can stand up and speak up for herself). Fulmaya 
Tamang is her name. She and I went to a local forest office where we 
were briefed on how to register the forest as a community forest. 
After about three or four months of bureaucratic procedures, we 
were able to do that with us (the thirty Dalit Households) as the 
primary Users and Management Group. Of course, the Humagains 
protested and threatened us by saying, “You will get access to this 
forest only if we allow you” to which I retorted by saying, “This is 
not your baau’s jagga (father’s land). This is public land. Tomorrow 
all the thirty Dalit families shall go to the forest with our tools and 
                                                          
83 Equivalent to the post of Chair of a Village Development Committee during the Panchayat 
regime. 
84 Two Bishwokarma and twenty-eight Pariyar families. 
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equipment to collect fuelwood. Whatever happens shall happen in 
the forest.” They never came. 
To my question of how she was able to summon so much courage, Durga 
responded: 
Necessity. All of us needed fuelwood and fodder and we had no 
other option. When people are starving terribly they might start 
sucking tree saps to survive, no? Also, I knew from radio and 
television that public lands and community forests can be accessed 
by anyone. Equality is the basis. Jat pat ya thulo sano ko kura hunna 
tyaha (no influence of caste and status is applicable there). But then 
again, I also got help of other people like Fulmaya Tamang and the 
full support of all the thirty Dalit families.   
Talking about accessing drinking water, Durga B. K. went on: 
We did not have separate taps for drinking water. When the Bahuns 
came to fill their pots, we had to keep a distance and let them get the 
water first. But after 1990 adherence to such strict practices got much 
laxer. Now we have piped waters coming to houses in each cluster so 
it is not a contested issue any more.   
Most villages in more remote districts of the Mid and Far Western Regions 
like Accham still have two separate taps with a wall in between to provide 
drinking water to Dalit and non-Dalit. But Patle Gau now has piped water. The 
piped water reaches every house near the Arniko highway, and there are water 
sprouts near each settlement where water can be accessed. Since the three groups 
are spatially segregated each living in its own bastee, each bastee has its own 
source of drinking water. Hence it is not a source of inter-caste contentions. 
Besides this incident narrated to me by Durga B. K., I did not see or hear anything 
contentious regarding drinking water during my fieldwork.  
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Quasi-private Space: Where Dalits Want ijjāt  
Ijjat is close to dignity, self-respect. Therefore, ideally any one in Patle Gau 
has ijjat as long as she has lost it through acts of immorality or criminality. So 
even an economically poor person has ijjat if she is earning her living through 
legal and socially accepted means. Contrarily, a rich powerful person may lose 
his ijjat in a society if has committed a crime or socially unaccepted act such as 
stealing, murdering, etc. I use this concept of ijjat to illustrate below how every 
Dalit seeks to live her life with ijjat in her “quasi-private spaces” as well. But first 
I want to elaborate a little on what I mean by “qausi-priavte space.”  
It is easy to identify private farms and even forests in western countries 
because boards like “Private property. Do not trespass.” emphatically warn any 
potential trespassers. But not so in Nepal. Private houses in cities may be 
protected by walls but private farms are not marked in this way. Sometimes it is 
difficult to know where a public road ends and where private land begins. And, 
walking in someone’s lands, especially if fallow, and sitting in the open spaces of 
a private house is not considered serious trespassing. I refer to these spaces, 
including courtyards, as quasi-private spaces. It is these quasi-private spaces that 
set the scene for the practice of untouchability. While Dalits are the ones who 
these practices target, the “discriminator” is a non-Dalit, Bahun or Tamang.  
 During a casual conversation, a couple of Dalit women confided in me that 
when they had visited a Tamang household to pay respects to the soul of a dead 
Tamang person laid on the ground in front of a Tamang house, they were told 
not to “touch” the body and maintain some distance, a request to which they 
acquiesced. But such demure compliance does not occur everywhere all the time. 
Acts of resistance and revolt have occurred. Recalling a socially charged event 
Meena Purkoti, a Dalit woman in her early 30s who also doubles as an active 
“development agent”, once narrated such an act to me: 
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… since we don’t own much land one of the ways of earning income 
is to work as farm labourers. We normally labour on Bahuns’ lands. 
They have much land and when the labour from their own family 
members or kinship relations is not sufficient— usually at the times 
of seeding, planting, weeding, and harvesting— they seek our 
labour. As a rule when we work in these farms it is the landowners 
who provide khaja (snacks) during the day at around three o’clock 
and cash for the work at the end of the day. Chiura (beaten rice) with 
some kind of vegetables usually make up a typical khaja. We do eat 
together maintaining some distance in the farm. We then later wash 
the plates with which khaja is served and place the plates by the side 
of the fields. The Bahuns later collect the plates.   
It was one of these events in the month of September in 2007, when 
Gopal Purkoti, a thirteen-year-old Dalit boy went to pick up his plate 
of khaja but also happened to touch another plate by the side of his. 
The other plate was meant for a Bahun woman working in the same 
field. The Bahun woman considered the food touched by a Dalit boy 
“impure” and in a fit of rage verbally and physically abused the boy 
for “polluting” the food. The boy told his parents in the evening and 
I came to know about it only the next day. I immediately called a 
meeting between the adult Dalits and we decided to confront the 
Bahun woman … We were so angry that we wanted to do the same 
to her. So about twenty or so of us stormed to the area where the 
Bahun woman lived to find her and teach her a “lesson.” But the 
Bahun patriarchs protected her and she did not come out of the 
house.  The patriarchs apologised on her behalf and promised that 
such an incident would not be repeated in the future. 
When I asked Meena if they did, or did not seek the help of local police or Chief 
District Officer (CDO) office, she simply said: 
No, we did not. The office is that far, about 30 minutes bus ride. And 
you know how the local administration is. They would either ignore 
such a case or delay it without taking any concrete action. 
I then asked what prompted them to take the action that they did. Meena 
replied: 
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The radio and other media sources plus some bujhne (understanding) 
people keep informing us that such caste-based discriminatory 
behaviour was banned in Nepal. We are equal citizens like any other 
Nepali. How can we tolerate this? We also have ijjat 
(respect/dignity). 
Bahuns, Dalits and Tamangs continue to meet in quasi-private spaces. But 
overt assertions of caste superiority are receding. Bahuns still require Dalit labour 
in their farms when collective Bahun labour is inadequate at times such as 
harvesting, weeding and planting. Likewise, the predominantly poor Dalits also 
need the money available through these casual farm labouring opportunities. 
This economic mutual inter-dependence makes the two work together in 
agricultural farms where they still continue to eat and drink separately alongside 
each other typically without any physical and verbal abuse. In a similar manner, 
they live in close but separate bastees, such that while caste distinctions are 
maintained, ijjat is also retained.  
Private Spaces: The Most Dynamically Negotiated Space 
One afternoon as I was observing the details of making jānd (local beer) in 
a Tamang house we heard a cry from outside, “Didi, didi (sister, sister).” 
Recognising the voice, the Tamang woman making jānd said to me, “Oh. That is 
Gopal Bhai (brother) from Sarkee tole. He probably wants to buy some jānd.” So, 
she poured some jānd into an empty beer bottle and sealed the bottle’s mouth 
with a cap made out of corn cob and went out. I followed her. Standing outside 
the veranda of the house was a man who I inferred to be Gopal Bhai, a young 
Dalit local resident in Patle Gau After exchanging niceties, the Tamang woman 
exchanged the jānd with some money from Gopal. 
 A few weeks later I was in the same house where I had observed the jānd 
making, to talk with the household head Autar Singh Lama, an 80-year-old 
Tamang man. As we were talking about his life in Patle Gau and about his own 
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particular life history, I managed to lead the conversation towards the issue of 
untouchability. He emphatically said that the Tamangs in Patle Gau not only do 
not accept any food or water from the Dalits but Dalits also do not enter their 
houses. When I asked him why it was so, he simply said, “It is just the way it has 
been. It is our challan (tradition).”  
 The conversation with Autar Singh Lama also reminded me of a casual 
conversation I had with Siromani Sapkota, in which I had the opportunity to ask 
him about issues around untouchability in Patle Gau. Siromani had emphatically 
said, “I have not let any Dalit enter my house yet. My dharma does not allow that.” 
I feel Siromani used Dharma in all its three senses – religion (he is a Hindu), duty 
(it is his duty to follow the rules of Hindu religion) and the natural order of things 
(it is “natural” for a Hindu to act according to one’s caste). I felt too awkward to 
carry the conversation any further, and I reminded myself that Siromani’s family 
is a priestly family. Although Siromani does not provide priestly services, but is 
instead more engaged in works of “development” and local “politics”, his father 
had been a priest. Now two of his four brothers living in close quarters are 
practicing priests. Maintaining Bahun purity must have been important for the 
sustenance of priestly practice and livelihoods. This is perhaps the reason why 
during the entire period of my fieldwork I did not see any Dalit in the premises 
of the Sapkota tole. Although I did not see any Dalit come into the residences of 
the Sapkotas, the Dalits did come to Bahuns’ farms as hired labourers working 
alongside the Bahuns. They worked together but ate separately during the 
breaks. 
 The adherence to caste-based practices is not strictly and exclusively a 
rural phenomenon. Although in the diaspora, say in Australia, UK or USA, non-
Dalits are found to eat foods touched and prepared by the Dalits without 
hesitation, I witnessed two instances in Kathmandu city during my fieldwork 
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period that contradicts this. Once after I had finished interviewing a Bahun 
government employee in his quarter in Kathmandu about government policies 
related to poverty and social inclusion, he made a remark about another Dalit 
employee who had just left. He had not liked the free movement of this Dalit 
colleague into the dining and kitchen area. He had this to say to me: 
Ke garne (what to do)?85 If this were my house in the village, he 
would not have been moving so easily in and out of the kitchen and 
dining area. But you know this is a government quarter so I cannot 
say anything. But deep inside I am not very comfortable with it. 
A few weeks later I found myself in a Newar86 friend’s house to attend his 
daughter’s birthday party in Kathmandu. Well-travelled in Nepal and around 
the world for a Nepalese man, this friend had gained a PhD from a well-known 
university in Japan which helped him gain a good job with an International Non-
Government Organisation (INGO). I considered him to be quite a “modern” man. 
But when I did not see at the party a mutual Dalit friend of ours who lived about 
fifty metres away I asked the host why this Dalit friend was not at the party. He 
replied in a soft voice, as if he were feeling guilty: 
I don’t have any problem with this thing of jat (caste). But you know 
my elder sisters come from rural background and they do mind such 
things. And I choose not to offend them. Ke garne (what to do)? 
While a modern educated urban man working with donor-funded INGOs 
attributes his adherence to caste-rules and commensality practices to 
“compelling” conditions, back in Patle Gau a few Bahun families, especially the 
ones engaged in commercial businesses, do not feel the pressure of such 
compulsion. While the Dalits eat separately during social rituals like marriage 
                                                          
85 Most Nepalese people commonly and often use “ke garne” when they feel that they have 
succumbed to situations where they feel they have been stripped of any agency to act, when they 
feel helpless, powerless or even clueless.  
86 An ethnic group. 
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ceremonies and keep their used plates separately which the Bahuns eventually 
“repurify” by sprinkling with “soon pani” (water containing gold in any form or 
shape like a finger-ring or earring or necklace is believed to have the ritually 
purifying effect), Rajkumar Purkoti’s case provides an exception to this.  
 I met Rajkumar Purkoti, a Dalit, not in Patle Gau itself but in Banepa where 
he was studying at a local college in standard eleven. He had been the top 
performer of a local school in Patle Gau while studying there and had obtained 
the highest score in School Leaving Certificate Examinations (SLC, level ten). It 
was because he was such a brilliant student that Laxman Timilsina asked him to 
stay over at his place for three months prior to the SLC examinations to help 
Laxman’s son prepare for the exams. Laxman Timilsina, an entrepreneurial 
Bahun, runs a shop that provides tea, snacks, soft drinks and other food items in 
addition to managing a vegetable collection centre. So Rajkumar Purkoti lived in 
Bahun Laxman’s house for three months. Recalling his experiences living in 
Laxman’s place Rajkumar told me: 
I lived as their own. We ate together, slept together. Like their son I 
also did not have to wash my dishes after eating. At least, our village 
is bikashit (developed) to that extent. 
 Unlike Siromani Sapkota, Laxman Timilsina’s family does not engage in 
priestly works, but as I said is engaged in commercial enterprises. For him a good 
performance by his son at school to secure a better future is more important than 
maintaining ritual purity. In an economy where school-based education has 
higher chances of providing good employment opportunities than anything else, 
Laxman Timilsina follows the logic of utilitarian rationale over the logic of 
religious dharma. In any case, even if a few members, mainly the older ones, of 
the Bahun community lament, “what times have come?!” to refer to this incident, 
Laxman Timilsina does “not lose Bahun caste” by doing what he did. While this 
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hypo-caste behaviour does not “raise” Rajkumar’s caste status neither is the 
caste-status of Laxman necessarily “degraded.” Gone are the days in Patle Gau 
when such acts would have been totally unacceptable, requiring Laxman’s entire 
family and his whole abode to undergo “cleansing” rituals. Referring to the same 
incident Siromani Sapkota said to me, “Mandip jee, this is ganatantra 
(democracy). People are ‘free’ to act in whatever ways they want.”  
 Maybe it is ganatantra or maybe Patle Gau has indeed got “bikashit 
(developed)” as Rajkumar Purkoti claims. Whatever happened, times surely 
have changed drastically in Patle Gau as Autar Singh Lama once put it: 
The Bahuns used to eat only the food that we prepared in oil and 
butter87. I don’t know why, but they did not accept bhāt (cooked rice) 
from us in the past. Now they eat anything we give them … I also 
remember them changing clothes before eating. But now they don’t 
do anything like that. In fact, they eat everything … jānd (liquor) too 
(laughs) …  
The ethnographic details that I have narrated above indicate that private 
spaces are the site of more extreme caste-based experiences. It is an arena where 
different actors negotiate “untouchability” using logics of varying kinds.  Private 
spaces are thus an arena where not only rural men but also educated “modern” 
urban men choose to stick to logics dictated by dharma, challan and emotions to 
perpetuate the practice of untouchability. And yet this very arena also 
accommodates actions performed using other (utilitarian) logics whereby even 
the members of “high-castes” opt to “gamble” and break cultural “boundaries.” 
Perhaps the modern capitalist economy and the discourses of progressive state 
act are the source from which these “boundary breaking” actors find their agency 
                                                          
87 In strict Hindu terms, food prepared in ghee, butter and oil is considered choko (pure) but 
food prepared in water for instance rice is considered jutho (impure/polluted). 
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to act in untraditional terms. But in breaking these boundaries it is also important 
to them that they do not lose their “high-caste” status.    
Conclusion 
Starting with a general introduction to Patle Gau itself I have introduced 
in this chapter its three social groups – Bahun, Dalit, Tamang – and their socio-
cultural practices not in isolation and rigidity but in relationality and fluidity. I 
then critically analysed the dynamic cultural politics of “untouchability”, a 
practice that sets the Dalits apart from any non-Dalit, be it Bahun or be it Tamang. 
 Governed for more than two centuries under Hindu-based rules and 
customs, caste-conscious societies like Patle Gau are the site of everyday practices 
that preserve distinction and difference. These distinctions and differences are 
sometimes maintained by state-given identities and sometimes abandoned by 
self-chosen identities. While I did not exhaust all the socio-cultural practices 
which define “belongingness” to any of the three social groups in Patle Gau, I 
provided sufficient evidence to argue that however caste and ethnic identities are 
formed— through self-claimed and validated mythologies, political statements 
or state-sponsored documents— once formed, they tend to be continually 
reproduced through distinctive cultural, religious, linguistic and even economic 
practices. For instance, unlike the past, Bahuns and Dalits sit alongside each other 
in commercial spaces to drink and eat together but like in the past, they do not 
still intermingle so much in the private spaces. Inter-caste marriages are not 
absolutely absent as in the past but the general norm still follows endogamy. 
Consequently, these socio-economic practices create and maintain boundaries, 
though they do not remain totally impervious. Likewise, they cannot be so 
diluted as to become invisible or meaningless (Gellner, 2012). Top-down 
approaches like forming National Dalit Commission at state-centre do not 
necessarily immediately transform caste-relations in everyday lives. Therefore, 
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differentiated by language, religion, rituals, tradition, and influenced by caste-
consciousness and notions of purity and impurity, but governed by the same 
state that preaches equality and inter-dependence for economic reasons, Bahuns, 
Dalits and Tamangs choose to reside in adjacent yet separate geographical 
spaces.  
 Caste-based hierarchical identity is constantly being negotiated by both 
dominant groups seeking to retain “distinction,” and by non-dominant groups 
seeking to dismantle it. Acting within the premises provided by this dialectic and 
provoked by egalitarian values propounded by modern governments as opposed 
to religion-based hierarchy, these social groups themselves regularly negotiate 
their identities. Over time, Achyuts became Dalits, Matwalis became Janajatis and 
even Tagadharis became Khas-Arya. But such changing national identities get 
transmitted to the local level not directly nor immediately and not with the same 
effect on all social groups. The politically-conscious and literate villagers are the 
first ones to take up these identities while the not-so politically conscious and the 
illiterate continue with traditional identities and roles. But the changing social 
and political milieu does provide the marginalised and traditionally lowest 
ranked among the social groups, the Dalits, with some agency, otherwise 
inconceivable, to increasingly assert their claim as equal citizens, and not as lesser 
caste group.  
 Assertions for equality by marginalised social groups, particularly against 
all forms of caste-based discrimination, including the practices of untouchability, 
in all social spaces is a social field that has shown considerable dynamism and 
contradictions.  The progressive and modern state-managers including 
proponents of the Maoist Revolution keen on seeing Nepal as a modern, bikashit, 
progressive and egalitarian nation have attempted to annihilate caste-based 
discrimination practices. These practices have prevented the economically poor 
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Dalits from accessing public resources, living dignified lives (ijjatdar) and from 
fully participating in food-based enterprises. But these discriminatory practices 
continue to show up in various spaces, particularly rural Nepal, although in 
decreasing frequency and intensity. I have shown in this chapter how these 
practices are now less and less overt in public places but continue to persist 
covertly in commercial and private spaces while being fiercely contested in quasi-
private spaces. Only time will tell when and if such discrimination will either 
dissipate totally or reach minimal levels even in private spaces.   
 Having described the cultural core which influences almost all spheres of 
life in Patle Gau in this chapter, I now move into the remaining chapters to see 
how practices of bikas and concrete aspects of materiality are embedded within 
such cultural norms. 
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Chapter 5  
Practice of Bikas, Land and Labour in Patle Gau 
Ram Prasad Sharma                                                                                              
Aammai Ammai                                                                                                 
Unko bauko theeyo saath gauma lekhopakho birta …                                               
Kati tyaagi manche!                                                                                           
Chaadee diye lekhopakho aruko lagee                                                                                                                                                                            
Amar hune bho unko katha,                                                                                      
Ma ta Ram Prasad hoina                                                                                         
Ma banna sakdeena mahaan! ....                                                                            
Ma sanga gumanune bajeko birta chaina …                                                           
Ma kadapee banna sakdina mahaan! 
(Ram Prasad Sharma                                                                                               
Oh my, my                                                                                                           
His Grandfather had Birta lands in seven villages …                                 
How sacrificing is he!                                                                                             
He gave away some lands to others                                                                                                      
His story will be remembered forever                                                                                                     
I am not Ram Prasad Sharma                                                                                             
I cannot be great! …                                                                                                   
I do not have grandfather’s Birta lands to give away …                                     
I can never be great!) 
(Aahuti, 2010, pp. LIII, LIV - my translation) 
When Nepal began the process of modernisation in the 1950s, it started 
undergoing unprecedented changes in all spheres of life. Along with these 
changes three ideologies concurrently entered Nepalese soils and minds: the 
ideologies of nationalism, democracy, and development (bikas). The ideology of 
nationalism was strategically utilised during the Panchayat democracy to 
assimilate all Nepalese social groups into one culture dominated by hill-based 
Hindu populations. While this ideology slowly faded, it briefly made a re-
appearance (mainly expressed in terms of an anti-India sentiments) when India 
informally blockaded Nepal right after Nepal promulgated its new Constitution 
in 2015. This, many people believed, was in support of the resistance posed by 
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the Madheshi groups. As I have shown in previous chapters the ideology of 
democracy was born and re-born in several different avatars, its current form is 
secular federal parliamentary democracy. The ideology of bikas has seen neither 
slumps nor booms like the ideology of nationalism, nor demise and revitalisation 
like the ideology of democracy. It has not only continued to exist since its birth 
but has actually been the darling of all forms of government. Bikas has 
continuously found a prominent place in social and political discourses under 
divergent systems of political governance.  
The discourse of bikas thrived during Panchayat democracy (1962 – 1990), 
blossomed during the constitutional monarchical democracy (1990-2006) and 
continues to flourish in the present day federal republic democracy (2006 – date). 
Despite this, many debate whether bikas has actually occurred. The pursuit of 
bikas through higher economic growth has been constant, first via the heavy-hand 
of the state, and later in the 1990s through the “free market”. Ever since then the 
Nepalese state has committed to neoliberalism, advised by Bretton Wood 
institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), they 
are committed to the idea that “free markets” should lead the practice of bikas, 
monitored only by occasional regulatory state mechanisms. The Nepalese state’s 
adherence to such principles is clearly evidenced by its most recent ambition to 
“graduate” from least-developed status to middle-income country status by 
2030, a feat that is to be achieved through “higher growth-promoting public 
investment” by efficiently maximising productive capacities and “mobilising 
private savings” (GON, 2016b, p. xiii). 
 When such state policies get translated into everyday practices, thousands 
of NGOs start pouring into rural villages to deliver bikas88 by conducting training 
                                                          
88 The NGO Federation of Nepal claims that there are about 5,643 NGOs currently operational in 
Nepal (http://www.ngofederation.org/ accessed on 9/12/2015) with tens of them in Kavre. 
 137 
with local communities on commercial vegetable production, to distribute hybrid 
seeds and exotic breeds, to deliver adult literacy programmes, and to construct 
pit-latrines and small bio-gas plants and so on. 
 I critically reflected upon the discourses of bikas in my previous chapters 
and in the present one I want to analytically explore how bikas is practiced in 
Patle Gau.  Then by focusing on one particular practice of bikas, I propose to 
analyse the failure of land reform in Patle Gau— like elsewhere in Nepal— a 
failure which continues to have major repercussions to this day. Throughout my 
analysis, I also seek to provide structural explanations for why certain social 
groups attained access to land, and how this effected the economic base of each 
social group. Highlighting the importance of land in an agrarian economy I then 
examine how the labour of various social groups itself is organised around land-
ownership.  
Practices of Bikas in Patle Gau 
It is no wonder that Siromani Sapkota sees bikas in the NGO-sponsored 
construction of pit-latrines and bio-gas plants. This bikas activity neatly falls 
within the Ministry of Health’s assertion that the improved health of Nepalese 
citizens is both a pre-requisite and an outcome of bikas:  
The Ministry of Health plays a leading role in improving the health 
of the people including mental, physical and social well-being, for 
overall national development with the increased participation of the 
private sector and non-government institutions in the 
implementation of programmes.89  
                                                          
Interested readers can read (Bhattachan, Dahal, & Rana, 2001; Bongartz & Dahal, 1996) for critical 
examination of the bikase roles played by NGOs in Nepal.  
89 From http://www.mohp.gov.np (GON, 2017). 
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Thoroughly persuaded by such discourses, when Siromani Sapkota talks about 
bikas in Patle Gau, he has this to say to me: 
This village used to be quite dirty some years back since not every 
house had a latrine. Thanks to the efforts by an NGO it is much 
cleaner. Almost all families were assisted to build pit-latrines. And 
some homes were even helped with the construction of small bio-gas 
plants which they use to cook food. In that sense, this village is quite 
bikashit (“developed”) now.   
Siromani’s kaka (uncle), Murali Sapkota finds bikas in the mechanisation of 
agricultural farms. He is one of the Bahun families who have recently started 
using small hand-held tractors for ploughing the fields to prepare them for 
planting various crops. When I asked him about the tractor, Murali said this to 
me: 
You know in the past, we Bahuns, were not supposed to labour 
physically, not in the farms. We were just meant to do priestly and 
scholarly works. And it was enough. But now times have changed. 
There is not a plentiful supply of labour. So, we work in our fields 
too. But this tractor has reduced so much of the drudgery involved in 
farming. And this also means that we don’t need to ask for labour or 
hire labour for certain kinds of works. Using manual labour those 
tasks would have taken so many days. Now this tractor does the 
same things in a matter of few hours. That is bikas, no? 
For Meena Purkoti, a Dalit woman, and an Executive Member of the aptly 
named Namuna Naree Chetana Bachat tatha Hrin Sahakari Santha (Model Conscious 
Women Savings and Credit Co-operative) bikas happens when the level of chetana 
(consciousness) is “raised” (Fujikura, 2001, 2013). Therefore, she suggests that 
Dalits are more bikashit (developed) now than before because now they have 
“learnt” to eat healthy and nutritious foods grown fresh in their own kitchen 
gardens (Figure 20): 
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Previously almost no Dalit family cultivated vegetables like this. But 
because of programmes by the District Agriculture Development 
Office and District Public Health Office some of them now know how 
to be healthy by eating vegetables cultivated in their own kitchen 
gardens. They are now more bikashit than before.  
Figure 20 Meena Purkoti stands by the side of a vegetable garden of a Dalit family     
(Photo by author) 
 
It is not only the materiality of pit-latrines and vegetable gardens, or the 
abstract notion of raised consciousness that invoke a sense of bikas in Patle Gau 
residents. A young Dalit man Rajkumar Purkoti finds bikas in the changing inter-
caste social relations, which he sees to be increasingly less discriminatory 
(Chapter Four): 
Maybe in our village, (jat paat ko bhed bhaav) caste-based 
discrimination is lot less than it used to be. It was not like this before. 
I therefore, think our village is more bikashit now.  
For many bikas is an illusion, a mystery, a puzzle which everybody else 
seems to understand (Greig, et al., 2007). They remain sceptical of bikas’s meaning 
and intent. A Dalit man in his late 50s, Jit Bahadur Pariyar ekes out his living by 
following his traditional caste-based occupation of tailoring, through which he 
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earns barely enough to feed his family. In a response to my casual conversation 
with him about life in general in Patle Gau, he said: 
Bikas bikas bhanchan sabai. Khoi k ho bikas thaha chaina. Afusanga na pugdo 
jagga cha, na kamai. Afulai ta bharai bholee k khaaun bhanne cha.  
(Everybody says “development”, “development”. What is 
development? I don’t know. I have neither enough land nor sufficient 
income. My immediate concerns are how to eat tonight and 
tomorrow). 
Contrary to Siromani, Murali, Meena, and Rajkumar, Jit denies any 
understanding of bikas, whatsoever. It may be because although these people live 
in the same small space of Patle Gau, Jit is so different from Siromani, Meena, 
and Rajkumar. Sirnomani Sapkota is a former VDC chair and currently chairs the 
local School Management Committee and a local co-op. Meena Purkoti is an 
“active” member of a local woman’s co-operative. Rajkumar Purkoti is an 
educated young man. Jit Bahadur does not have any form of such capital. He has 
never been to school and hence cannot read and write. No one has asked him to 
directly manage or help manage any development projects in Patle Gau. Jit is 
mostly engrossed in labouring to ensure his family’s economic subsistence. His 
disconnection with practices of bikas perhaps explains his naivety. Despite the 
ignorance of people like Jit about bikas, bikas gets practiced in Patle Gau anyhow.  
 Bikas today in Patle Gau is primarily regarded as taking the form of pit-
latrines, kitchen gardens, raised consciousness and lessening social 
discrimination. But in the past bikas was something else.  Bikas was understood 
quite differently in the 1950s and 1960s when it first entered Patle Gau as part of 
Nepal’s nation-wide pioneering experiments with modernity. Bikas was 
introduced to Nepalese in many different forms simultaneously, but chemical 
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fertiliser and land reform were its earliest avatars. As Bhoj Raj Sapkota, a Bahun 
man aged 87, remembers: 
I got to see bikase mal (“developed” fertiliser) for the first time as the 
government began distributing it in our village at that time. Until 
then we only used gobar mal (cow-dung) in the farms. Most of us 
could barely eat enough because of low farm yield but I have to 
admit using bikase mal we substantially increased farm production. 
Along with bikase mal, bikas’s presence was also almost concurrently felt in 
Patle Gau, with the arrival of officials and technicians, who acting on behalf of 
the state, wanted to modernise land tenure administration systems in Nepal. The 
state at this time desired to abolish some of the previously held tax-free land 
tenure systems and in their place apply modern state-centric land tenure systems 
for easing the processes of collecting taxes. To achieve this, the state also wanted 
to distribute land deeds to the designated owners for the first time. Many 
viciously competed for land deeds in Patle Gau. This competition eventually led 
to some social groups having much more land than the others, resulting in the 
present-day unequal distribution of land in Patle Gau. But since land reform is 
itself a practice embedded within the larger national discourse of bikas in Nepal, 
it is important first to understand how bikas is managed in Patle Gau and in Kavre 
district in which Patle Gau is situated. I complement this understanding by 
analysing which groups and individuals have greater access to leading and 
managing bikas, and what mechanisms have allowed them to gain this control.  
Management of Bikas in Patle Gau 
Presently many actors manage bikas in Kavre district, the biggest actors 
being state representatives and institutions, NGOs, co-operatives and the 
villagers themselves, who in bikase jargon, are described as the “recipients” or 
“target group.” Although the Office of the Kavre Chief District Officer (CDO) 
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under the Ministry of Home Affairs is responsible for the general administration 
of Kavre district including the mobilisation of security forces, the Office of the 
District Development Committee (DDC) under the Ministry of Local 
Development90 is responsible for the overall co-ordination of bikase activities in 
the district.   
 While the CDO can directly mobilise security forces such as the armed 
police forces, the DDC co-ordinates a number of bikase offices such as District 
Agriculture Development Office, District Livestock Development Office, District 
Forestry Office, District Land-Conservation Office, Drinking Water Division, 
Division Road Office, District Education Office and the like which are all staffed 
by the state’s civil personnel. The bikase offices report to three different 
institutions: (i) CDO’s office for general administration, (ii) respective line 
ministries and departments for technical advices and bureaucratic procedures, 
and (iii) DDC for overall programme planning and implementation. The DDC 
has several committees such as the Infrastructure Development Committee, the 
Agriculture Forest and Environment Committee, and the Water Resource and 
Land Committee to co-ordinate the activities of these bikase offices. The bikase 
offices then deliver their programmes such as drinking-water connections, 
community training, small-irrigation programmes, literacy programmes and so 
on through VDC level service centres and sub-centres.  
 Following the principle of “local participation” for implementing local 
needs-based programmes, the offices of DDC and VDCs are supposed to be led 
by locally elected people’s representatives. However, during the time of my 
research all these DDC and VDC offices were “temporarily” filled by government 
officials since local elections for DDCs, municipalities, and VDCs had not 
                                                          
90 The Ministry of Local Development has recently been converted to the Ministry of Federal 
Affairs and Local Development. 
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occurred since 2002. The insecurity during the Maoist conflict, king Gyanendra’s 
illegitimate power take-over, and the uncertainty of the formulation of the new 
constitution were normally the reasons cited for the non-occurrence of local 
elections. So instead of committees formed by elected members of local peoples, 
Kavre had a sarbadaliya (“all-party”) co-ordinating mechanism body both at the 
district level and the grass-roots VDC levels. The, DDC-level co-ordinating body 
was led by a Local Development Officer (LDO), a government employee, rather 
than by an elected District Chair. Political parties “active” in local politics would 
nominate their local resident representatives to fill these positions, which would 
normally have been filled by elected members. Likewise, instead of an elected 
member chairing the VDC, a government employee: the VDC secretary, served 
as the chair of VDC “all-party” co-ordinating committee. As in the case of the 
DDC, the local political parties nominated their local representatives to the VDC-
level “all-party” co-ordinating body to fill the positions left vacant due to the lack 
of elections.  Kavre District at the time of my field visit had five municipalities 
and 76 Village Development Committee (VDC) offices. Figure 21 provides the 
complete list of the members of “all-party” Kavre DDC working committee in 
2014. And, Figures 22 and 23 list the members of all-party VDC working 
committees for two VDCs governing Patle Gau.  
Figure 21 All-Party Kavre DDC Working Committee in 2014 
SN Name  Caste or 
ethnicity 
(gender) 
Post Organisation 
1 Mr. Dilip Kumar 
Chapagain 
Bahun (man) Chair and 
LDO 
Ministry of Local 
Development  
2 Mr. Shankha Buddha 
Lama 
Tamang/Janajati 
(man) 
Member Representative – 
Nepali Congress 
3 Mr. Gokhul Baskota Bahun (man) Member Representative – 
United Marxist-
Leninist Party 
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SN Name  Caste or 
ethnicity 
(gender) 
Post Organisation 
4 Mr. Dinanath Gautam Bahun (man) Member Representative – 
United Nepal 
Communist Party 
(Maoist) 
5 Mr. Dil Kumar Lama Tamang/Janajati 
(man) 
Member Representative – 
Nepal Prajatantric 
Party 
6 Mr. KabiRaj Timilsina Bahun (man) Member Representative – 
Nepali Janata Dal 
7 Mr. Ran Bahadur Bohora Chhetri (man) Member Representative – 
Nepal Communist 
Party – Maxist- 
Leninist 
 
Figure 22 All-party Working Committee in Bela VDC in 2014                                       
(governing one part of Patle Gau) 
SN Name  Caste or 
ethnicity 
(gender) 
Post Organisation 
1 Sanjeev Dahal Bahun (man) Chair and 
VDC -
Secretary 
Ministry of Local 
Development  
2 Kedar Sapkota Bahun (man) Member Representative – 
Nepali Congress 
3 Buddhi Man Tamang Tamang/Janajati 
(man) 
Member Representative – 
United Marxist-
Leninist Party 
4 Sanjay Lama Tamang/Janajati 
(man) 
Member Representative – 
Nepal Prajatantric 
Party 
5 Ram Prasad Chaulagain Bahun (man) Member Representative – 
Nepali Janata Dal 
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Figure 23 All-party Working Committee in Foolbari VDC in 2014                                   
(governing another part of Patle Gau) 
SN Name  Caste or 
ethnicity 
(gender) 
Post Organisation 
1 Umesh Shivakoti Bahun (man) Chair and VDC 
Secretary 
Ministry of Local 
Development  
2 Bikarm Hari Pathak Bahun (man) Member Representative – 
Nepali Congress 
3 Maan Bahadur Tamang Tamang/Janajati 
(man) 
Member Representative – 
United Marxist-
Leninist Party 
4 Harihar Humagain Bahun (man) Member Representative – 
Nepal Prajatantric 
Party 
5 Tirtha Parjauli Bahun (man) Member Representative – 
Nepali Janata Dal 
 
These bodies were not vacant from 1962 to 2002 when Panchayat 
democracy and constitutional monarchy under multi-party democracy were 
fully functional. I provide the lists of people’s representatives heading the 
District Panchayat and DDC and village level development panchayat and 
committees during those times under respective governance systems in Figures 
24 and 25.  
Figure 24 Village Heads in Fulbari VDC (governing one part of Patle Gau) 
Time 
period 
Person Caste or 
ethnicity 
(gender) 
Title Political party 
1962 - 1975 Sarkee Man 
Tamang 
Tamang (man) Pradhan Pancha 
(Village Head) 
Not applicable 
1976 - 1981 Devi Prasad 
Pyakurel 
Bahun (man) Pradhan Pancha 
(Village Head) 
Not applicable 
1982 - 1990 Shashidhar 
Sharma 
Bahun (man) Pradhan Pancha 
(Village Head) 
Not applicable 
1991 - 2002 Govind Satyal Bahun (man) Chair, Village 
Development 
Committee 
Nepali 
Congress 
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Figure 25 Village Heads in Bela VDC (governing another part of Patle Gau) 
Time 
period 
Person Caste or 
ethnicity 
(gender) 
Title Political 
party 
1962 - 
1975 
Ghana Nath 
Kharel 
Bahun (man) Pradhan Pancha 
(Village Head) 
Not 
applicable 
1976 - 
1981 
Shiv Lal 
Danuwar 
Danuwar/Janajati 
(man) 
Pradhan Pancha 
(Village Head) 
Not 
applicable 
1982 - 
1985 
Ghana Nath 
Kharel 
Bahun (man) Pradhan Pancha 
(Village Head) 
Not 
applicable 
1986 - 
1990 
Ghriba Nath 
Kharel 
Bahun (man) Pradhan Pancha 
(Village Head) 
Not 
applicable 
1991 - 
1995 
Jagat Prasad 
Neupane 
Bahun (man) Chair, Village 
Development 
Committee 
Nepali 
Congress 
1996 - 
2002 
Ghribhanath 
Kharel 
Bahun (man) Chair, Village 
Development 
Committee 
United 
Marxist 
Leninist 
 
I have elaborately presented the names, caste, ethnicity, gender and 
political parties in the above lists for a reason. A cursory social and gender 
analysis of these lists show a pattern and trend that is quite striking from 1962 to 
2014, from the Panchayat democracy to parliamentary democracy and to the 
present secular “soon to be fully federated” democracy. Mostly “high-caste” 
Bahun men and occasionally Janajati men have occupied these politically 
powerful posts.  It is extremely important to note this because this signifies that 
it is mostly Bahun men and occasionally Janajati men who have taken up 
leadership positions powerful enough to lead, plan, manage, influence and 
manoeuvre mechanisms and processes of local bikase and related resource 
allocation in Kavre district and in Patle Gau. There has never been a Dalit, and 
never a woman in any of these positions. I shall connect these local power 
configurations to current unequal land holding patterns in Patle Gau to argue 
that the low social capital (Bourdieu, 2011) amongst the Dalits has also been a 
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major cause of their landlessness which the discourse of bikas in the form of land 
reform has failed to address.    
 Before I begin to unravel land-access in detail I now take up two 
illustrations from the present to illustrate how local political powers held by 
Bahuns are used to manipulate the allocation of resources such that fruits of bikas 
reach them first. Although my one-year field-stay in Palte Gau in 2014 was too 
short for me to actually witness any construction of an agri-road, I still want to 
take up this as a bikase activity to support my argument. Let me discuss a 
particular case. The Kavre DDC allocates a certain amount of the budget every 
year for a number of agricultural fair-weather roads through the district with the 
aim of eventually connecting every village to the main Arniko Highway. An 
agricultural road the construction of which began a few years ago and may 
resume in a few years’ time reaches Patle Gau from the Arniko Highway via a 
bastee where Bahuns reside exclusively (Figure 26). Using this agri-road some 
Bahun farmers have already started mechanising their farms by using small 
hand-held tractors and bringing their farm produce in other tractors to markets. 
However, the agri-road still remains far from the Dalit bastee. The locals including 
Siromani Sapkota tell me that eventually this road will pass through the Dalit 
settlements, providing them with connections to markets, but for the time being 
the Dalits have to do with small walking trails (Figure 27).  
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Figure 26 Agricultural road passing through Bahun settlements in larger Patle Gau    
(Photo by author) 
 
Figure 27 A walking trail to a Dalit house (Photo by author) 
 
Land, a Supreme Asset in Patle Gau 
Since all the residents of Patle Gau are directly or indirectly involved in 
farming, land is an extremely important resource for all residents in Patle Gau. 
Some work their lands as farmers producing cereals and vegetables for 
consumption and sale; some depend on other’s lands where they work as 
seasonal agricultural labourers; and still others run enterprises like vegetable 
collection centres or dairies which in turn depend on land as a primary resource. 
Location of residential land can also hugely influence an individual’s economic 
welfare, social prestige and power (Regmi, 1976; S. R. Sharma, Upreti, & Müller-
Böker, 2013; Wickeri, 2010).  
Agri-road 
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 Compared to lands further away from the Highway, lands closer to the 
Highway vastly improve market connectivity and hence increase land value. 
More accessible lands are thus priced higher than less accessible ones, with a 
considerable price difference between them. For example, the lands by the side 
of Arniko Highway are priced at around NRs 400,000 per ropani91 which is about 
20 times more than the marginal lands much further away from the highway that 
are priced only at around NRs 20,000 per ropani. In the simple economic terms of 
the market prices of these lands, the social groups (mostly Bahuns and Tamangs) 
living by the side of the highway are richer than the Dalits who live in 
comparatively more remote locations. The commercial advantages provided by 
locations are also greatly exploited by Bahuns and Tamangs. They make the most 
out of such locations by converting parts of their residential houses into milk 
collection centres, vegetable collection centres, teashops, grocery-shops, pubs, 
and other spaces where commercial transactions can occur.  
 Besides benefitting economically from lands well-connected to the outside 
world through roads, people living close to roads, like Sironmani Sapkota and 
Jayjeev Dhakal—local elite Bahun men— also enjoy greater access to outsiders. 
Such proximity to roads allows them to be the first point of contact for outsiders. 
Outsiders not only come as customers wanting to buy food and drinks but can 
also come as bikas agents and practitioners, representatives of government and 
non-government “development agents” or even researchers such as me. For 
outsiders, people like Siromani and Jayjeev generally are the first and often the 
only “link” to the village. Almost by default adopting the position of “key local 
informants” in bikase jargon, they may in fact end up being the only “local” voices 
                                                          
91 A unit of land measurement used primarily in the hills and Kathmandu Valley. It is 
approximately 5,476 square feet or 509 square meters. 
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ever heard by state development agents. A position which they are often able to 
leverage to shape the image of the village and articulate its bikase needs to outside 
development agents, with the effect that they become the bikase brokers and 
translators in Patle Gau (Lewis & Mosse, 2006). Listening only to these voices, the 
bikase agents may never hear the voices of the Dalits who live in comparatively 
“remote” places within Patle Gau, and thus may plan bikase activities on the basis 
of profoundly distorted and self-interested representations of reality. 
As a natural primary resource land can also influence access to another 
secondary human-made resource: education. A state-run public secondary 
school (Pancheswor Madhyamik Bidhyalaya)—managed mostly by men of Bahun 
origins— providing formal education up to level ten is the school which most 
children from Patle Gau attend. Although the Dalits themselves can walk to the 
school in about 30 minutes, the school is located in Pathak (Bahun) tole. This was 
explained to me because administratively the school administration (mostly led 
and managed by Bahun men – Figures 28 and 29) found it easy to buy about 
twenty ropanies of land from one single owner, a Pathak man – Bikram Hari 
Pathak. And because Bikram Hari Pathak donated a few ropanies of land to the 
school this made the decision to build the school there even easier. As Aahuti has 
said in a beautiful poem at the start of this chapter, the Dalits traditionally did 
not possess vast lands like this either to sell or donate.  
Figure 28 Panchewor School Management Committee 
SN Name Caste or 
ethnicity 
Gender Position 
1 Siromani Sapkota Bahun Man Chairperson 
2 Tilak Bahadur Lama Tamang/Janajati Man Member  
3 Dhruba Regmi Bahun Man Member 
4 Basudev Pyakurel Bahun Man Member 
5 Basodha Ghimire Bahun Woman Female Member 
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SN Name Caste or 
ethnicity 
Gender Position 
6 Shiv Prasad 
Tripathee 
Bahun Man Member 
7 Harisharan Acharya Bahun Man Member 
8 Govind Prasad 
Timilsina 
Bahun Man Member 
9 Ramesh Raj Pathak Bahun Man Teacher Representative  
10 Kedar Nath Ghimire Bahun Man Member-Secretary 
(School Principal) 
 
Figure 29 Panchewor School Parent-Teacher Association 
SN Name Caste or 
ethnicity 
Gender Position 
1 Neel Prasad Parajuli Bahun Man Chairperson 
2 Prahlad Sapkota Bahun Man Member  
3 Astman Tamang Tamang/Janajati Man Member 
4 Kalpana Purkoti Dalit Woman Member 
5 Jamuna Adhikary Bahun Woman Member 
6 Badri Prasad Adhikary Bahun Man Member 
7 Hari Prasad Humagain Bahun Man Member 
8 Ratna Prasad Sapkota Bahun Man Member 
9 Puspa Prasad Pathak Bahun Man Member  
10 Nar Prasad Humagain Bahun Man Member 
11 Kedar Nath Ghimire Bahun Man Member-Secretary 
(School Principal) 
 
Land, an important resource for not only for economic reasons but also for 
social prestige is, however, held in disproportionate proportions by three social 
groups in Patle Gau because of differential access to social and political powers 
by the three social groups which I shall present in the coming pages. 
Unequal Land-holding in Patle Gau 
My land related data is based on the survey results that I conducted in the 
third month of the field-work in 2014. The 51 households which I represented in 
Figure 9 in Chapter Four provided me with the data used in this chapter. I 
regularly revised and updated the data as my understanding of Patle Gau 
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deepened with the passing of time, and after I could validate some of the survey 
results with whatever access that I could arrange at the District Land Revenue 
Office, Kavre.  
 I want to stress here that before carrying out the survey I had taken a 
number of formal and informal interviews to comprehend the significance of 
land in terms of agricultural production. Most interlocutors agreed that due to 
the lack of year-round irrigation facilities a household with about six family 
members needed at least ten ropanies of land to produce enough food (mostly 
maize, wheat, and barley) for a year.92 I therefore used the landholding size of ten 
ropanies as a cut-off point for self-sufficiency and have described families holding 
ten ropanies or more as “landed”. “Landed”, however, should not be confused 
with “landlord” (zamindar) to denote someone who owns very large tracts of 
land. In current times at least in principle one can only hold lands in accordance 
to the ceiling imposed by the government. Many individuals thought to hold 
lands in excess of this ceiling were targets of violence during the Maoists 
Revolution, and thus the term zamindar is today quite unpopular and little used. 
However, when a man like Bikram Hari Pathak—long dead now, who owned 
more than hundreds of ropanis prior to the 1964 land reform— is remembered in 
Patle Gau, he is usually remembered as a zamindar or saujee (rich business-like 
man). 
 Various government and non-government development agencies use 
their own classificatory schemes to categorise farmers based on their land-size 
holding. For instance, the Agriculture Development Strategy (ADS) (2015 – 2035) 
the latest agriculture development policy of the Government of Nepal suggests 
                                                          
92 No land in Nepal can actually be “owned” by any individual since all lands within the territory 
of state of Nepal belong solely to Government of Nepal. Yet under Raikar system, individuals are 
provided with “land deeds” through which land tenure is granted to them, enabling them to 
perform any market transaction after paying necessary taxes and fees. 
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four such categories: (i) landless or near-landless (holding less than 4.75 ropanies), 
(ii) subsistence farmer (holding more than 4.75 to less than 19 ropanies), (iii) small 
commercial farmer (holding more than 19 to less than 95 ropanies), and (iv) 
commercial farmer (holding 95 or more ropanies). Such a blanket national policy 
is however often blind to location specificities, and can yield distorted pictures. 
Most families who engage in commercial vegetable production, with lands more 
than say ten ropanies in Patle Gau, would be, according to the ADS document 
subsistence farmers. But such “subsistence farmers” resemble commercial 
farmers in the sense that they can successfully make profits from commercial 
vegetable production.  Therefore, to avoid such misrepresentations, I rather use 
the local vernacular terms such as jagga chaina (no land), tho-thorai (little), ali ali 
(some) and ramrai (good) to categorise land-size holdings in Patle Gau into four 
different groups.  
 
 According to local perspectives the first category of families who virtually 
have no land (jagga chaina) are landless. This is not to suggest that the families 
belonging to this category have started to squat on others’ lands or have been 
evicted from their dwellings. Rather it means that whatever negligible 
landholding they may have around their slum-like houses is “economically 
useless” and thus these lands produce virtually no crop either for consumption 
or for sale. The second category of families are said to have tho-thorai (little) land 
if they possess dui char (two, four) ropanies which typically yield crops that last 
between three to four months. Those who have ali ali (some) land possess seven 
or eight ropanies with produce lasting for seven to eight months. Finally, any 
family holding ten or more ropanies is considered to hold ramrai (good) amount 
of land, and is effectively food self-sufficient (able to produce food from their 
own land for a year). Using this logic which relates land-size holding with yearly 
food production in this local context, I have classified the families in the village 
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into four categories: (a) jagga chaina (“no land” or landless), (b) tho-thorai (little 
holding or near landless: holding less than five ropanies), (c) ali ali (“some” or 
small holding: holding between five and less than ten ropanies), and (d) ramrai 
(“good” or landed: holding ten or more ropanies). The result of my survey using 
these categories is presented in Figure 30. 
Figure 30 Landholding distribution between the three social groups in Patle Gau 
Landholding (in ropanies) 
No. of Dalit Family 
(% of the total)  Bahun 
Family 
(%) 
Tamang 
Family 
(%) 
Meejar 
(%) 
Pariyar 
(%) 
Landless (none to less than 1) 0 (0.00) 3 (33) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Near landless (1 to less than 5)  10 (71.4) 6 (67) 3 (21) 2 (15.38) 
Small-holder (5 to less than 10) 3 (21.4) 0 (0) 2 (14) 3 (23.08) 
Landed (10 or more)  1 (7.2) 0(0) 9 (65) 8 (61.54) 
Total  14 (100) 9 (100) 14 (100) 13 (100) 
 
The survey results show significant inequalities across ethnic and caste 
groups. While none of the Bahun and Tamang families are landless, three Dalit 
(Pariyaar) families are. Most Dalits do not possess enough land required to feed 
a family for a year, i.e. 10 ropanis. Most Dalit families, around 70%, are 
concentrated in the first two categories (landless and near landless. Most Bahun 
and Tamang families, about 80%, cluster in the latter two categories (small-holder 
or landed). Likewise, the average landholding per family for Brahmins, Dalits 
and Tamangs is 9.92, 1.59 and 10.60 ropanis respectively.93 My results are not 
particularly surprising. They, in fact, reflect other the results of other reports 
presenting similar caste and ethnicity based patterns of disparities in land-
holding: “high castes” own more, “low castes” own less (UNDP-Nepal, 2004). I 
have, however, treated one Dalit person as an outlier since he has much more 
land than other Dalit families, as such I have not included him in my calculations. 
                                                          
93 The calculation does not include values given by Tikaram who I have considered to be an 
outlier. 
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But even if his landholding of 29 ropanies, which many Bahuns and Tamangs 
already hold, is included in the calculation, the results that I have just discussed 
would not be changed significantly.  This Dalit man is Tikaram Dhalkoti – whom 
I have already discussed when describing the residential pattern in Patle Gau. 
Tikaram, now 68, left his village a few kilometres away from Patle Gau when he 
was only eleven. Remembering parts of his life, Tikaram said: 
I had nothing to lose at that time. We were very poor and so it did 
not matter where we went. So, a few of us got together and headed 
to India to try our luck. We came to a city which now I know as 
Calcutta and stayed there. For a couple of years, I worked as a 
domestic help to a Bengali family. Later, the Sau (house-owner) 
helped me get a labouring job at the Indian Railways. In time, I 
became a mechanic and worked for 20 years after which I took 
voluntary retirement and returned to Nepal. I liked this place here 
and had enough money from my job to buy 30 ropanis of land from 
the Acharya Bahuns in the early 1970s. The Acharyas sold and 
migrated to besi (flat lands). 
Besides Tikaram, no other Dalit possesses ten or more ropanies of land. To 
understand this caste and ethnicity based disparity in landholding in Patle Gau, 
it is imperative to understand the local history. But since the local history itself is 
embedded in the larger national history of the Nepalese efforts at land reform, I 
now briefly narrate the latter.  
History of Land and Land Reform in Nepal 
For a long time the Nepalese monarch was thought to be the only Malik 
(property owner) or Bhupati (lord of the land) of all the lands falling within the 
jurisdiction of the nation-state of Nepal (Forbes, 1999; Wily, et al., 2008). The 
Nepalese monarchs and the ruling elite had fully understood that total and 
strategic control over and manipulation of the tenure of land falling within the 
territory of the state was a major source of political power, particularly given that 
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almost all Nepalese relied on land for their well-being (Joshi & Mason, 2011; 
Regmi, 1976, 1978; Stiller & Yadav, 1979). Therefore, the state retained its ultimate 
authority over lands under Raikar system in which the individual landowners 
could utilise and “own” lands only after paying due taxes to the state (Regmi, 
1976). Until the 1950s when the economy was minimally monetised, the ruling 
elite used land as a tool both to pay for the services of people serving the state 
and also to reward and please the members of the governing elite (bhardars), 
priests and village headmen, important allies in the consolidation power 
(Caplan, 1970, 1971; Regmi, 1963, 1972, 1976, 1978; Sever, 1993, 1996; Shakya, 
2012) The state paid “white collar” government employees with Jagir land, 
manual workers such as carpenters, masons, and bricklayers with Rakam land, 
and royal concubines with Bekh land (Regmi, 1963, 1976). Similarly, it let religious 
or philanthropic institutions such as temples, monasteries and schools keep Guthi 
land. It allowed some of the former rulers of many kingdoms who had accepted 
Gorkha suzerainty to utilise lands under the Rajya land tenure system. Similarly, 
it permitted some ethnic groups such as the Kirant (Rai and Limbu) and Tamang 
who practiced some forms of communal land ownership to enjoy the lands under 
the Kipat land tenure system (Regmi, 1963, 1976). As described earlier the state 
elite also “gifted” tax-free lands to members of bhardari, local village headmen 
and priests. These lands were called Birta lands. This practice of “gifting” Birta 
lands was actually hundreds of years old, but it was greatly manipulated and 
intensified after the Shahs started ruling Nepal, and even more so during the 
Rana rule, which some argue eventually led to the extreme inequalities that 
characterise contemporary of land ownership (Pradhan, 1991; Regmi, 1976, 1978; 
Rose, 1983; Sever, 1996; Sugden & Gurung, 2012; UNDP-Nepal, 2004).  For 
instance, Leo E. Rose reports that in 1971, 6% of farmers owned almost 44% of 
the land while 56% owned only about 12% (Rose, 1983). More recently the 
2004UNDP Nepal report suggests that while the top 5% owns nearly 37% of the 
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land around 29% of rural households do not own any farmland at all (UNDP-
Nepal, 2004). 
 When the Rana regime was finally toppled, a new Government of Nepal 
was formed in 1951 that was led by the socialist Nepali Congress. The socialist 
government, therefore, desired to dismantle the prevailing land-tenure system 
that it felt had mostly benefited the elite. With the intent of eliminating the 
remnants of feudalistic Rana rule and to ameliorate the conditions of the peasants 
following principles of social justice, the state immediately pursued more 
modern state-centric land tenure system, abandoning some forms of tax-free 
tenure and allowing the direct collection of land revenues (Karan, et al., 1994; 
Regmi, 1976; Wily, et al., 2008). The state aspired to govern all lands, except the 
ones under the Guthi and Raikar systems, to facilitate systematic tax collection. 
Additionally, to provide some sort of justice to tenants, the Tenancy Rights 
Security Act 1951 stipulated that tenants could not be evicted from the lands they 
tilled at the whims of the landowners. It also intended to regulate the rents paid 
by tillers to landowners, forbidding any obligatory contributions of money or 
labour by the tillers.  
 Cognisant of the extent of these reforms, the government granted some 
time to all landholders holding lands under the Birta, Jagir, Rajya, Rakam and Bekh 
systems to convert their lands to the Raikar tenure system (Zaman, 1973). It was 
also determined to re-distribute lands held in excess of the land-ceilings imposed 
on respective tillers (Zaman, 1973). But as the state began to assemble relevant 
data, it soon realised that Birta lands posed the most difficulty for data 
management. First, these lands were just too numerous in number (Figure 31). 
Second, since Birta grants had been provided at the whims of the rulers, they had 
not been systematically recorded in any land offices. Third, since almost all 
government employees administering land reform programmes held some Birta 
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lands themselves, they along with other land-owning elites were reluctant to 
sincerely implement this land reform programmes. They did not want to be 
effectively alienated from their own most highly prized possession: their land 
(Stiller & Yadav, 1979).  
Figure 31 Principal forms of land tenure before 1950 [source (Zaman, 1973; table II)] 
Form of tenure Percentage of total area 
Raikar (state-owned, taxable) 50.0 
Birta (private-owned, non-taxable) 36.3 
Guthi (religious, philanthropic 
institutions-owned) 
2.0 
Kipat (community owned, non-
taxable) 
4.0 
Rakam, Jagir, Rajya, (assignment of 
Raikar lands to government 
employees as salaries), etc. 
7.7 
Total 100.0 
 
 Fully aware of the contentions around this land reform programme and 
the powerful resistance to it King Mahendra dismissed the Nepali Congress 
government in December 1960. Claiming that previous governance systems and 
governments had failed to provide bikas, he proposed another attempt at land 
reform, not in the light of social justice but in the name of overall economic bikas 
through industrial growth by diverting inactive capital and human resources 
from land to other economic sectors in order to benefit everyone (Zaman, 1973). 
So as Birta, Rajya, Jagir, Rakam/Bekh and Kipat land tenures were abolished in 1959, 
1961, 1952, 1963 and 1964 respectively, Mahendra proclaimed another Land 
Reform Act in 1964 which would legally register tenants, impose ceilings not only 
on both owned and tenanted land but also on rent which was fixed at a maximum 
of 50% of the main crop (Zaman, 1973 ). 
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 According to Mahendra’s plan, the Government of Nepal was to acquire 
excess lands after duly compensating the landowners, and to re-distribute these 
excess lands to tenants, landless and land-poor farmers in phased projects. His 
project had estimated that 600,000 hectares of land would be available for 
redistribution but unfortunately for the tenants, landless and the land-poor 
farmers by the end of the programme only 3% of this estimate had been made 
available for redistribution (Karan, et al., 1994). To make matters worse less than 
1% was actually redistributed (Karan, et al., 1994). In the absence of authentic 
record keeping systems and with the help of corrupt government officials, big 
landowners were able to register their excess lands under the names of their 
children, relatives and even fake names (Karan, et al., 1994; Ludwig F Stiller & 
Yadav, 1979). As Pradyumna P. Karan and Hiroshi Ishii observe: 
The ceilings under the land reforms of 1964 were fixed at arbitrarily 
high level, nearly ten to 12 times the average size of a family’s 
cultivated land holding. Also, every son over the age of 16 and every 
unmarried daughter above the age of 35, even when living with 
parents as a single family, were counted as separate families. Many 
landlords transferred their land above the ceiling to other relatives to 
avoid the confiscation of surplus land, thus effectively defeating the 
purpose of land reform (Karan, et al., 1994, p. 72) 
Thus, the land reform programmes aimed at dismantling the landowning 
elite and redistributing lands largely remained unsuccessful in Nepal. It is with 
this in mind that we can now fully comprehend the land ownership pattern in 
Patle Gau. 
His Story of Land in Patle Gau: Legacies of Birta and Kipat and Dalit 
Marginalisation 
In Patle Gau, in recent years some lands have been registered under 
women’s names, perhaps as a result of tax exemption of 25 percent on 
registration when land is owned by a woman, but men still overwhelmingly 
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register the lands in their own names.94 Women are not totally deprived of 
accessing the lands they cultivate, and can benefit from the families’ lands 
whether registered under their own names or their husbands’. However, when 
most land-related oral histories are told or written histories are read, only men 
are remembered. This is the reason for the title of this section (“His story” instead 
of “history” of land in Patle Gau).  
Patle Gau is a patriarchal society. Daughters are married out of it and 
daughters-in-law are married into it. The surname of the father is passed on to 
the next generation. Men are expected to perform tasks outside of the house and 
women inside the house, including cooking food and washing clothes. Both men 
and women work in the fields. Except for tasks requiring muscle such as 
ploughing fields, most other agricultural activities such as planting, hoeing, 
weeding, and harvesting are done by women with occasional support from boys 
and girls. Women are expected to stay home and not move out of the home very 
much. I was amazed when a few Bahun women told me that they had never been 
to the Dalit bastee only a couple of hundreds of metres away. Whenever the need 
for farm labour arises, it is the Bahun men who walk to the Dalit bastees to seek 
their services. Bahun women told me, “k kaam cha ra thyaha jana (what is the need 
to go there?).” Yet because the Dalit women have to make their ends meet by 
labouring in the farms of the Bahuns and in brick kilns in Bhatapur, they are more 
mobile than their Bahun counterparts. 
 
  If oral histories are to be believed, then most of the land where Patle Gau 
now stands used to be either the Birta land of the Sapkotas or the Kipat land of 
the Tamangs. I was told that a certain Malla king had gifted land to Chudaamani 
Sapkota a couple of hundreds of years ago while the Tamangs held communal 
                                                          
94 Personal communication with Mr Sanjeev Dahal, VDC Secretary (Bela VDC). 
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Kipat land nearby for an equal or even longer period of time. Maintaining his 
forefathers’ claim to Birta land, Siromani Sapkota one day showing me a piece of 
paper, declared: 
Here, look at this Sapkota family genealogy. My brother has the 
original but this is a photocopy. I shall show you the original some 
other time. You see here at the top? This is Chudaamani Sapkota, our 
great great grandfather. Hundreds of years ago, a Malla king gifted 
him a piece of land extending from … [mentions four landmarks in 
four directions] … as Birta for his services in the royal kitchen as a 
cook. 
Other members of the Bahun community also support this claim and state 
that until a few decades ago whenever they heard the news of death of a Sapkota 
they used to hold a minute of silence and observe bodily non-movement in 
honour of the dead. This practice started to fade away after 1990 and is now 
completely absent.  
 The Tamangs have their own history. While they do not directly reject the 
claims of Birta by the Sapkotas, they also claim that the Tamang are the first 
settlers in Patle Gau. Navin Lama, a man in his mid-40s and a returnee from 
Malaysia now helping his wife run a cheeyapasal (teashop) does not think that any 
Tamang maintains a written family genealogy as the Sapkotas do. Nonethelss he 
still had this to say to me: 
Bahuns may have their own stories. But Patle Gau is our Kipat too. 
Other Tamangs may be here for only two or three generations but we 
are Dhong Tamang. We are probably now the tenth generation living 
here. Elders tell me before that we may have migrated from Sindhu-
palchowck.95 But when we did come here, there was only forests 
which we cleared to farm and settle. We did not take this land from 
anyone else. It is our Kipat.  
                                                          
95 Sindhu-palckhowk is an adjoining district northeast of Kavre.  
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In support of the Tamangs’ claim to Kipat land, some elderly Bahun men 
also acknowledged that they had heard stories of Tamang Kipat landholding in 
Patle Gau. My intention here is not to scrutinise these claims and establish their 
truth. Rather I want to stress that while Bahuns and Tamangs have ownership 
claim over the lands in Patle Gau, the Dalits do not have any grand narrative 
around which to stake a claim, despite the fact that everyone agrees that they 
most likely have been living in the same lands possibly for the same amount of 
time.  In the history of land-ownership in Nepal, the kings and other state elite 
neither presented land-gifts to Dalits, nor were Dalits able to make collective 
claims to communal land ownership such as Kipat. Therefore, when I inquired 
about land ownership amongst some elderly Dalits in Patle Gau, they typically 
had this to say to me:  
We can remember that even our grandparents lived here but we 
don’t know where we came from originally. They never told us. We 
never asked. As children, we just followed our fathers wherever they 
went carrying our sewing machines to serve the bistas (clients).    
 As Purna Nepali, a Dalit professional working with an international non-
government organisation and whose PhD thesis explores landlessness amongst 
Dalits in the Far Western Region of Nepal, said to me: 
If you read the Nepalese history carefully you will see that the Dalits 
have always been dissociated from productive resources such as 
land. They were always made to be economically dependent on the 
“high-castes.” They were made to serve them with agricultural and 
non-agricultural labour, leather-making, tailoring and other artisan 
services for economic patronage but never allowed to directly own 
productive resources.  
It is against this background that we can appreciate how Bahuns and Tamangs 
in Patle Gau use the legacies of Birta and Kipat to make claims to indigeneity and 
land-ownership in the village, while Dalits lack a legacy of such claims. 
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Differences in claims to indigeneity and first land-holdership, combined with the 
land reform programmes of the 1960s, are the origins of differentiated land 
ownership patterns in Patle Gau.  
 Along with bikase mal, bikas entered Patle Gau when a few representatives 
of the Government of Nepal arrived in early 1960s and informed villagers that 
the government wanted to keep land records and register their lands with the 
government of Nepal. Through these records, the land-owners would get proper 
land-deeds with their names, exact location and sizes of the lands they owned 
that would allow them to sell, rent, lease, and even transfer ownership through 
inheritance after paying due taxes to the state. At this time, mainly three clans of 
Bahun – Acharya, Pathak and Sapkota96 – along with the Dalits and Tamangs 
were already living in and around Patle Gau. Consequently, the tatha batha 
(clever) amongst them were quick to establish formal relations with the visiting 
government official who was also typically from the Bahun-Chhetri group. To 
gain legal ownership of land all Bahun groups competed with each other 
following the Chanakya Neeti (Chanakya policy)97 of saam, daam, danda, bhed 
(appease, bribe, coerce, divide) to basically get ahead of each other to “grab” and 
register as much as land as possible under their names. Therefore, while the 
Acharyas, Pathaks and Sapkotas possessed literacy in Sanskrit required to 
practice priestly works, the Pathaks, some of whom had been formally educated 
in schools in Kathmandu, possessed the advantage in terms of cultural capital 
                                                          
96 While Acharyas have now already migrated elsewhere, the in-migrants like Dhakal, Dahal 
and Timilsina are relatively newcomers in Patle Gau and had bought lands from Acharyas, 
Sapkotas, and Pathaks. 
97 Chanakya, also called as Kautilya and Vishnugupta, is believed to be an ancient Indian 
political figure and the author of the Arthashastra (science of wealth and governance), an early 
Indian treatise on statecraft. 
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(Bourdieu, 2011): the ability to read and write in Nepali. Elderly Bhoj Raj Sapkota 
remembers this time of competition with the Pathaks for gaining land deeds: 
Educated in formal schools in Kathmandu, some of the sons of the 
Pathaks knew how to read Nepali and fill up forms with Nepali 
writing and numbers. We knew Sanskrit. But education in Nepali 
was much better for these administrative works.  
Bhoj’s nephew Siromani Sapkota adds: 
Pathaks are cunning too. You know Kumai ko ghumai (cunning of 
Kumai). They registered the lands under each family member’s 
name. They could have even created false names for this purpose. 
Anything is possible, you know.  
Allegation of corruption and unethical practices like those that Siromani 
suggests, is not entirely far-fetched as many have commented on the rampant 
practices of bribery and corruption98 in those times (Caplan, 1971; Karan, et al., 
1994; Kondos, 1987a; Zaman, 1973). Contrary to the assertions made by the 
Sapkotas, however, Sudarshan Pathak, the 51-year-old youngest son of Bikram 
Hari Pathak who was supposed to have been involved in the immense land 
grabbing effort at the time, told me later that these lands originally belonged to 
the Sapkotas and the Pathaks bought them from them. Establishing the truth of 
such narratives is not my aim but I only want to tease them out to trace probably 
origins of land distribution in Patle Gau. 
 Close by to the lands of the Sapkotas, Pathaks and Acharyas, the Tamangs 
were also benefitting from their Kipat claim over land. In addition to this they 
also benefit form the added social capital (Bourdieu, 2011) of their kinship 
relationship natabad kripabad with Sarkee Man Tamang who happened to be the 
                                                          
98 Of course, each group blames the other group to have been involved in acts of bribery with 
state representatives. 
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Gau Pradhan Pancha (Chief Village Pancha similar to the contemporary post of the 
Chair of the Village Development Committee) at the time (Figure 24). According 
to Alex Kondos, natabad – crypabad literally translates to familism-favouritism to 
mean “favouring relatives and friends” (Kondos, 1987b, p. 16).  
 However, as I have already clarified before, it was the Dalits who had no 
related kin afno manche (one’s own people) (Bista, 1991, p. 97 - 98) in any powerful 
political and administrative positions either at the village level or district level 
such that they could not profit from natabad-crypabad.  Nor did they have the 
leverage of political associations, thus they could not equally participate in the 
land-grabs. They had been labouring on the lands of Bahuns under their 
economic patronage and had thus effectively been excluded from owning their 
own productive resources (Aahuti, 2010). As poor uneducated Dalits labouring 
the lands of Bahuns, they had neither claims of Birta or Kipat, they lacked the 
education or cunningness of Pathaks, nor could they establish ties with visiting 
government officials to make them their afno manche. Further, unlike the Tamangs 
they were not related to the Village Chief of the time Sarkee Man Tamang to 
utilise natabad-crypabad strategically. 
 The failed national land reform programme of 1964 was not able to collect 
much land in excess of the land-ceiling and hence the re-distribution of lands to 
the landless or near-landless rarely occurred. This statement holds true for Patle 
Gau. Yet the failures of land reform programmes have not prevented Nepalese 
politicians and state managers from continuing to promise land reform 
programmes. This is particularly true after the re-attainment of parliamentary 
democracy in 1990. However, land reform programmes are so difficult to 
implement that no government has managed to fully implement them.  The 
recommendations put forward by the 1994 High Level Land Reform Commission 
(Badal Commission Report) never got implemented. To address the issue of 
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equitable access to land, the 1994 report had mainly proposed various ceilings to 
land ownership in various geographical areas. Similarly, another land reform 
programme with a revolutionary tag got announced in 2001 and was quickly 
shelved.  However, the governments of Nepal at least on paper are insistent upon 
implementing populist land reform programmes. Not dejected by the failure to 
implement the recommendation of the Badal Commission, one government 
formed the High Level Commission for Scientific Land Reform in 2010 and 
another formed the High Level Land Reform Commission in 2011. But no 
recommendations from either of these commissions were implemented.  
 Even though none of these recommendations have actually been 
effectively implemented, the Commission for Investigation of Abuse of 
Authority (CIAA), a constitutional body under the Government of Nepal, only 
recently issued directives to the Ministry of Land Reform and Management to 
seize land owned by individuals who have breached the land ceiling (Report, 
2016). Citing that the Nepal Land Reform Act 1964 had imposed land ceilings of 
10 bighas, 25 ropanis in Terai and Kathmandu Valley respectively and 70 ropanis 
elsewhere in the hills, the CIAA reported that a total of 5,223 bighas in Tarai and 
6,265 ropanis in the hills were possessed illegally requiring seizure by the 
government. But like past efforts almost everyone is sceptical as to whether the 
government can or will follow this directive. In fact Section 5 of Article 40 on the 
Rights of Dalits under part 3 of the Fundamental Rights and Duties of the 
Constitution of Nepal 2015 declares: “The State shall have to make legal 
provision to provide land to landless Dalits for one time” (GON, 2015a). 
However, until the recommendations by the CIAA and the provision of the new 
Constitution get fully enacted, the landless and near-landless in Patle Gau have 
to adopt livelihood styles to cope with this situation. The possession of land 
 167 
critically affects how the residents in Patle Gau organise their labour and manage 
their social relations.   
Organisation of Labour-Relations in Patle Gau 
Organisation of labour revolves around landownership in Patle Gau. As a 
general rule the landed farm their own lands, and do not labour on other’s land. 
The landless and the near landless labour on landed people’s farms. Since I have 
already established the relationship between landownership and caste and 
ethnicity, my above argument translates to stating that Bahuns and Tamangs 
cultivate their own lands while Dalits labour in other’s fields as hired labourers 
(Figure 32). 
 One late morning I met Kalpana Purkoti a Dalit woman in her early 
thirties for a brief conversation as arranged with her a couple of days before. 
When we met she politely asked me if I could see her maybe later in the evening 
or the next day in the early morning, as she had just been called to work in a farm 
of a local Bahun. She said:  
I am sorry that I cannot talk to you now. I thought I would be free 
but I did not know this morning. I was sitting in the tea-shop near 
market and a Bahun woman asked if I was free today to work in 
their fields. I said I was. What to do? This is how we get labouring 
opportunities to make some money.  
A couple of months later when I asked a Tamang man why the Tamangs in Patle 
Gau did not go to the nearby districts to work in brick kilns, he explained: 
Working in these brick kilns is very hard. I don’t think I could do it. 
And in any case, if we go there then who is going to take care of our 
farms and livestock?  
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Yam Kumari Dhakal, a Bahun widow who earns her living by selling vegetables, 
buffalo milk and goats, also implied the importance of tending her farm when I 
asked if she had ever been to the Meejar or Pariyar settlements: 
Never. Where is the need? Everyone has to do one’s own business. If 
I have some clothes to sew, then my sons take them to Damais. I 
don’t go. My time is usually taken up in cultivating vegetables and 
looking after the livestock. 
When asked if she labours in others’ farms, she responded: 
No. Not in others’ farms for money. But we rotate our labour among 
our own Dhakal clan. We are about ten Dhakal families here and so 
labour rotation amongst us is usually enough to tend the farms. We 
call it perma. You must know about it. But in any case, when need be, 
we usually call the Meejars or Damais for farm labour.  
Like any other informal voluntary reciprocal exchange of labour elsewhere 
in the world (Geertz, 1962), perma is an informal voluntary kin-based reciprocal 
and co-operative exchange of labour. Especially during labour intensive periods 
such as planting, weeding, and harvesting, family members of each clan help 
other in turn, day-by-day to jointly work each family’s farm. No money is 
exchanged but the “host” family provides the other family members with food. 
In Patle Gau, each clan (sub-caste) of Bahun such as Dhakal, Timilsina, Dahal and 
Sapkota helps out respective clan members through perma. Generally practiced 
within the families of each sub-caste, perma between Bahun clans may also occur. 
However, none of the Bahuns in Patle Gau labour in Tamangs’ or Dalits’ farms 
either for free or for money.  
 Tamangs also exchange their labour in a similar fashion but Dalits do not, 
simply because of their limited land holding which can be easily attended to by 
their family members. Therefore, although virtually all of the families in Patle 
Gau, irrespective of caste and ethnicity, do farming of one kind or the other and 
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may be agricultural labourers themselves on their own farms, it is only the Dalits 
who are “professional” agricultural labourers working in others’ farms for 
money. The labouring usually starts at noon with a break at about 3 pm. During 
the break of about 20 minutes, the farm owner provides the labourer with food 
(khaja) generally composed of chiura (beaten rice) and vegetable. The work is 
finished generally by 6 pm. But as I stressed earlier, agricultural labouring is not 
an all-year round occupation on which the Dalits can rely as their only livelihood 
option. Usually the Bahuns and Tamangs can provide sufficient labour 
themselves or from within their clans to work their farms and Dalits are called in 
only at times when such self-generated labour does not suffice. Landlessness and 
near-landlessness is also the main reason why the Dalits do not cultivate 
vegetables for commercial purposes while some of the Bahuns and Tamangs do 
so profitably.  
Figure 32 Dalits boys and women labour in Bahun lands along with Bahun women   
(Photo by author) 
 
Coping with Landlessness 
It is interesting to note that some of the Bahuns who do not hold as much 
land as other Bahuns also rely on their relatives who have more land to produce 
crops. Indra Acharya, a local “dairy master” and a successful businessman, has 
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an expanding dairy as well as other businesses that fully engage him and his 
family members. They do not have time to attend to the more than 30 ropanies of 
land they own. But rather than let his lands become “unproductive”, he contracts 
out his land to his Bahun kin relations and to some Dalits. Talking of his lands he 
said: 
I use something like two or three ropanies of land to raise vegetables 
for our own consumption. The rest I have contracted to four Dalit 
families. I charge each of them about NRs 6,000 a year flat. I think 
each of them has about four ropanies … oh … I also have a couple of 
nata-gota (relatives, cousins) to whom I have let out 3 or 4 ropanis 
also. But I don’t have a fixed rate for them. They give me whatever 
money they can, whenever they want. I just let them. 
The landless and near landless Dalits do not have such landed kin relations 
(nata-gota) or afno manche (one’s own) to benefit from natabad-kripabad (familism-
favouritism) for access to land. The only Dalit who owns a considerable amount 
of land is Tikaram Dhalkoti. But Tikaram does not have any entrepreneurial 
business or a salaried job and hence while his 29 ropanies of land is tended by his 
two wives and their children, it means that he virtually has none left to share 
with other Dalits as Indra Acharya can. 
 But people have to survive. People have to eat. One of the ways that the 
landless and near landless Dalits access land is to find some un-tended public 
lands (Figure 33). About six or seven landless and near-landless Dalit families in 
Patle Gau have used marginal public lands by the side of the Arniko highway 
about three kilometres east of their homes over the last four years to grow maize, 
a crop requiring the least managerial attention. They sow the maize seeds there, 
let it grow, weed when time permits and harvest when ready. But the 
precariousness of the land was explained to me by Koplia Pariyar, a Dalit 
woman: 
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We just “discovered” that land. It had normally been fallow for some 
time, so we decided to grow maize there. Since it is not any one’s 
personal land but public land no one has disagreed so far. But the 
locals want it converted to community forestry. For the time being, 
six families here grow maize there. We at least have some to eat for a 
couple of months from that production. After the land is taken by a 
community forest, we shall give up using it. Let us see … 
Figure 33 Marginal public lands precariously accessed by the Dalits                     
(Photo by author) 
 
No one can exactly estimate when the locals will register these public 
lands as a community forest. But when that does happen, some of the Dalits in 
Patle Gau are sure to lose their access to it and the associated maize produce, that 
will increase their vulnerability to food insecurity.  
 I talked about this and related issues with Ganesh Bhatta, a senior 
government officer at the Ministry of Land Reform and Management. He had 
this to say to me: 
Our government will not be able to distribute land that produces 
enough for each family. It is not possible. They might, at the most, 
provide one or two ropanies of land to the landless or add that much 
to the lands of the near landless. But that will never be sufficient to 
feed one family for a year. Even if you were to double agricultural 
and land productivity, it is not enough to feed one family for a year. 
So instead of providing lands to each family for self-sufficiency, we 
Arniko Highway 
Land accessed 
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need to move away from land-based economy to other bases for the 
economy. 
Ganesh Bhatta is only repeating the language of the mainstream discourse of 
Agriculture Development Strategy (ADS) (2015 – 2035)99 when he asserts: 
The ADS promotes a decentralised approach to science and 
technology and empowers communities to reorient the extension, 
research, and education system to meet their needs. The services 
covering the small commercial farmer will be generally 
inappropriate to the subsistence farmer, and in the context of 
institutions targeted to the small commercial farmer (e.g. value 
chains) the subsistence farmer will be left out except for those few who 
can respond to the approaches suitable for the small commercial 
farmer … The landless rural households will be benefiting from the 
ADS indirectly, … the employment opportunities expanded in the 
rural non-farm sector, and the growth of agriculture-based 
enterprises … The ADS will accelerate the process of 
commercialisation, while improving both the income of the small 
commercial farmers and the livelihoods of the subsistence farmers, 
and generating growth and employment in the non-farm sector to 
absorb the increasing number of landless/marginally landless (GON, 
2014, pp.7-8 - my emphasis)   
The ADS acknowledges that transforming Nepalese agriculture from its not 
so commercial status to a fully commercialised form requires that the state focus 
only on small commercial farmers, i.e. those who have land holdings of more 
than 19 ropanies of land. This means the landless and subsistence farmers like 
most Dalits in Patle Gau will be excluded from participating in agricultural value 
chains, from production through to final consumption. Instead, these landless 
and near-landless subsistence farmers can only benefit from employment 
opportunities in the rural non-farm sector and agriculture-based enterprises 
(such as dairy, poultry, etc.). Such a view means that landless and near landless 
                                                          
99 The ADS is the main policy document of the government of Nepal which proposes to transform 
the current subsistence agricultural sector into a fully viable commercial one using mostly market 
based approaches.  
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subsistence farmers, who are the poorest and most vulnerable to food insecurity 
happen to be precisely the ones who will not benefit from the transformation of 
the Nepalese agricultural sector.  
 Amartya Sen argued that the individual or family who cannot produce 
their own food from adequate land will have to receive food gifts from others, 
work for food or be able to buy food (Sen, 1981). But in Patle Gau, the state and 
non-state actors such as the World Food Programme (WFP) do not gift food in 
subsidised forms as they do in more remote districts. Similarly, since the Dalits 
do not labour in the houses and farms of Bahuns for food as they did in the past, 
they necessarily do not “work for food.” They presently access marginal public 
lands to supplement their food production. But in the present-day capitalist 
market-led economy of Nepal, the Dalits can only sell their labour for money to 
buy food.  In the next chapters I will explore how they do this. 
Conclusion 
In the previous chapter I concentrated on the cultural politics of caste-
based discriminatory practices, which despite the national discourse of equality, 
continue to occur in everyday practices. Caste-based distinctions, privileges and 
discrimination may have ceased to be overtly practiced but they continue to be 
practiced more covertly and more subtly. In this chapter, I show how land reform 
itself is tainted with caste-based privileges which advantages some and 
disadvantages others.   I traced this unequal sharing of land not only to the 
historical legacies of Birta, Kipat, but also to the configurations of social capital in 
the forms of afno-manche and natabad-kripabad.  
 I argued that access to land in an agrarian economy like that of Patle Gau 
has tremendous impact on how labour is organised. Lack of access to land might 
force an individual or even a whole family to labour on others’ farms, while 
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access to land can open up avenues for economic opportunities such as 
commercial farming or investing in rural enterprises. I argued that the social 
capital of natabad-kripabad and afno-manche continues to remain relevant as near 
landless Bahuns and Tamangs can rely on their landed afno-manche to access 
lands. Dalits, however who do not enjoy the same “kinship” advantages can 
precariously access only “marginal” public lands to temporarily improve their 
food security. Even a “landed” Dalit such as Tikaram Dhalkoti has only enough 
lands only for his family and cannot provide any of it to his own Dalit afno-
manche.  
 Market-led neo-liberal policies postulate that possession of land is not 
absolutely necessary for sustaining livelihoods or to escape poverty. If the 
landless and near landless can profitably engage in other sectors of the economy, 
then the targets of food security and poverty alleviation are achieved. For this the 
poor may only have to achieve access to any form of productive resource, not 
necessarily land. They may engage in agricultural enterprises run by the landed. 
The productive resource could be money, or finance to start a rural enterprise. In 
the next chapter, I investigate these possibilities. 
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Chapter 6  
Bikas, Saujee and Financial Institutions  
One of the English words commonly used by Nepalese people when 
speaking Nepali language is the English word “bore” (boredom). In the process 
of becoming part of the Nepali language the word “bore” has however taken on 
a life of its own. In addition to signifying what it generally means in English, i.e. 
“uninteresting”; “bore” in Nepali carries many meanings depending on the 
context. Bore is never used just to signify “boredom.” “Bore” is associated with 
almost any negative feeling such as disgust, disappointment, sadness, distress, 
and so on. So, when a Nepalese fails an exam or meets with an accident, she 
usually exclaims, “Kya bore bhayo!” (It was such a bore!). Something similar but 
not quite as dramatic can be said about the term Saujee.  
 Although the dictionary defines Saujee as “an honorific word used for 
shopkeepers; merchants, money-lenders, pawnbrokers or creditors” (Lohani & 
Adhikary, 2011, p. 862), a closer analysis shows that it means far more than that. 
Saujee is normally used to refer to a male property holder. Its corresponding term 
for a woman is Saunee. For a tenant, the landlord is either a Saujee or a Saunee. 
And since Saujee/Saunee also means a shopkeeper, any customer buying an item 
from a shopkeeper calls the shopkeeper either Saujee or Saunee. Reflecting the 
unequal social and power-relations in which the Madheshis (people from 
Madhesh) are projected as “less Nepali” and “inferior” to Pahade (hill peoples) 
(Gellner, 2016) and in a classic case of “reverse of the norm” a Masheshi street 
vendor selling vegetables and fruits actually calls a Pahade customer a Saujee or 
a Saunee. Another general meaning that Saujee often takes is a rich person, 
generally a business person, who may at times lend money to others. As Nepal 
is generally a patriarchal society, rich people are generally men. Therefore, Sajuee 
is more often heard and seen than Saunee. Just like the term pundit (expert, 
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academic) may sometimes be sarcastically used for “fake pundits” or “pundits 
getting it wrong”, Saujees can also be projected at times as miserly, cunning, 
heart-less and selfish. Usually, however, this term is not an insult. Rather it is a 
status, which not all can achieve in their lives. In the past Saujee was a status that 
only Bahuns enjoyed. Presently Tamangs and even co-operatives have attained 
this status, but Dalits have never attained it, despite some individuals gaining 
sufficiently large material wealth to deserve it. 
 As discussed above since Saujee is part of the language of crediting, 
financing and money-lending, in this chapter I closely scrutinise the mechanisms, 
processes, effects, impacts and directions of another widespread practice of bikas, 
the provision of rural finances through savings, credit co-operatives and micro-
finance groups in Patle Gau. My central argument in this Chapter is that the 
mobilisation of the social economy (Carpi & Juan, 1997) of groups, co-operatives 
and NGOs have provided some financial assistance to poor Dalits for daily 
sustenance, yet this has not been transformative (contrary to the claims by the 
state). It has not rescued these poor Dalits families from being perpetually 
indebted to the local Bahun Saujees, occasionally Tamang Saujees and now even 
to co-op Saujees. To provide evidence for my argument I engage with the 
language of Saujee - how it is used and understood, who can embody it and how, 
and who cannot. 
 Social economy, labelled the third sector of the economy in addition to the 
public sector and the capitalist (private) sector, is that arena of the economy in 
which profit is not the primary motivation and the where the state does not have 
any direct undertaking (Carpi & Juan, 1997; Starr, 2006). Social economy includes 
cooperatives, mutual societies, non-profit organisations, non-governmental 
organisations, voluntary associations which provide productive goods and 
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services; political parties, pressure groups, lobby groups and unions are excluded 
since their aims are not primarily for productive purposes (Carpi & Juan, 1997).  
Using the concept of social economy as defined above, the national 
planning elite of Nepal have sought to develop Nepal through all three sectors 
of the economy – state, private and co-operative/non-government sector. The 
Nepalese state appreciates co-operatives and NGOs as powerful agents of bikas 
capable of transforming rural areas, including places like Patle Gau from areas of 
slow economic growth to being more progressive. The Eighth Plan (1992-97) of 
the Government of Nepal, thus, forcefully emphasises the significant role of the 
third sector in promoting bikas:  
It is evident that the private and non-government organisations are 
more effective in carrying out development programmes from the 
view point of flexibility, cost-effectiveness and initiative … The 
government will formulate appropriate rules and regulations and 
create a conducive environment in order to increase the participation 
of private, community and non-government organisations (GON, 
1992, p. 390). 
In the past, cooperatives could not develop in accordance with 
cooperative principles because they were dependent on government 
direction and control. Therefore, co-operatives will be promoted by 
reorganising them on democratic management principles. 
Cooperatives will play an important role in the delivery of technical 
services, production inputs, credit and market services in their areas 
through the mobilisation of the savings scattered in the rural sector. 
They will thus assist in achieving stability in economic activities 
(GON, 1992, p. 161). 
Since 2006, the state has provided an extra impetus to the co-operative sector as 
the third pillar of economy for bikas: 
As envisioned by the Interim Constitution, the cooperative sector has 
been recognised as one of the three pillars of development [bikas] 
along with the public and private sectors (GON, 2007, p. 165) 
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In the light of this neo-liberal stance in which the state is seen to play only the 
minimal role of creating and maintaining conducive environments, the private 
sector, non-government organisations and co-operatives are encouraged to 
“freely” conduct development activities. Given that the state expects community-
based organisations and co-operatives to mobilise credit services in the rural 
sector, it is perhaps unsurprising that there have been massive increases in the 
number of co-operatives and NGOs throughout Nepal, Patle Gau being no 
exception. In the process, they have become the new Saujees. 
Old and New Saujees in Patle Gau 
Kinara pasal (shops), cheeyapasal (teashops), bhattees (pubs) and dairies 
inhabit the small market of Patle Gau. But in all of Patle Gau, savings and credit 
co-operatives are no less widespread. They are, for some like Nima Tamang (an 
Executive Member of a local women’s savings and credit co-operative), a symbol 
of bikas: 
Because we now have different savings and credit co-operatives and 
groups, people can now access finances relatively easily and at 
cheaper rates than in the past. The women actually have their own 
co-operative exclusively serving them with financing facilities. We 
must admit that some bikas has already happened in Patle Gau. 
For someone in a privileged position like Nima Tamang, co-operatives and their 
money-lending services signify bikas but for others, not so privileged, they may 
not. I will therefore begin by discussing how Saujees operated and operate in Patle 
Gau. Siromani Sapkota, the Chair of a savings and credit co-operative, already 
calls the savings and credit co-ops new Saujees since for him they provide new 
ways of financing the enterprises aimed at turning Patle Gau into a “bikashit” 
village. Before my research I thought that only humans: rich patrons, could be 
Saujees. I never thought that non-humans could be Saujees. But Siromani asserted 
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that they could. I wanted to know how that was possible from Siromani, a Bahun 
man who never passed level ten but reads the Gita100 every morning and asks his 
son to do so whenever his is home and not in Tribhuvan University in 
Kathmandu where he is pursuing a Masters of Arts in Sociology. Siromani 
exclaimed: 
Why can’t they be Saujees? People come to these co-operatives for 
loans. Some use loans to expand business. Some for foreign 
employment. Some just to finance social needs. Usually if they have 
made some matching savings or can deposit some collateral, they do 
not return empty-handed from these co-ops. People used to go to 
local money lenders, the Saujees, just for that in the past. So, these co-
operatives have replaced the old Saujees to be new Saujees, no?    
For Siromani, co-ops are a good thing. They perform the important role of 
providing financial services to the needy, like rich Saujees did in the past but in a 
more equal and less exploitative relationship. Where in the past the relationship 
was between a rich (literate) Saujee and a poorer (illiterate) debtor, in co-ops it is 
between a formal “democratic” institution and a debtor. As I will demonstrate 
later Siromani also likes these new money-lending co-op Saujees because they 
have also helped him become a Saujee, not necessarily a businessman or a money-
lender but a rich man himself.  
 In the period, just after the Nepalese economy became massively 
monetised in the 1950s and 1960s, there was only one Saujee (rich, landed, money-
lender) in Patle Gau. There were others in other villages to whom Patle Gau 
residents would go to for loans but the only one in Patle Gau was Shyam Hari 
Pathak, a Kumai Bahun. Shyam was one of the products of Nepal’s first 
experiments with bikas and modernisation in the 1950s. At this time of rapid 
monetisation, a vast majority of the villagers needed money for financial 
                                                          
100 A part of an ancient Hindu text called Mahabharat.  
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transactions while only a few rich villages had money to spare (Demetriades & 
Luintel, 1996; Y. Raj, 2010). Before that commodities and labour were exchanged 
to fuel the economy (Y. Raj, 2010). The state even used to pay its employees and 
loyalists in land-grants (Jageer, Birta, etc.) (Chapter Five) and citizens paid tax to 
the state not in cash but in grains. 
 In a fascinating life memoir of Krishnabhakta Caguthi (1928-2011), a 
Bhaktapur peasant leader, Yogesh Raj in “History as Mindscapes: A Memory of 
Peasants’ Movement of Nepal” recalls Caguthi’s memories of the 1950s/60s: 
Money was still considered the latest innovation in those days. It was 
quite scarce. In our lives at least. We would barter meat with rice 
grains. We used to pay paddy to the land revenue office as well. 
Money rose to its prominence only after [King] Tribhuvan declared 
monetary salaries to the government … we did not used to pay 
wages for labour. We did not receive that either. We used to pay 
labour by labour, especially among ourselves, in activities such as 
mining the clay soil, tilling the land, or carpentering and bricklaying 
works (Y. Raj, 2010, pp. 51-52).101 
Caguthi’s memory coincides with the memories of some of the elder 
respondents (more than 80 years of age) in my field site who also remember 
paying taxes to the government with paddy and only later with coins. This was 
during the 1950s and 1960s when Nirman Tamang, aged 83, of Patle Gau used to 
receive suka (25 cents) or mohar (50 cents) for two days’ labour. As the state 
monetised, the economy grew both extensively and rapidly, it even allowed the 
Indian currency to circulate widely since the “underdeveloped” Nepalese 
currency was short in supply. But the Nepalese people needed money to pay for 
                                                          
101 Tribhuvan had returned to Nepal from a year-long refuge in India to become an all-powerful 
monarch on 15 February 1951 until which time the government of Nepal had been assigning 
parcels of land to its employees instead of cash as a form of payment. This practice was named 
Jageer and was terminated the same year. 
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commodities such as chemical fertilisers and other commodities imported from 
India and China that started flooding the Nepalese market on an unprecedented 
scale (Demetriades & Luintel, 1996). As the demands for money shot up and cash 
was in short supply, wealthy landed people like Shyam Hari Pathak emerged as 
powerful and exploitative local money lenders. Shyam Hari Pathak had been able 
to acquire large tracts of land using the strategies of saam, daam, danda, bhed 
(appease, bribe, coerce, divide) during the implementation of the first land 
reform programme to consolidate his position as thulo manche (big man) and 
Saujee (Chapter Five). 
 In those days Shyam Hari Pathak in addition to having much land always 
had some money to spare.  He used to charge interest rates as high as 40% per 
annum with a deduction of 10% at the very first point of transaction through a 
system called Dus Rupe Theki (roughly translated as “deduction of 10 per each 
100”). This meant that he provided only NRs 90 for a loan of NRs 100 although 
he charged an interest of 40% on the full amount (NRs 100) and would ask for 
the whole NRs 100 to be paid back. Since there were not many local money-
lenders around Patle Gau, Shyam Hari Pathak virtually monopolised the credit 
market. Shyam’s children from his four wives were sent for formal education in 
Kathmandu and acquired the necessary cultural capital to migrate to cities like 
Kathmandu. Some of his descendants have even settled in foreign countries like 
the US. As a result after Shyam’s death none of his descendants continued his 
role as money-lender. The few who stayed behind in Patle Gau were happy with 
their jageers (salaried jobs) or with the sales of the agricultural produce from their 
plentiful land. As such the Pathaks are no longer the local money-lenders.  
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 Despite the fact that state-sponsored media102 and folktales project local 
money lenders as exploitative scoundrels (perhaps like Shyam Hari Pathak) who 
cheat simple-minded illiterate folks by charging exorbitant interest rates or 
blatantly lying about the credit amount, the institution of local money lending 
persists: only the faces and personalities have changed. The Pathaks are no more 
the money-lending Saujees. Instead, a few men engaged in commercial businesses 
are the new Saujees. The Pathaks’ legacy of money-lending Saujee has been taken 
over by Indra Acharya and Laxman Timilsina, two Bahun businessmen, and 
Chandra Bahadur Tamang, a janajati businessman. Residing close to other 
residents in Patle Gau, these Saujees are easily accessible for urgent matters. They 
typically provide small to medium sized loans not exceeding NRs 25,000 with no 
need for collateral. They usually do not even charge interest on such loans. 
However, for larger sums they require collateral with land usually functioning 
as that collateral. On such loans, they charge interest ranging between 15% and 
20%.  
 The Saujees possess large parcels of land, have extra cash and also operate 
kirana shops where the Patle Gau residents buy essential household goods such 
as oil, salt, sugar, soaps, toothpaste and the like. Additionally Indra Acharya and 
Chandra Bahadur Tamang run dairies to which the cow or buffalo keepers in 
Patle Gau can sell their milk, while Laxman Timilsina owns a vegetable collection 
centre for those who may want to sell their surplus vegetables.103 Having a 
combination of money, land, shops, dairies and vegetable collection centres 
                                                          
102 In a campaign to “educate” the rural masses to send girl children to schools, the Ministry of 
Education with support by UNICEF used to air an advert through televisions wherein a “literate 
girl” detects an old money-lending man deliberately inserting extra zeroes after the loaned 
amount in his transaction-register. The girl then makes her “illiterate” father aware of the money-
lender’s misdeed thus saving the family from being a victim to an unethical act. 
103 The collected milk and vegetables are in turn sold to markets at Dhulikhel, a town centre 
about 20 kms west or even to Kathmandu, 50 kms away.  
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enables the Saujees to develop and maintain multiple economic ties with debtors 
who have the option to pay back the loan using various means: cash, labour or 
commodities, as explained by Laxmi Purkoti, a middle-aged Dalit woman: 
We always go to Indra Acharya whenever extra cash is required, 
especially for urgent matters. A few months ago, I fell sick and had 
to be taken to a hospital. To pay for my treatment, my husband went 
to him for cash. As his house and shop are close-by, it is easy to reach 
him. He always seems to have some cash to spare. Besides, we also 
buy noon tel104 from his shop and we sell our cattle milk to his dairy. 
He even gave us half the money to buy the cow that we own now. 
Not only that, he also hires us to work in his farms every now and 
then.     
Explaining the ease of taking credit from Indra Acharya, Jit Bahadur Pariyar, 
another Dalit man, also had this to say to me: 
I actually owe some money to Indra Acharya, something like six or 
seven thousand. I should have paid it months ago but I could not. 
But I shall return the money when I start making more money from 
this tailoring business. Anyway, we always buy foodstuff from his 
shop and we are not going anywhere. He also has not been asking 
for it. Maybe he has forgotten it altogether.  
 But Indra Acharya does not forget (Figure 34). He actually maintains an 
up-to-date register and knows exactly who owes how much. He claims that he 
has about NRs 2,000,000 (AuD 27,000) “circulating” in and around Patle Gau in 
the form of loans for cow or buffalo purchases, for subsistence purposes or for 
any other reason. But he is not complaining as he is still profiting. He also does 
not hassle the creditors because they not only sell their milk to him, but also buy 
necessary feed and food items from him. In fact, his business is growing so much 
that his eldest son gave up his university education to help him further expand 
his business. There are some poorer Dalits whose cattle or buffaloes (priced 
                                                          
104 Literally noon tel means “salt and oil” but it actually symbolises basic food stuffs. 
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around NRs 60,000 which is a significant amount to poor people) Indra has 
bought for them but in the form of credit with a tacit understanding that they 
will sell the milk to his dairy. The cattle/buffalo holders not only sell milk to his 
dairy but also buy needed feed and other household foodstuff from his shop. The 
Dalits think that they will make profit in the long run but many others do not 
think that this ever will happen since the costs of feeding the cows/buffaloes far 
exceed the profit received from the milk sold, added to the fact that the animals 
tire (tharo) quickly and stop giving milk. If this occurs, some of the money 
received by re-selling the tired animals is returned to Indra Acharya. Yet, people 
say there is always an amount outstanding because of the way the livestock and 
dairy economics operate in favour of Indra Acharya and other Saujees. But this 
does not deter the Dalits from letting Indra re-buy them new livestock since their 
economic sustenance is maintained while Indra Acharya expands his business. 
Figure 34 Indra Acharya and his house with a shop and dairy collection centre 
(Photos by author) 
  
 Seeking money from local Saujees may be easy, but it is not always without 
dire consequences, especially when the transactions happen to be quite large. 
Dhan Bahadur Pariyar, an 80-year-old illiterate Dalit who lives off his small 
landholding and meagre income from sewing at home, received a loan of NRs 
100,000 from Chandra Bahadur Tamang (Figure 35). Dhan had deposited two 
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ropanis of land as a collateral for the credit. Dhan wanted to use the money to 
finance his son Tek Bahadur Pariyar’s plans for foreign employment in Malaysia. 
But, because Tek happened to be dealing with corrupt dalal (brokers) in 
Kathmandu, he got cheated and lost all the money in the process.105 Subsequently 
when Dhan Bahadur Pariyar was unable to return the loan to Chandra Bahadur 
Tamang, Chandra was insistent on claiming all the deposited land. Dhan 
Bahadur Pariyar somehow understood that the monetary value of the lands 
deposited was double the amount of the loan. So, he sought the help of the 
Secretary of Village Development Committee, Sanjeev Dahal, who along with a 
few Maoist cadres of the time intervened and saved Dhan Bahadur Pariyar from 
losing all his land. The three parties involved – Dhan Bahadur Pariyar, Chandra 
Bahadur Tamang and the intermediaries - finally agreed to settle the dispute by 
transferring the ownership of half the land deposited (one ropani) to Chandra 
Bahadur Tamang. In chasing money with the hope of achieving some kind of 
upward economic mobility, the near landless Dhan Bahadur Pariyar lost even 
more of his lands. 
Figure 35 Dhan Bahadur Pariyar stands dejected in front of his house  
(Photo by author) 
 
                                                          
105 Others have also documented such cases of cheating elsewhere in Nepal (Adhikari & Hobley, 
2011; Sunam & McCarthy, 2016). 
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Incidents like this are a cruel reminder to many that whenever possible one 
should always avoid Saujees for loans, especially when it involves depositing 
land as collateral.  
Managing without Saujees 
Five months into my fieldwork and after many casual conversations Jit 
Bahadur Pariyar— who I have already introduced above— and I had bonded to 
the extent that we could talk of almost anything quite easily. I normally met him 
at his home about fifteen minutes’ walk north of the Arniko Highway. I usually 
found him sewing with his old machine.  The local villagers, almost always men, 
who needed their clothes made or mended would come down to his house to use 
his services. But one day as I was walking around in a local bazar I spotted him 
in what looked like a tailoring shop (Figure 36). After greeting him with a 
Namaste, I sat down on the floor asking, “So you started a business, Jit Dai (elder 
brother) (Turin, 2001)106?  
JBP: Ke garne (what to do?). Sewing is all I know. I don’t own much 
land; its produce cannot feed my family for the whole year. These 
days everything is commercialised and things are really expensive, 
no? It is difficult to earn enough to feed ourselves. I don’t know how 
to read and write and hence do not qualify for jageer (salaried jobs)107. 
I think my body is also too weak to labour in farms and brick kilns 
which require hard physical work. So, I thought maybe if I set up a 
tailoring shop here I may make some money.  
MR: But the money to set up this business …? 
                                                          
106 In Nepal it is customary to use kinship terms such as dai (elder brother), bhai (younger brother), 
didi (elder sister), bahini (younger sister), etc. even to perfect strangers. Turin, 2001 discusses the 
subtleties of the application of Nepali kinship system to non-Nepalese.   
107 Jageer originally meant the land grant made by the king to feudal lords for their 
administrative or military services (Raj, 2010; Regmi, 1963, 1976). After the extensive 
monetisation of Nepalese economy when government employees started getting paid in money, 
jageer took a new meaning to refer to the government jobs. In its newest meaning these days, it 
refers to any salaried job. 
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JBP: My first daughter loaned me NRs 5,000 (AuD 66). My second 
daughter gifted me with this new sewing machine worth a couple of 
thousand rupees. A nephew bought me these clothes. The loans that 
I got from other relatives and close friends amount to about NRs 
10,000, I think. I now have sufficient money and equipment to start 
this business. I shall return them the money when I can. 
At that time, Jit’s younger daughter, Geeta108, interjected, “Don’t worry about the 
sewing machine, though” as if to mean that she was not expecting her father to 
translate her gift into money and repay the favour. Nearby, Jit’s wife 
Makhamalee was stitching buttons to the shirts that Jit had tailored.  
 Jit leaves home, after having tea and titbits at around 10 in the morning to 
open this tailoring shop. He then later shuts it at around four or five depending 
on how long the day is. Makhamalee brings lunch (dal-bhat - cooked rice and 
lentil) to Jit some time during the mid-day. After eating the food, Jit continues 
with his sewing whereas Makhamalee washes the dishes and then stays a little 
longer at the shop to help her husband finish some tailoring tasks. While Jit does 
most of the “core” tasks related to tailoring such as measuring, cutting and 
sewing, Makhamalee helps with “finishing” touches, such as stitching the 
buttons and removing the pieces of thread or other clothes that may have stuck 
to the “finished products.” Makhamalee only spends a couple of hours doing 
these tasks and leaves Jit to run the shop so that she can take care of the other 
household chores.  
After a pause when I asked Jit if he had gone to Indra Acharya for 
assistance, Jit continued: 
No, I did not borrow any money from him. I also did not go to the 
co-operatives. I already owe Indra Sau [short for Saujee] some money 
                                                          
108 Geeta lives in Kathmandu with her own small family and had come to visit her parents in 
Patle Gau. 
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that I have not been able to return for quite some time now, so how 
can I ask for more? We could have asked for some money at the local 
co-operative where my wife has savings of a few thousand rupees. 
But they charge, what, like 15% interest rate, no? We would rather let 
my wife’s savings earn its interest there.  
Figure 36 Jit Bahadur Pariyar gets some help from his wife Mukhamalee in their 
newly opened tailoring shop (Photo by author) 
 
 Jit is using his own rationale to justify why the co-ops were not the first 
place he went to when he was in need of economic capital. Co-ops lend money 
at one of the cheapest rates (at around 15%) unlike some individual Saujees who 
may still charge 20% or more on larger loans. But Jit can still avoid paying that 
interest if he can collect his loans through his close friends and kinship relations. 
Although the kin-based voluntary practices for labour exchange called perma are 
very active in Patle Gau as in many other places, I was not aware of any kind of 
informal voluntary kin-based credit associations there. This is not to suggest that 
they do not exist or did not exist elsewhere in Nepal. As in other parts of the 
world (Geertz, 1962), caste, kin and region based voluntary native associations 
like Dhikur, Guthi and Kipat exist(ed) in other parts of Nepal to manage money, 
goods, labour and even land on rotational basis (Caplan, 1970; Forbes, 1999; 
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Messerschmidt, 1978).109 But such associations were not found in Patle Gau. So as 
Jit Bahadur Pariyar does not depend on these informal voluntary associations for 
monetary requirments, he also demonstrates that Saujees are not always the first 
port of call if financial requirements can be managed through families, friends 
and kin relations, particularly if the needed sum is not large, say only a few 
thousand Nepalese Rupees.  
 Supports from friends and families can take the form of cash or 
commodities provided as gifts like sewing machines, cloth pieces, thread rolls, 
etc. as in Jit’s example. No collateral or third-party guarantee is required when 
borrowing money like this. Normally no interest is charged and both the 
payment method and pay-back time are flexible. The debtor may return the cash-
equivalent sum all at once or in small allotments whenever possible. When the 
creditor is an immediate family relation like a daughter, the compulsory 
obligation to return the cash or commodity gift may be entirely absent. This kind 
of financial support extended by family members, families, kinship relations and 
close friends not only assists a person like Jit to initiate a small business but also 
helps youth gain foreign employment. One Tamang lady once told me that she 
and a number of her close cousins had collected enough money to send off a 
young person for employment opportunities to Malaysia (Chapter Seven). But 
when money is not arranged through friends, families and local Saujees, it is often 
arranged through savings and credit groups and co-operatives. 
                                                          
109Donald A. Messerschmidt analyses Dhikur, a non-kin rotating credit association of around 30 
members, amongst Gurungs, Thakalis and Bhotias (various Nepali ethnic groups) living in the 
upper hills and mountains (Messerschmidt, 1978) Similarly, Guthi, kin-based voluntary 
association, continues its centuries-long existence amongst the Newars of Kathmandu for the 
management of the land and water of and around community buildings and temples through 
rotational contributions of money, goods and labour to perform various religious and social 
rituals. Although abolished by the state in 1968, Kipat, was a form of indigenous communal land 
management system practiced by the Kirantis in the eastern Nepal (Caplan, 1970; Forbes, 1999). 
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Saujees Reproduce Saujees 
A couple of weeks after the conversation I had with Jit Bahadur Pariyar I 
was sipping tea at Hari Acharya’s kirana pasal cum cheeyapasal. A Bahun man in 
his mid-thirties, Hari, also collects milk from locals to transport to Dhulikhel, 
about 30 minutes bus ride from Patle Gau, at a profit. As Hari and I were chatting 
about the on-coming monsoon, a woman entered the shop with a small booklet 
in her hand. Without exchanging any word with the woman but fully 
comprehending the meaning of her entrance Hari handed over NRs 500 (about 
AusD 7) to her. The woman recorded this transaction in the booklet which I now 
understand was a passbook of a savings for a credit co-operative based in 
Dhulikhel. After the woman left Hari looked at me with a wry smile saying, “You 
never know when and where you will be needing money, no? So, I make monthly 
savings here and there, you know.” 
 The savings and credit co-op in Dhulikhel in which Hari Acharya keeps 
savings is one of the new “Saujees” which Siromani Sapkota was referring to 
earlier. The mushrooming of NGOs and co-ops in Patle Gau as in other places in 
Nepal after 1990 was a remarkable phenomenon, yet the idea and practices of 
non-government co-operatives are not entirely novel. As I have suggested before, 
although Kipat, an indigenous voluntary association, was forced into extinction 
by the state in 1964 other similar associations for rotational credit and labour such 
as Perma, Dhikur, and Guthi, had existed for a long time in Nepal. But the 
provision of rural credit through “formal” government-owned co-operatives 
began to occur only from 1956.110 In an effort to “develop” and “modernise” 
Nepal in a planned fashion, the Government of Nepal in 1956 created and 
                                                          
110 Back then rural credit (grameen hrin) was the term used instead of microfinance (Laghubitta). 
Microfinance got its popularity only during 1970s when Mohammad Yunus of Bangladesh 
successfully designed mechanisms of functional financing services to the Bangladeshi rural poor 
people, a concept which until then was thought to be financially unviable. 
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managed thirteen co-operatives to provide rural credit, among other things, to 
thousands of families who had come to resettle in the Chitwan valley (with high 
agricultural productivity, low population density) from various hilly areas (with 
low agricultural productivity, high population density) (S. M. Shrestha, 2009).  
 The Nepalese government then established a Co-operative Bank in 1963 
with the chief aim of delivering agricultural inputs and credit while monitoring 
the thirteen original co-operatives. The Co-operative Bank later renamed the 
Agriculture Development Bank Nepal (ADBN) in 1968 provided its services 
through cooperatives created under its guidance and management. Most of these 
co-operatives were however, mismanaged,111 and as critics accused them of 
failing to contribute towards reducing rampant poverty. In 1975 the ADBN 
piloted the Small Farmers’ Development Programme in two districts (Dhanusha 
and Nuwakot) imitating the Bangladeshi Grameen Bank’s model of micro-
finance. It aimed to provide loans to the rural poor such as landless labourers, 
tenants and small farmers on a “group guarantee” basis. But while a few such 
state-led cooperatives continued at a small scale in selected “targeted districts”, 
it was only after the re-establishment of democracy and the adoption of more 
neo-liberal policies in 1990 that the Nepalese government ensured that NGOs 
and co-operatives could play a significant role in transforming rural areas by 
mobilising the savings and remittances of villagers. 
 As a result, the Co-operatives Act 1992 decisively “freed” the management 
of co-operatives from the hands of the government. Accordingly, any willing and 
co-operating twenty-five individuals could effectively create and register a co-
operative under the Ministry of Agriculture through local District Agriculture 
                                                          
111 A survey in 1983/84 suggested that the majority of these co-operatives were incurring losses 
(S. M. Shrestha, 2009) 
 192 
Development Offices.112 With guiding policy documents such as the Agriculture 
Perspective Plan (1995 – 2015) and the Agriculture Development Strategy 
(2016/17 – 2036/37)113 both of which recommend the commercialisation of 
agriculture for higher economic growth, the Nepalese government continues to 
stress the importance of the collaboration between government, non-
government, co-operative and private enterprise to create wider 
“inclusion”(GON, 1995, 2014). Consequently, the number of co-operatives and 
NGOs continues to grow. It is against this backdrop that various savings and 
credit co-operatives and smaller groups have emerged in Patle Gau. Many NGOs 
and some government offices have formed savings and credit groups and co-
operatives in Patle Gau for one purpose or the other. Savings and credit groups 
are more informally established without being registered at any government 
offices while savings and credit co-operatives are more formal and are registered 
at local District Agriculture Development Offices. Howver, most of these have 
disappeared as quickly as they appeared, particularly once their objective, say to 
run an adult literacy class, has been met. But four, in particular, have persisted: 
Bela Co-op, Namuna Women Co-op, Phoolbari Co-op and the Bright Future 
Women’s Group.114  
 
 
 
                                                          
112 Since 2012, co-operatives are registered with the Ministry of Co-operatives and Poverty 
Alleviation. NGOs, however, continue to be registered with the Social Welfare Council. 
113 These documents are prepared with financial support from international financial institutions 
such as the Asian Development Bank. 
114 These are short forms for Bela Self-reliant Vegetable Producers Co-operative Ltd., Model 
Women Awareness Savings and Credit Co-operative, Phoolbaari Savings and Credit Co-
operative and Ujjowal Bhawishya (Bright Future) Women’s Group respectively. 
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Figure 37 Sources of finances in and around Patle Gau 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Although the government of Nepal administers state-supported 
development banks targeting poverty alleviation amongst the poor with names 
such as Nirdhan Utthan (Uplifting the Poor) and Swabhalamban (Self-reliant), these 
only cover some “selected” districts, and do not extend to the Kavre district 
(Figure 37). Since the state likes to call Kavre a “commercial” or “advanced” 
district, where the market is able to operate more fully than in remote districts, 
and where the proportion of poor is lower than in other districts, these 
development banks do not extend their services to Patle Gau residents. However, 
the more educated and economically better-off and Saujees use credit and savings 
facilities of commercial banks, located in nearby town centres such as Dhulikhel 
or Nepalthok.  
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 Given this context many co-ops in Patle Gau started out as informal 
farmer’s groups. When such a group decides to become a co-op, they are required 
to register with the District Office of Agriculture Development, in accordance 
with the Co-operative Act 1992. Post 2012 when the Department of Co-operatives 
was removed from the Ministry of Agriculture and merged into the new Ministry 
of Co-operatives and Poverty Alleviation, prospective co-ops were required to 
register at the District Co-operative Office which functions under the Registrar’s 
Office of the new Ministry.   
 According to the Co-operative Act 1992 at least 25 persons, who have 
elected an Executive Committee led by a Chair, can apply for formal registration 
as a co-op. These members are to be local residents of the area in which the co-op 
is allowed to function. Once a co-op is formally registered, the Co-operative Act 
1992 specifies that it retain records of every meeting of its General Assembly and 
committees and sub-committees. The co-op is also required to maintain up-to-
date accounts of all economic transactions which are to be examined every fiscal 
year by any registered auditor recognised by the Registrar. Every co-op is also 
legally bound to submit an annual report of its transactions and audit report to 
the Registrar through Registrar’s representative office at the district 
headquarters.  
 The deregulation of the fertiliser sector in Nepal, in accordance with neo-
liberal principles in 1990, helped fortify co-ops present in largely agrarian and 
rural Nepal. When the offices and depots of state-owned Agriculture Input Co-
corporation were completely dismantled in 1997, and subsequently when the 
private sector showed its reluctance to be involved in this sector, the government 
allowed local co-ops with a Permanent Account Number (PAN) to buy and sell 
chemical fertilisers (Shrestha, 2010). Any co-op desiring to trade chemical 
fertilisers only had to obtain a Permanent Account Number (PAN) from the 
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Inland Revenue Department, Ministry of Finance, Kathmandu, (Shrestha, 
2010).115 
Founded in August, 2000, Bela Co-op is the oldest amongst the co-ops in 
Patle Gau. Led by Siromani Sapkota116, Bela Co-op used to be a farmers group 
exclusively dedicated to providing extension services for agricultural techniques 
and inputs. It used to work with the District Agriculture Development Office to 
run farmers’ trainings and various workshops. But as Siromani and others 
wanted to expand its scope to include financial services, they held a meeting 
amongst the members and decided to convert it from a farmers’ group into a 
savings and credit co-op in 2000. Following the provisions laid in the Co-
operative Act 1992, they registered the Bela Co-op at the Registrar’s Office 
through District Agriculture Development Office based at district headquarters, 
about a 30 minutes bus ride away. Initially operating with a modest membership 
and funding, Bela co-op has now grown to over three hundred members and 
manages more than NRs. 10,000,000 making it the largest and richest co-op in 
and around Patle Gau.  
 Siromani Sapkota has rented a room from one of his cousins near the 
Arniko Highway to function as the Bela co-op’s office. On Saturdays it remains 
closed, but on week-days usually Nilkantha Parajulee, another Bahun man and 
the Secretary General and an Office Manager, remains in the office from roughly 
                                                          
115 Chemical fertilisers have been sold under various policies in Nepal. Before 1970, they were 
sold at full market price.  Price subsidy and a selective transport subsidy were provided during 
the 1970s through to 1997 after which the subsidies were removed to let the market fully take 
over. However, after complains about quality, delays, and rising prices, beginning in 2009 the 
government has again begun to directly procure and distribute the chemical fertilisers with price 
and transport subsidies. Since 1997 when the offices and depots of government-owned 
Agriculture Input Co-corporation have been dismantled, local co-operatives have been given the 
authority to buy and sell these chemical fertilisers.     
116 Siroman Sapkota still remains Bela Co-op’s chair by winning the last three consecutive 
elections. 
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ten in the morning till five in the evening. Prospective members come to the office 
to buy membership in the co-op or to apply for loans. Membership in Bela Co-op 
is obtained with a purchase of 10 shares, each valued at NRs 100. The new 
members also commit to a compulsory saving of NRs 100 each month, although 
this requirement is not strictly enforced. Bela co-op pays 10% interest on the 
savings and charges 14.5% interest on loans. There may be a very small variation 
from one co-op to another but such interest rates are almost standard in Patle 
Gau. A certain percentage of whatever profits (called “surplus” in the co-
operative term) the co-op makes is compulsorily invested in providing trainings 
and workshops (mostly agriculture-related) to the co-ops’ members and local 
residents. The rest of the surplus is to be distributed, however according to 
Siromani (and decided by the General Assembly) as the co-op is renting a room 
and does not have its own land and building, presently much of its “surplus” is 
being spent on this office space. Like other co-ops Bela holds a mandatory 
General Assembly Meeting every year where major policy and operational 
decisions are made and which every three years elects a new Executive 
Committee. Most operative and day-to-day financial decisions are made by the 
elected 11-member Executive Committee, three-member Account Committee 
and three-member Loan Sub-Committee. 
 Members are allowed to draw loans which more or less match their level 
of savings. When applying for a loan, the member-applicant has to have her 
application supported by another member, yet this member is not a guarantor 
and so if the debtor defaults, the supporter is not in any way held responsible. A 
defaulting member does not necessarily come under heavy group pressure as in 
the Grameen Bank model but is refused other loans until she clears any 
outstanding loans.  Since the loan provided does not normally exceed the savings 
made, a member actually draws from his own savings. In the case of small or 
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medium sized loans (upto NRs 25,000), when the sum of the loan requested 
exceeds the amount saved, no collateral is needed, and as long as two one or two 
other co-op members support the loan application (a support which as described 
above does not make the supporter liable to pay in the event of the creditor 
defaulting). However, when the requested money exceeds the savings made and 
is larger than NRs 25,000, collateral of some kind is necessary. Jewellery or the 
like is accepted but in most cases land is usually the most common form of 
collateral provided. There are a few cases where some co-op members have 
delayed in paying back the principal loan while repaying only the interest. There 
are other cases where the members have stopped paying both principal loan 
amount and interest for some months. But no one reported to me a single case 
where a member had to lose lands to the co-op because of a failure to repay the 
loan. 
 As recent decades have witnessed various government bodies and NGOs 
attempt to apply buzzword-like concepts of “participatory”, “inclusive” and the 
like (Cornwall & Brock, 2005) to development projects, Bela Co-op has readily 
acted as the “local development partner” to the government and non-
government agencies. These development partners together have tried new 
seeds of maize, constructed pit latrines and domestic biogas plants and have 
conducted trainings for adult education, commercial vegetable cultivation and 
livestock raising in Patle Gau. Additionally, equipped with a PAN, Bela also 
trades in chemical fertilisers. These partnerships with government and non-
government bodies for implementing bikase activities and trading in chemical 
fertilisers provide Bela Co-op with opportunities to further strengthen its 
financial position.  
 Some of the trainings such as a week-long Integrated Pest Management 
Training that Bela Co-op facilitated with a local NGO, have not had the desired 
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effect, as the trainees have returned to their old habits of using chemical 
pesticides. However, the pit latrines and biogas plants have till the time of my 
field work, which was around two years after their installation, remained 
functional. Overall, Siromani Sapkota is happy with the performance of Bela Co-
op.  
 “He has a reason to be,” says Jayjeev Dhakal, a Bahun man in his mid-30s, 
and presently the Chair of Phoolbari Co-op and former Treasurer of Bela Co-op, 
hinting at Siromani’s possible “elite capturing” and misappropriation of funds 
obtained from NGOs and others (Arnall, Thomas, Twyman, & Liverman, 2013; 
Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Platteau, 2004), Jayjeev said: 
Sahakari faphya cha Siromani lai (Co-op has been good for Siromani). 
Otherwise without a well-paying jageer (salaried job), no inheritance, 
no commercial enterprises, how can he build a three-storeyed 
modern house with concrete foundation, roofs, cemented walls, and 
tiled bathrooms? His three other brothers, with similar background, 
education and capabilities, still live in modest old houses with tinned 
roofs. I am sure his two local buffaloes cannot give him the kind of 
money to afford a lifestyle that he seems to be enjoying now … 
Figure 38 Siromani Sapkota's modern new house (in ruby red) (Photo by author) 
 
Siromani is right that the co-ops are the new Saujees: Saujees which loan 
out money almost always with ease. But this new Saujee helped Siromani become 
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a Saujee himself, not necessarily a money-lender or shopkeeper but a rich man 
(Figure 38). This was possible for Siromani because he is a Bahun member of the 
local landed elite. He claims one of his ancestors owned the lands (birta lands) on 
which Patle Gau is situated. He is also a former VDC chair, a “politically active” 
local member of Nepali Congress, a chair of the Bela co-op, and a chair of the 
school management committee. While most members of his generation from the 
Dalit and Tamang and even Bahun community remained either illiterate, or had 
only a few years of schooling, Siromani had about ten years of schooling. Because 
of this combination of different forms of social capital, Siromani was already a 
thulo manche (big man), but his new Saujee instituion with “profitable” connections 
to bikase offices and activities (including fertiler trade) have now made Siromani 
a rich man: a Saujee.   
 However, in 2008 villagers residing in and around Patle Gau started 
gossiping that Bela Co-had mismanaged the distribution of chemical fertiliser. 
These critics particularly accused the management team of Bela Co-op, led by 
Siromani Sapkota, of natabad-crypabad (familism-favouritism) (Kondos, 1987a) for 
providing fertilisers to afno manche (one’s own/close aids) only (Bista, 1991). The 
management committee of Bela Co-op, Siromani himself in particular, was 
accused of showing favouritism to kin, friends and families living closer to where 
Bela Co-op is located, by providing them with disproportionately larger amounts 
of fertiliser, while depriving others of sufficient amounts or by providing them 
with hardly any at all.  
 Experiencing such bitterness Jayjeev Dhakal who had served the Bela Co-
op as an important member of the executive committee for one term before the 
incident occurred, was able to mobilise other villagers to establish another co-op, 
called the Phoobari Co-op, in September, 2010. A university graduate, secondary 
school teacher in a nearby school, and a motorcycle owner, Jayjeev Dhakal swiftly 
 200 
obtained a PAN from Kathmandu for the Phoolbari Co-op, and convinced others 
to not only to elect him as the chair but also employ him as the salaried Co-op 
Manager117. As many as 30 people living closer to where the Phoolbari Co-op is 
physically located and who were convinced by Jayjeev, left the Bela Co-op to join 
the Phoolbari Co-op. Therefore, although the Bela Co-op— who has more than 
300 members— was not massively affected by this transfer of members, 
Phoolbari Co-op funds around NRs 300,000 and has a membership of about 80 
and is rapidly growing in membership numbers and size.  
 However, unlike Bela Co-op, it has not yet had any opportunities to 
“partner” with any development agencies, but Jayjeev hopes this will change 
soon. Working in the dual role of paid manager and the co-op Chair, perhaps 
Jayjeev, by leveraging the power of the Phoolbari Co-op, will one day become a 
Saujee like Siromani. I suggest this because although Jayjeev criticises Siromani 
for Siromani’s unethical behaviour, he himself is a man of contradictions. One 
Dalit woman praised Jayjeev for his “goodness” and the help he provides to some 
Dalits to write application letters for things like applying for a citizenship 
certificate and so on. Two other stories circulating in Patle Gau, however tarnish 
his image, at least amongst the Tamang community. The first story describes how 
when Jayjeev was the Chair of the Management Committee of a primary school 
in Patle Gau he played a crucial role in removing a Tamang teacher (on the basis 
of alleged unapproved absences) to recruit his own nephew to that post. The 
second story details how Jayjeev had replaced a Tamang woman with his Bahun 
sister-in-law to work as a cleaner in the same school, alleging underperformance 
which the Tamang woman contests. In a society mostly dominated by Bahuns in 
                                                          
117 Jayjeev draws about NRs 1500/month for managing the Phoobari Co-op, including its 
accounts. 
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all spheres of life, both the Tamang man and the Tamang woman did not have a 
forum in which to make their voices heard.  
 If these allegations are true then Jayjeev, just like Siromani, is engrossed 
in the game of Natabad-kripabad. Jayjeev perhaps like Siromani— whom he 
criticises— may inevitably commit unethical acts during his tenure as the Chair 
and Manager of Phoolbari Co-op. He may get away with these acts and become 
another new Saujee, because his society as it is in Patle Ga accepts actions 
motivated by natabad-kripabad and afno-manche, and does not necessarily deem 
them unethical.  
 If the Bela co-op and Phoolbari Co-op serve members of both genders, 
then Namuna Co-op established in June, 2005, serves women only. A group of 
women, led by Durga B. K. and Nigma Tamang, felt the need for cheap and 
readily available credit that only women could access. To create such a group 
they converted a women’s group initially registered under the District Forestry 
Office as a forest users group into the Namuna Co-op, which had the capacity to 
provide its members with financial services. These women felt that since men 
generally had more control than them over financial resources—not only by 
making decisions for the whole family about how the money should be used, but 
also by directly holding the money— women should have a separate source of 
income or access to loans which they could use independent of men’s decisions. 
Since in many cases it was the men (normally husbands) who were members of 
the Bela Co-op or even Phool-bari Co-op, the men were the only ones who were 
legally recognised by the co-ops as potential debtors. This normally excluded 
women from accessing loans in the very first place. Having a co-op solely 
dedicated to women only, would mean that women did not have to depend their 
male-counterparts to access loans from co-ops.  
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 However, making a modest start and adopting a modus operandi similar to 
Bela Co-op’s, Namuna Co-op, while not as big an operation as Bela Co-op, has 
managed somehow to survive. Unlike Bela Co-op its funds do not exceed NRs 
50,000 and due to the high “transaction costs” involved in obtaining and 
maintaining a PAN118, it has no PAN and cannot perform any transactions related 
to chemical fertilisers: a commodity of crucial importance in the agrarian 
economy of Patle Gau. Its office remains mostly closed unlike Bela Co-op which 
employs staff to keep it open for economic transactions during the day. Namuna 
Coop has frustrated a number of its members who have left it to either join Bela 
Co-op or Phoolbari Co-op. Still Namuna Co-op does represent another source of 
finance for women who can either rely on it for their financial needs, or combine 
Namuna loans with funds available from other co-ops and local Saujees. 
 Besides the Bela, Namuna and Phoolbari Co-ops, the least institutionally 
developed of the formal institutions is Ujjwal Bhawishya (Bright Future) 
Women’s Group. Yet this co-op is a crucial source of small loans. Unlike other 
Co-ops, it neither has a formal office space nor any paid staff to manage it. The 
members are fewer in number compared to the other co-ops and usually find 
some public space like a field or a schoolroom where they once every few months 
conduct their meetings. It handles a total fund of only a few thousand Rupees 
which is kept by its Member-Secretary at her home. But this meagre group fund 
comes in handy to the poor, generally Dalit women, who may save and take a 
loan as little as NRs 500 (AuD 7). A lot of these poor Dalit women have sometimes 
defaulted or sometimes have not been able to fully pay back the loan such that 
their scope for requesting more loans from Namuna Co-op has decreased. Hence 
while they re-pay the loan to Namuna co-op little by little, they can still access 
                                                          
118 Frequent travels have to be made to Kathmandu to obtain a PAN, in which an individual has 
to go through lengthy bureaucratic processes which only increase the transaction costs. 
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very small loans from Ujjwal Bawishya for urgent necessities like buying 
foodstuffs. Ujjwal Bhawishya’s existence seems to be justified by its virtue of 
being a faithful friend to the poorest in Patle Gau. 
Use of Credit: Stuck with Saujees 
Even when money is available through different avenues, it is interesting 
to note that the three different social groups – Bahuns, Dalits and Tamang - in 
Patle Gau access loans from formal sources of co-ops and groups differentially. 
Of the total 51 households whom I surveyed in Patle Gau, 78% have at least one 
household member who has obtained membership to at least one of the savings, 
credit groups or co-operatives in the past few years. Group-wise Bahuns have the 
highest rate of participation in these formal institutions at 86% followed by Dalits 
at 78% and Tamangs at 69% (Figure 39).    
Figure 39 Percentage of families participating in the savings and credit groups and 
co-ops 
Caste or 
ethnicity 
Participating 
families 
Total 
families Percentage 
Bahun 13 15 86 
Dalit 18 23 78 
Tamang 9 13 69 
 
Although the size of savings and credit per household varies from one family to 
the next, a general pattern based on caste and ethnicity is detected. Dalits engage 
in the smallest transactions while Bahuns and Tamangs deal in much larger 
transactions. There are a number of Dalits who, when they have saved, have been 
able to save as little as NRs 1,000 (AuD 13) per family. On average, Dalits are able 
to save about NRs 5,000 per family, excepting the Dalkotis (families of Tikaram 
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Dhalkoti) who save much more. This average saving of NRs 5,000 by the Dalits 
sharply contrasts with the average saving of Bahun families at NRs 28,000 (about 
six times more) and of Tamang families at NRs. 19,000 (about four times more).119  
 The amount of savings a family can make is quite important since credit 
is provided based on the savings made. As I have shown earlier, Dalits are 
considerably less able to save than Bahuns or Tamangs, but they need credit the 
most for subsistence purposes.120 Hence, the average loan credit for Bahuns is 
NRs 13,000, for Dalits NRs 26,000 and for Tamangs NRs 44,000 (Figure 40). The 
reason for why the Dalits are still taking out loans, on average, which exceed their 
savings, is that often the co-ops and group management do not necessarily apply 
strict rules. Poorer Dalits not only take loans from one co-op, but from different 
co-ops and groups whose management committee members also feel morally 
obligated to loan out the money. When these poorer Dalits default, they cannot 
apply for any further loans. In such instances they usually resort to local money-
lenders (Saujees) or are obligated to migrate to work in brick-kilns, where despite 
the tough conditions, they are guaranteed to generate some money (Chapter 7). 
The co-ops usually do not take any legal actions against them, but constantly 
place social pressure (like reminding them to repay the money each time they 
meet) to repay the loan. However, no physical coercion is applied. 
Figure 40 Average saving, credit and balance per family (NRs) 
Caste or 
ethnicity Savings Credit Balance 
Bahun 28,000 13,000 15,000 
Dalit  5,000 26,000 -21,000 
Tamang 19,000 44,000 -25,000 
                                                          
119 For Tamangs too I have considered one case as an outlier since he had saved NRs 700,000 in 
Bela co-operative only to take out all of it to construct a house. 
120 I was unable to analyse financial transactions with finance companies and commercial banks 
which some better off and educated Bahuns and Tamangs have access to. 
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Although I have said that that Ujjwal Women Group manages the smallest 
fund, it is still the most important source of credit for Dalit women as it caters to 
their most pressing needs. Although no one from the Bahun or the Tamang 
community has taken credit as meagre in size as NRs 500 (around seven AuD), 
five Dalit women have done so. While these transactions get recorded as “for 
buying hybrid seeds”, “for buying fertilizer” and so on, Dalit women draw this 
measly amount of money just to buy foodstuffs, to survive and to live. 
 The neoclassical economic (neo-liberal) discourse of bikas in Nepal pre-
supposes that an individual is a “free” agent capable of making decisions centred 
on self-interest and guided by aspirations to create maximum utility in every 
economic transaction. But this is not entirely true since an individual is 
essentially a social being in “chains” (Rousseau, 2001). All actions, including 
economic ones, by an individual are performed under constraints imposed by 
social relations and social context (Granovetter, 1985; Polanyi, 1957). Hence 
although government and non-government agencies in Nepal assume that the 
savings and credit groups and co-ops provide loans only for “productive” 
purposes so that the economy grows and not for non-productive “consumption” 
purposes, the villagers in Patle Gau know better. They know that not all rural 
people are able to be enterprising (Karnani, 2011). They know that people are 
deeply embedded in social relations and obligations, such that they need credit 
to supplement their own savings, and to meet certain needs such as buying foods, 
marrying off children, or repairing leaking roofs. As Nima Tamang, an executive 
member of the Namuna Co-op put it: 
We know that such and such’s daughter is marrying and she will 
need money for this. When asking for the loan she does confess this 
as our rules don’t allow us to loan out money for such purposes. 
Only recently two of our members have taken about NRs 20,000 each 
to support another member to marry off their daughter. But in the 
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document we write something like “commercial vegetable 
cultivation” or “goat keeping” so that auditors do not complain later. 
We live in a society. If we don’t provide credit from here, where will 
they go? It is just that if they are unable to repay the loan, our door 
for them in the future will be closed. So, normally some continue 
paying only the interest just to maintain the group membership so 
that they don’t end up accumulating a large sum to repay. 
  Economic transactions made for social consumptive purposes thus get 
“recorded” as entrepreneurial commercial purposes, such as chicken-raising or 
commercial vegetable cultivation, to fulfil the state expectation that rural people 
are enterprising and that the mobilisation of rural economy will generate greater 
economic growth.  
 The three social groups – Bahun, Dalit and Tamang - possessing different 
levels of economic bases also utilise loans for different purposes. As I argued 
earlier while the poorest and the most cash-deficit Dalit families take credit for 
sustenance purposes, a few of them also utile these loans to buy livestock or 
cultivate vegetables. One or two exceptional Dalits have even utilised such loans 
to buy small pieces of land, expand carpentry business or even finance foreign-
employment. But these are only a few Dalits in Patle Gau. Contrarily, of the 
thirteen (out of fifteen) Bahun families who have savings, only three had the need 
for credit from Phoobari, as one Bahun woman said,  
Let the savings grow and keep earning its interest. No hurry. I shall 
take it out when I want to do something substantial … 
Something substantial roughly translates to Jayjeev Dhakal, the same 
person I have been discussing earlier, taking out NRs 50,000 for commercial goat 
keeping. While a family normally keeps five or six goats, Jayjeev now has twenty 
goats. Similarly, another Bahun man, Achyut Dhakal, used credit of NRs 30,000 
to expand his vegetable collection centre, while Harisharan Acharya upgraded 
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his kirana shop with NRs 50,000 credit. The rest of the Bahun community has only 
savings which explains why as a community they have an average positive 
balance of NRs 15,000 per family. The Tamangs are similar to the Bahuns in terms 
of the size of their savings, and like Bahuns they are not reported to have taken 
many small loans. Rather they use larger amounts of credit (around NRs 50,000) 
to upgrade and upscale business, buy buffaloes, and finance foreign 
employment.  
 All my above analysis shows that the bikase discourse of co-ops providing 
loans to transform rural economy while alleviating poverty is not true. The richer 
Bahuns and Tamangs because of their higher economic standing and landedness 
(Chapter 5) can use credit productively to increase their wealth status. But credit 
does not necessarily help poor Dalits get out of poverty. Poor Dalits who start 
from a very low economic base mostly use credit facilities provided by the co-
ops and groups for sustenance purposes, and thus do not escape the “chains” of 
debt. Sometimes they remained chained to local Saujees and sometimes to savings 
and credit co-op/group Saujees. And so, to survive a lot of depend on brick-kiln 
Saujees.  
 The brick-kiln Saujees are the owners of the brick-kilns in Bhaktapur, a 
district about one-hour drive from Patle Gau, where many Dalit individuals and 
families seasonally migrate to work in brick-kilns. The brick-kiln Saujees make 
contracts with a number of Naikes (leaders) who in turn contract a number of 
labourers in Patle Gau to make about NRs 45,000 (about AuD 500) to produce 
250,000 bricks. Essentially the money is given as a full-payment in advance but it 
also acts like credit since the money is normally provided against a land collateral 
or by depositing ones’ citizenship certificates. Prospective workers receive the 
money in September before the Dasain and Tihar festivities, and use the money 
to celebrate them.  Because Bahuns and Tamangs in Patle Gau have sufficient 
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economic opportunities from the cultivation of their own lands, raising livestock 
or running rural enterprises, they are not attracted to work in the sub-human 
conditions that prevail in the brick-kilns (Chapter Seven). Nonetheless, for the 
Dalits who continue to work in these brick-kilns under harsh physical conditions, 
the brick-kiln Saujees still provide much needed cash which otherwise is hard to 
come by. 
The Saujee Who Isn’t 
A Saujee can mean many different things. Sajuee is a rich man, a property-
holder, a money-lender, or a shop-keeper depending upon the context. Although 
savings and credit co-ops have recently attained Saujee status, I argue that Saujee 
is a status attained only by some, not by all. Shyam Hari Pathak was a Saujee for 
previous generations. Indra Acharya, Laxman Timilsina, and Chandra Bahadur 
Tamang are Saujees for today’s generation. While they were Bahun men who 
attained that status in the past, now it is both Bahun and Tamang/Janajati men 
who have achieved that status. No Dalit, man or woman, has accomplished that 
status. Even Saujees running brick-kilns in Bhaktapur are not Dalit but are from 
the Newar ethnic group.  
If a Saujee referred solely to a rich person or a property holder, then 
Tikaram Dhalkoti, a Dalit man, should also have been categorised as one. But no 
one in Patle Gau calls or considers him a Saujee. Similar to the Saujees, Tikaram 
owns 29 ropanis of land where a typical Dalit owns only two ropanis. Tikaram also 
possesses two houses, both bought from migrating Bahun families. This is a rare 
feat not only for a Dalit, but also for Bahuns and Tamangs. However, the 
relatively high level of material wealth that Tikaram Dhalkoti possesses does not 
allow him to establish multiple economic ties with others. His lands are just 
enough for him and families from two wives to cultivate crops and vegetables. 
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While he lives in one of his two houses amongst the Dalits, he has rented out his 
second home to a Tamang family to profitably operate a cheeya plus bhattee pasal 
(a shop that sells tea, liquor and snacks). As I have argued in Chapter Four, since 
the notion of caste-based ritual purity and impurity is deeply held by many in 
Patle Gau, Tikaram or any other Dalit cannot fully participate in food-based 
economic enterprises. Therefore, Tikaram does not run a kirana pasal, cheeyapasal 
or a bhattee or a dairy. Tikaram himself is not rich enough to invest in brick-kilns 
like the Newar Saujees in Bhaktapur who provide employment opportunities to 
many in Patle Gau. Unlike other Bahun and Tamang Saujees in Patle Gau, 
Tikaram cannot run a shop or provide credit, or seasonally employ others in his 
farm such that they could re-pay their debts in labour. Since he also does not 
possess any dairy or vegetable collection centres, his prospective debtors (if he 
were to have any) cannot pay back their debt in the form of commodities like 
milk and vegetables. Hence, despite his fairly good economic status he is unable 
to forge multiple economic ties. Burdened by his Dalit status, Tikaram cannot 
achieve the Saujee status which even the co-ops (as money-lenders) and Siromani 
Sapkota (as newly rich) have acquired recently. Tikaram is just another Dalit, 
who despite his good economic life, will never be a Saujee. 
Conclusion 
The discourse of bikas in Nepal wants us to believe that the third sector 
(the social economy composed of community-based non-profiting co-ops and 
NGOs) supported by the state and the market will mobile the social economy 
including the provision of finances in a way that will eventually transform the 
rural economy from stagnancy to high growth. But this is not entirely true. 
Further the assumptions behind such policies— that the poor, landless and near 
landless do not necessarily have to depend on their lands for adequate income 
generation, but can simply rely on the market mechanisms by participating in 
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employment opportunities provided by expanding rural enterprises, to raise 
incomes and reduce their rates of poverty— are also without substance. 
 These assertions and assumptions are challenged by the reality that in 
caste-conscious rural societies, like that of Patle Gau, where the notion of purity 
and pollution still heavily influence many spheres of life, the legacies of Bahun 
Saujees of the past are inherited by landed Bahun Saujees and even Tamang 
Saujees of the present. These individuals can fully exploit current market 
opportunities, whereas Dalits simply cannot. The poor landless Dalits cannot 
fully and profitably participate in expanding rural enterprises and hence remain 
forever indebted to Saujees, even when the Saujee happen to be co-ops, which 
themselves are inevitably run by Bahuns. Sometimes when large debts to Saujees 
do not get repaid the already near landless Dalits can lose their lands and become 
even more destitute.    
 The concept of caste and its principles of purity and pollution is so deeply 
held in rural places like Patle Gau that long outlawed caste-based discriminatory 
practices still manifest in subtle ways that effectively bar Dalits from fully and 
profitably participating the in food-based rural economy (Chapter Four). Hence, 
they cannot own kirana pasal, cheeyapasal, bhattees or dairies, the very rural 
enterprises that the Nepalese state would like to think are pro-poor. Restrained 
by such social expectations, even the wealthy Dalit, Tikaram Dhalkoti, cannot 
establish the multiple economic ties required for exchanging commodities, 
labour and money in different forms and modes with others, which effectively 
prevents him from acquiring the status of a Saujee. 
 Although savings and credit groups and co-ops have eased access to 
credit, the Dalits typically utilise credit facilities either for subsistence purposes 
like buying food, repairing leaking tinned roofs, treating illness, or for 
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performing social rituals such as marriage. They cannot normally utilise credit 
for economic upscaling. Therefore, the credit they borrow generally gets used up 
in consumption purposes losing its supposedly regenerating and reproducing 
capacity. On the contrary, landed Bahuns and Tamangs can make money and 
utilise credit by commercially growing vegetables in addition to running various 
farm-based enterprises such as milk and vegetable collection centres and non-
farm based enterprises such as kirana pasal, cheeyapasals and bhatees to maintain 
the multiple ties with others required to become a Saujee. They use the same 
credit facilities that Dalits do, but by borrowing much larger amounts, they 
generate more economic capital through re-investment in their small to medium 
rural enterprises.  
 Bahuns like Siromani Sapkota are even able to “shape” and “capture” the 
bikas activities provided by the third sector (co-ops) to become rich Saujees, while 
most poor Dalits continue to remain poor. The provision of credit through social 
economy has lessened Dalit’s total dependence on local money-lending Saujees 
for economic sustenance. Nonetheless, unlike the landed and non-poor Bahuns 
and Tamangs the Dalits do not possess sufficient lands, farm or non-farm full-
time employment, and remain perpetually indebted to Saujees, individual or 
collective, local or outsider (Bhaktapur), for economic subsistence. 
 In this chapter, I have demonstrated how the non-economic structure of 
caste and ethnicity plays a significant role in one practice of bikas, i.e. the 
provision of financial services through the mobilisation of the social economy. I 
have argued how Bahuns and Tamangs leverage their landed and non-Dalit 
status to make the most of present market-based economies to become Saujees. 
Benefitting the least by the discourse and practices of bikas in a rural village, in 
the next chapter, I argue that Dalits opt for migration, a field which again is 
differentially appropriated by the three different social groups of Patle Gau. 
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Chapter 7 
Moving Places: Differential Migratory Strategies and Patterns 
I have relied, in this thesis, on the life-histories of certain key individuals 
to illustrate the social dynamics of life in Patle Gau. Siromani Sapkota—part of a 
local elite, socially and politically powerful— was one of those upon whom I 
focused. Siromani, as I detailed in the last chapter, is now facing competition 
from Jayjeev Dhakal, another of my interlocutors, both of whom were capable of 
articulating Patle Gau’s “image” and “needs” to both insiders and outsiders of 
Patle Gau. These two men hope to influence bikase agents and stir bikase practices 
in Patle Gau. Other key individuals such as Indra Acharya, Laxman Timilsina 
and Chandra Bahadur Tamang are the local Saujees: financially powerful men 
upon whose business success many depend for economic sustenance. Of the 
women I discussed, Meena BK and Durga Purkoti are more empowered than 
most other Dalit, or even Bahun and Tamang women. They act as change and 
bikas agents, and remain strong enough, to time and time again challenge the 
caste-based practices of the status quo. Jit Bahadur Pariyar and Dhan Bahadur 
Pariyar have also appeared repeatedly in this thesis, for almost exactly the 
opposite reasons to those I have listed above. These Dalit men are some of the 
poorest and the least influential across all spheres of the village life in Patle Gau. 
Their primary concern is typically how to get their next meal.  
 My analysis of the Dalit landowner Tikaram Dhalkoti, has demonstrated 
how he has surpassed all of his Dalit peers. While he is far richer than most other 
Dalits, his material wealth has not entitled him the status of a Saujee. Any non-
Dalit possessing the level of property that he has would easily have been referred 
to as a Saujee, but this label is not applied to Tikaram. Because Tikaram embodies 
many contradictions of contemporary Patle Gau, it is worthwhile to consider his 
life trajectory once again in somewhat more detail. 
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 Tikaram Dhalkoti was born in 1951 in a village about 40 kms away from 
Patle Gau. Tikaram lost his father when he was quite young and lived his 
childhood in economic hardship. When he was about eleven, his parents and the 
parents of a Bahun boy, a few years older than him, made the two boys each 
other’s mit (blood brother)121 by a ritual of mixing their blood. It was with this 
Bahun mit that Tikaram ventured into India when he was only fourteen years 
old. These boys had no concrete destination, no particular dream, only a belief 
that they had a better chance in India of making a living and eventually returning 
to a better life in Nepal. 
 Their travel to India eventually led them to Calcutta where Tikaram 
started living in the streets picking up any day-labouring jobs he could find. After 
a few months Tikaram was hired by a Bengali family as a domestic help to clean 
their house, dishes and clothes. Meanwhile his Bahun mit worked as a guard in 
a sawmill. After a couple of years the Bengali family helped Tikaram find 
labouring work with Indian Railways. First he laboured casually and later in a 
permanent job as a rail mechanic. After twenty years with Indian Railways, 
Tikaram took voluntary retirement and benefited from a payout of a substantial 
amount of money. Although his Bahun mit was also able to save some money as 
a “guard” he did not make as much money as Tikaram did. When Tikaram finally 
returned to Nepal from India he purchased 29 ropanis of land and two established 
houses from the high caste Acharya Bahun in Patle Gau, a feat that no other Dalit 
in Patle Gau has ever been able to achieve. These high caste owners departed to 
farm better land elsewhere and their bastee settlement became occupied by 
Tikaram and other Dalit families. Rather than use his wealth to open up social 
standing equal to that of higher castes Tikaram built himself a place within his 
                                                          
121 Mit relationship is considered to be much stronger than mere friendship or even familial 
relationships 
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Dalit group. Despite his impressive wealth people don’t consider him a Saujee. 
He is still a Dalit living as a Dalit with other Dalits. In Tika’s own words,  
I have never entered a Bahun’s house … not even my mit’s house. Sure, 
we were mit but that did not alter the fact that he was a Bahun and I, a 
Dalit. Even now I don’t enter any Bahun’s house. Even during our 
wedding reception, they do not eat the food we cook. Instead we arrange 
for a Bahun cook who cooks the food for them on our behalf outside of 
our house. This way they do accept our invitation for attending the 
wedding reception but also are able to maintain their caste purity by 
eating the food prepared by another Bahun. I mostly interact with other 
Dalits for most social events such as birth, death and marriages. 
 The unusual circumstances of Tikaram’s life trajectory illustrate both the 
possibilities and barriers that Dalits face in Patle Gau. Tikaram is at once both an 
anomaly: an extra-ordinary person, and a normality: an ordinary person. His 
economic standing sets him apart from most other Dalits but his social status as 
a Dalit in Patle Gau remains virtually unchanged. He is landed amongst the 
mostly landless and near landless Dalits. He owns two houses, both well-built. 
He has already sent two of his children to Malaysia for better income 
opportunities while most other Dalits and even some Bahun and Tamang 
families struggle to gather the initial administrative costs for such a move.  He is 
successful in providing most of his children and grand-children with several 
years of formal education unlike most other Dalit parents whose children drop 
out of school in order to help their parents earn a living before completing six or 
seven years of schooling. Yet Tikaram remains in many ways just another Dalit 
in Patle Gau. In a process similar to “reverse of gentrification” what used to be 
Bahun bastee is now a Dalit bastee. After Tikaram bought houses from some 
Acharya Bahuns other Bahuns did not move their residences closer to him but 
only other Dalits did.  This ritually “pure” land is now an “impure” one which 
most Bahuns avoid unless they are seeking occupational services like that of 
tailoring provided by Dalits. 
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 The sizable amount of material wealth that Tikaram possesses does not 
“cleanse” him of the ritual impurity that the non-Dalits assume his body 
possesses.  An equivalent amount of material wealth could have raised the status 
of any non-Dalit person to a Saujee, a rich man, a property-holder. Bikram Hari 
Pathak, a Bahun man, for example was a Saujee in the past. Indra Acharya and 
Laxman Timilsina are the two Bahun men who are present-day Saujees. Unlike in 
the past, even Tamangs can now be Saujees like Chandra Bahadur Tamang. Even 
institutions like local savings and credit co-operatives have attained the symbolic 
title of Saujee. But nobody in Patle Gau considers Tikaram to be a Saujee. Bahun 
and Tamang men who do not bear the brunt of “untouchability” keep shops, 
bhattees, and dairies where others “freely” consume food and related items, but 
Tikaram is socially and covertly barred from running such food-based 
enterprises. While Bahun and Tamang men use these enterprises plus lands and 
money-lending activities to maintain “multiple economic ties” with others and 
be treated like Saujees (Chapter Six) Tikaram cannot establish these multiple 
economic ties and cannot be a Saujee despite possessing relatively greater wealth. 
Tikaram is just another Dhalkoti, another Meejar, another Sarkee, another Dalit. 
 Yet Tikaram’s material wealth provides him the comfort that he and his 
family members do not have to physically labour in other’s farms or in brick 
kilns. Like most other Bahuns and Tamangs and unlike other Dalits, Tikaram and 
his family tend to their own farm. They also supplement their income from the 
money obtained through the rent from one house near the highway occupied by 
a Tamang family who run a bhattee there. Tikaram’s upward economic mobility 
would not have been possible if he had not migrated to India all those years ago 
(N. R. Shrestha, Velu, & Conway, 1993). If he had been stuck in Calcutta for a 
long time as a domestic help, or had he not had a lucky break with the Indian 
Railways, he probably would not have earned enough to enable him to have the 
 216 
life that he lives now. His Bahun mit whom he has not met for many years now 
did not come back to Nepal with as much money as he did. His current 
possession of material wealth occurring through a fortunate event that permitted 
his upward economic mobility was brought about by the lucky incident of 
migration. For most Dalits being able to achieve the economic transformation 
which Tikaram has been able to achieve is only a dream. Only a few exceptional 
Dalits in Nepal, who were close to powerful (royal) elites and served them 
through their caste-based occupations, like making iron weapons, shields, 
utensils, clothes and jewellery were “gifted” wealth without ever having to 
migrate out of Nepal122. But dreams motivate people. Dreams drive people. And 
Dalits, as well as Bahuns and Tamangs, continue to look to migration as a way to 
improve their lives.  
 Internal circulatory migration performed by the Dalits and international 
migration to which young people, especially men, aspire is not a new 
phenomenon in Nepal. In fact, migration of any sort – internal, international, 
seasonal, circulatory, semi-permanent, and permanent – has been practiced in 
Nepal for a long time. The nation itself is composed of various ethnic and caste 
groups who migrated from the South and the North hundreds and thousands of 
years ago. Even the founders of the present-day nation-state of Nepal, the Shah 
royals, migrated from India during the sixteenth century to evade Muslim rule 
in India (Bista, 1991; Gurung, 2005).  While internal migration has continued since 
the early phases of the formation of Nepalese nation-state in the 1860s, 
international migration, mostly trade-related, of Nepalese peoples to and from 
                                                          
122 Personal communication with Aahuti, a Dalit intellectual and Dr. Purna Nepali, a Dalit bikase 
professional. 
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India and Tibet (China) has a long history in Nepal, although the phenomenon 
lacks precise documentation.  
 Certain Nepalese hill peoples, most notably the “martial tribes” such as 
the Rai, Limbu, Gurung, Magar and Chhetri migrated to Lahore (in present day’s 
Pakistan) to join the army of the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh who gave them and those 
employed abroad afterwards the nickname “Lahure” (Seddon, Adhikari, & 
Gurung, 2002; p. 19). After 1815 the same “tribes” served foreign (particularly 
British and later Indian) military services as “Gurkhas” following the signing the 
Sughauli Treaty which allowed the British Government to recruit Nepalese 
mercenaries (Khatiwada, 2014; Shrestha, 1985; Toffin, 1976).123 In the second half 
of the nineteenth century, encouraged by liberal policies of land allotment, 
hundreds of thousands of Nepalese also permanently migrated to Assam and 
Darjeeling in India, and to Bhutan, buying lands there while also fulfilling the 
large demands for agricultural labour for tea and rice plantations (Toffin, 1976). 
In recent years thousands of Nepalese have migrated to the USA, UK and 
Australia under various visa schemes for permanent residency. After 1990 large 
numbers have increasingly migrated to Middle Eastern countries and Malaysia 
for non-military employment opportunities (Thieme & Wyss, 2005). Currently an 
estimated five million Nepalese are employed outside of Nepal, 40% of whom 
are in India (Khatiwada, 2014, p. 235). 
 Those who have not migrated outside of Nepal have moved within the 
country in three distinct waves (N. R. Shrestha, 1990; Suwal, 2014). In the first 
wave, during the early phases of nation-formation in the early eighteenth 
century, Nepalese populations from the west moved east into the Kathmandu 
                                                          
123 The estimated numbers of such Nepali soldiers, labelled “Gurkhas”, are 200,000 and 250,000 
during first and second World Wars respectively (Toffin, 1976,  p. 200). 
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Valley and further east to settle areas with greater annual rainfall conducive to 
farming.  After the state was successful in controlling malaria in the Southern 
plains of the Terai, making it substantially more hospitable, a second wave of 
internal migration moved there from the hills in the 1950s. This internal 
migration was strongly supported by the state who used its techno-scientific 
rationale to re-distribute population internally. It achieved this by providing 
Nepalese people with finance and other facilities to migrate from the hills, which 
then had high human-land ratio with less productive lands, to the Terai, which 
had relatively low human-land ratio and more productive fertile lands 
(Kansakar, 1985). While thousands of state-aided families resettled during this 
project, thousands more migrated voluntarily clearing large tracts of forests for 
residential and agricultural land (Shrestha, 1990). The third wave of internal 
migration from rural to urban areas, primarily Kathmandu, took place after 1990 
with the restoration of parliamentary democracy and the adoption of neo-liberal 
economic policies that gave rise to employment opportunities in the informal 
sector (Shakya, 2002).  
Migration Patterns into and out of Patle Gau 
The migration pattern in Patle Gau mirrors this national pattern but with 
its own location-specific peculiarities. Through a detailed examination of 
migration patterns into and away from Patle Gau, I aim, in this chapter, to show 
that different social groups pursue migration to attain different dreams and 
different forms of livelihood.  
 In Chapter Five I narrated the origins and patterns of land-ownership in 
Patle Gau, to argue that Sapkota Bahuns use the legacy of Birta (land-gifts) to 
support their claims that they are the first owners of land and hence the first 
settlers in Patle Gau. A claim which other Bahun sub-groups do not dispute. 
Pathak interlocutors told me that until about twenty or thirty years ago, the Birta 
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land claims of the Sapkotas were symbolically recognised by maintaining a 
minute of silence and bodily non-movement upon hearing of the death of any 
Sapkota. Yet concurrently the Tamangs also leverage their claim of Kipat 
(“indigenous” communal land), to assert their claims to indigeneity and first-
settler status. Some elderly Bahun and Tamang men told me that a few Dalit 
families must also have accompanied the first Sapkota families to settle in close 
but separate lands. According to them, the Sapkotas would have needed the Dalit 
families to provide them with farm labour and caste-based occupational services 
such as sewing and blacksmithing. But of course, as I have argued in previous 
chapters the Dalits, including the elderly among them, do not have grand and 
glorified tales of Birta or Kipat to assert original land ownership or first settler 
status. They also do not seem to care about such origins. I, therefore cannot argue 
for certain who among Bahun, Dalit and Tamang are the first settlers in and 
around Patle Gau.  
 Whatever is the ultimate truth regarding the first settlers in Patle Gau, the 
Kumai (originally from Kumaon, now in India) Pathak Bahuns from the West 
also migrated to Patle Gau possibly around time of the first wave of internal 
migrants in the eighteenth century which occurred as a result of the political 
unification of the country by the Shahs. Following the Pathaks, in due course of 
time other Purbia (Eastern) Bahuns like Acharya, Dhakal, and Timilsina from the 
East also started settling into Patle Gau. But not all continued staying in Patle 
Gau. As some started migrating into Patle Gau, some also started migrating out 
of it.   
 Some of the more adventurous and those seeking upward economic 
mobility, especially those from Pathak families have also permanently migrated 
out of Patle Gau. The Pathaks equipped themselves with formal education in the 
national language, Nepali, and found jageers (salaried jobs) with the Government 
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of Nepal. The cultural capital of formal education (Bourdieu, 2011), combined 
with the social capital of “good connections” (Bourdieu, 2011) and the economic 
capital of money and vast tracts of land “grabbed” during the land reform 
programmes of the 1960s, provided the basis for some Pathak families to 
eventually migrate to bigger cities like Kathmandu and even to overseas 
countries like the US. The Sapkotas, in contrast who stayed in Patle Gau and stuck 
with the hereditary transmission of Sanskrit-based priestly and astrological 
skills, were unqualified for government jobs and continue today practicing 
farming and jusmani - puretai [providing priestly and astrological services to 
jusman (client)]. The relatively late-coming Bahun sub-groups of Dhakal and 
Timilsina who migrated into the village after buying lands from the Pathaks and 
Sapkotas, drew on their pre-existing entrepreneurial skills to set up rural-
enterprises like dairies, shops and so on, in addition to farming land in the 
village.   
 A few Acharya Bahuns who also migrated in with the Dhakals and 
Timilsinas, have also remained in Patle Gau. Like other Bahun sub-groups they 
are mostly engaged in farming, but some also earn a living from commercial 
enterprises. However, most have sold their lands to migrate to other parts of the 
Kavre district where lands are flatter, more fertile and easily irrigated to cultivate 
rice, the number one crop in Nepal. As I have narrated earlier Tikaram Dhalkoti 
bought the land and houses of one such migrating Acharya family. While most 
Dalits labour on others’ farms or in other economic sectors in the Kavre district, 
some Tamangs have also become as enterprising as the Bahuns. Yet they have 
largely chosen not to migrate elsewhere and continue farming. 
 A combination of these migratory patterns paired with the livelihood 
occupations chosen means that Acharyas, Dhakals, Pathats, Sapkotas, and 
Timilsinas are the sub-caste groups residing in and around Patle Gau along with 
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members of Dalit and Tamang social groups. However, today there is 
considerable migration happening in Patle Gau, which takes three forms: 
temporary international migration, seasonal circulatory internal migration, and 
semi-permanent internal migration. These migration patterns, nonetheless, are 
very different for each caste and ethnic group. 
 There are centres outside Patle Gau which are more economically dynamic 
urban places which allow room for economic mobility and the possibility of more 
equal social relations.  Therefore, while most persons of higher castes migrate for 
economic reasons, Dalits migrate from Patle Gau not only for economic reasons, 
but also to benefit from the “politics of anonymity” (Folmar, 2007; p. 45). In urban 
centres they are able to mask, hide or manipulate their Dalit identities so that 
they can interact with others in more equal ways. Such manipulation of caste-
based identities is virtually impossible in rural places like Patle Gau where 
everybody knows everybody else, and where caste and ethnic identity is 
foregrounded over individual identity. Although Patle Gau is seeing a decline in 
overt caste-based practices, notions of caste system and associated caste 
hierarchy are so deeply embedded in the Nepalese society, specially in the rural 
areas that caste-based discrimination continues to be practiced in many covert 
forms (Chapter Four). This makes it very difficult for the Dalits to live socially 
dignified and economically fulfilling lives at home and so many of them choose 
to permanently migrate out of Patle Gau. 
 Bahuns undertake migration, but purely for economic and political 
reasons. Bahuns, as economically and politically powerful, do not migrate out of 
Patle Gau for labouring work. Rather they either go abroad to accumulate 
economic capital or go to urban places to accumulate cultural capital such as 
formal education or for white collar jobs that in turn consolidate higher social 
and political status at home in Patle Gau. Tamangs work in cities and abroad as 
 222 
vehicle drivers and restaurant waiters with hopes of achieving upward economic 
mobility. Although Tamangs from other villages and districts also work in back-
breaking brick-kilns, Tamangs in Patle Gau who are mostly landed, are not 
interested in doing this. Never stigmatised on the basis of caste to the extent that 
the Dalits have been, Tamangs tend to their farms and livestock in Patle Gau and 
even run other business enterprises. Both “high-caste” Bahuns and Janajati 
Tamangs feel no need to participate in the politics of anonymity like Dalits do. 
Young people, especially from the Bahun and Tamang communities, who do not 
want to labour in the tough conditions of brick kilns or elsewhere in Nepal, but 
desire economic opportunities, typically seek employment opportunities 
overseas in countries like Malaysia or the Gulf countries. Their typical argument 
is: 
Ke garne, dai (brother)!? You don’t quite make the same amount of 
money working here in Nepal than you would working there. A few 
years of hard work there would probably provide us with 
considerable amount using which you could start a business or 
whatever.    
Temporary International Migration 
I have already discussed above that the trade-related migration to India 
and Tibet even before the formation of the nation-state of Nepal was followed by 
the migration of certain ethnic groups (most specifically Rai, Limbu, Gurung and 
Magar),124 to India for military services from the 19th century. Since none of these 
ethnic groups reside in Patle Gau, there is no one from Patle Gau serving in these 
armies. Nonetheless, foreign destinations like Quatar and Malaysia attract a lot 
of youth from Patle Gau for non-military employment. These youths are typically 
young men between the age of 21 and 40 who do not have regular salaried jobs 
in Nepal. While a few Tamang men drive vehicles, most of these international 
                                                          
124 Before the Indian Mutiny in 1857, “Chhetri” (Hindu warrior group) was also recruited. 
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migrants labour in factories assembling parts of various consumer products such 
as refrigerators, fans, and the like or work as security guards. They usually spend 
a couple of years working in this way, after which their contract may or may not 
be extended. And while some of the returnees try to make money through rural 
enterprises such as shops, small furniture houses and the like, some just wait for 
forthcoming opportunities. Most do not seem to be interested in farming 
(Adhikari & Hobley, 2011; Seddon, et al., 2002). 
 However not all aspiring youth in Patle Gau can afford to make 
international trips of this kind, given that initial administrative costs per person 
range between NRs 100,000 and NRs 200,000 which is unaffordable for poorer 
families living in debt and applying for loans as little as NRs 500. In addition to 
these financial costs, social networks and connections are critical in order to reach 
the final foreign destinations (Chapagain, 2015; Sunam & McCarthy, 2016). The 
journey from home in a village to the final destination requires an aspiring 
migrant to collect necessary information, have a citizenship certificate and 
passport (which demands time and money), pass medical tests, acquire a visa 
and so on (Figure 41). For many the very first hurdle is to acquire the necessary 
information. They do not know who to contact or where and when to go to seek 
such information. The families who already have one family member abroad may 
not necessarily share the required information. Therefore, those lacking in such 
social capital (Bourdieu, 2011), especially poorer Dalits, often times are “blocked” 
at the very first hurdle since they fail to gain the right information.  
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Figure 41 Recruitment steps for foreign employment                                                   
[source: (Sunam, 2016, Figure 3)] 
 
Like, anywhere else in Nepal, any aspiring migrant in Patle Gau has to 
depend on an intermediary, a broker, a middle-man, typically called a dalal. 
These dalals benefit from rents by making contacts with a potential employer in 
destination foreign countries and guiding the aspirant through a work contract. 
The dalals also typically are involved in all other processes from obtaining the 
aspirant’s citizenship certificate to buying air tickets, taking percentages 
whenever possible. Since it is the aspirants who have to perform all these 
necessary actions and bear the economic as well as transaction costs of living in 
an expensive place like Kathmandu, dealing with “inefficient” government 
bureaucracy and filling in all the necessary paperwork, a lot of illiterate poor 
people find these hurdles insurmountable.  
 In addition to leaving behind the comforts of home the salaries obtained 
through foreign employment, whether through labouring in factories or working 
as guards, are not drastically life-changing. While the company makes 
arrangements with dalals, who obtain a commission with each labour contract, 
the labourer typically is paid between NRs 8,000 to NRs 25,000 a month. The 
contract also may not necessarily go beyond a year or two. I had encounters with 
a couple of returnees from international migrations of this kind, and they claim 
that the remittances do not transform their economic lives in Patle Gau. They 
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have tales to tell of the travels in the plane (which almost are “the first and the 
only”), jheeli meeli (great lights) and night lives in big cities, but the fun almost 
always stops there. The money received is not life-changing.  In one case, the 
Tamang man could re-invest the savings made from international migration into 
a small cheeyapasal which his wife mostly runs, whereas in the second case, the 
Dalit man was quite disappointed that his two years stint in Malaysia turned out 
to be jasto ko tyastai (“break even”) only. His father who was close-by when we 
were chatting was actually unhappy that his son only “lost” two years. 
 It is because of these circumstance that individuals coming from non-poor 
but at the same time not so rich families, but who desire better economic 
opportunities, seek foreign employment. Sons of wealthier Bahun families like 
that of Indra Acharya and Laxman Timilsina in Patle Gau are not attracted to 
such employment opportunities. They’d rather work to help their fathers expand 
their local businesses such as dairies or shops or get salaried white-collar jobs in 
Kathmandu which exceed the economic gains to be made in foreign countries. In 
fact, rumours had it that Indra Acharya made his older son quit his studies at 
university to give him a hand to enlarge his prospering business.  
And for the political and social elite like Sironmani Sapkota and Jayjeev 
Dhakal migration of any kind comes with an opportunity cost that they don’t 
want to bear in Patle Gau. Migrating for (hard) labouring jobs that do not pay 
well is too high a cost to pay as they would rather enjoy the social and political 
status in Patle Gau. They are happy keeping themselves busy chairing co-
operatives, maintaining links with district-level local political leaders and 
political parties and bikase offices such that they enjoy the “power” to guide bikas 
in Patle Gau and become Saujees in the process. Such aspirations, therefore, led 
Sironmani to build a new house in order to consolidate his social and political 
power, and demonstrate his “raised” economic status as one of the few men 
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around Patle Gau with a three-storeyed modern house. He arranged for his first 
son working in Kathmandu as an accountant to marry a couple of years ago a 
Bahun woman who was the principal of a local primary school. Siromani’s 
second son was completing a Masters of Sociology degree from Tribhuvan 
University in Kathmandu which would allow him the cultural capital to get a job 
within the “aid industry” (Mosse, 2005). Happy with building all forms of capital 
and consolidating his powerful position in Patle Gau, Siromani and his sons have 
no need to seek labour employment opportunities abroad. 
 However, many in Patle Gau who are not as “settled” as Siromani Sapkota 
or as “economically prosperous” or considered, Saujees, such as Indra Acharya 
and Laxman Timilsina still wish for foreign employment. Yet not all surmount 
the hurdles I have described above. Two Bahun families have one family member 
and Tikaram’s Dalit family has two members in Malaysia. But it is Tamangs who 
have the highest percentage of families with members abroad in Malaysia, Saudi 
Arabia or Qatar (Figure 42) where they typically drive vehicles or work as 
guards. The social capital of networks matters for making the right connections 
in order to successfully reach the desired destination, and the Tamang 
community in Patle Gau has cultivated much more of that capital in this regard 
than the other two communities. 
Figure 42 Patterns of international migration in Patle Gau 
Caste or 
ethnic group 
Families with at least 
one member abroad 
Destinations Purpose 
Bahun 2 (out of 14 families) Malaysia Factory labour 
Dalit 1 (out of 24 families)  Malaysia Factory labour 
Tamang 5 (out of 13 families) Malaysia, 
Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia 
Factory labour, 
vehicle driving, 
guarding 
Total 8 (out of 51 families)   
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 Amongst the Dalits in Patle Gau, it is only Tikaram Dhalkoti who has one 
son and one daughter working abroad125. No other Dalit family has been able to 
send its members abroad mostly because they cannot put together the initial costs 
involved. But the lure of foreign employment endures. Dhan Bahadur Pariyar’s 
son insisted that he could earn better money if he worked in Malaysia. This is the 
reason why, as I have already discussed in my earlier chapters (Chapters Five 
and Six), Dhan Bahadur ended up depositing two ropanis of land to get a loan of 
NRs 100,000 from local money lender, Chandra Bahadur Tamang. But since 
Dhan’s son got cheated by fraudulent dalals in Kathmandu, they not only lost all 
the money but also half the land deposited. Such a case of cheating of poorer 
villagers, especially of the Dalits, both by local money-lenders and by dalals in 
relation to foreign employment is neither new nor specific to Patle Gau. Many 
others have documented such cases of cheating elsewhere in Nepal (Adhikari & 
Hobley, 2011; Sunam & McCarthy, 2016). 
 But such unfortunate incidences do not deter the ambitions of other young 
men who still want to try their luck in foreign countries. Shankar Dhakal, a young 
Bahun man, who repeatedly failed year ten examination (School Leaving 
Certificate) and does not have a secure salaried job, did not give up his ambition 
of making a trip to Malaysia. He hoped that he might be able to re-invigorate his 
current small-scale commercial vegetable farm with the savings made in 
Malaysia. But coming from an economically modest Bahun family, neither he nor 
his widowed mother had the financial ability to sponsor his adventure. 
                                                          
125 While it is usually young men between the age of 18 to 35 who have left Patle Gau for 
Malaysia and Qatar, Tikaram Dhalkoti’s daughter is the only exception.  
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Seasonal Circulatory Internal Migration 
Those Dalits who do not own land to cultivate like the Bahuns and 
Tamangs, who do not have economic resources to finance international work 
opportunities and who only get meagre seasonal and occasional on-farm and off-
farm labouring opportunities in Patle Gau, resort to working in the brick-kilns in 
Bhatkapur (a district about 45 minutes bus ride from Patle Gau) for their survival. 
 Immediately after Dasain and Tihar, the two biggest Hindu festivities in 
Nepal, I was struck by the strange quiet in the Dalit bastee of Patle Gau. The usual 
hustle bustle was totally absent. Many houses were locked, farms deserted and 
children playing in fields were fewer in numbers. When I asked why this was so, 
somebody told me: 
Oh. It will be like this for at least six months now. They have left, 
some even with their whole families, to work in brick kilns near 
Kathmandu. They will come back before the monsoon starts 
sometime in June. 
My survey data showed that more than half the Dalit families practice circulatory 
migration to labour in brick kilns in Bhaktapur to earn some cash for several years 
now.  The construction sector is one of the largest economic sectors in Nepal 
(GON, 2015b) with a thriving brick industry: 
Business is booming in Nepal’s brick industry. “Demand is 
increasing because building is increasing,” says Mahendra Chitrakar, 
president of the Federation of Nepal Brick Industries. “Each and 
every man wants to come to Kathmandu and build a house here.” 
(Pattisson & Kelly, 2015) 
To fulfil increasing demands for bricks there are around 800 brick kilns 
throughout the country, 112 of which are in Kathmandu Valley surrounding 
Kathmandu district itself (Report, 2015). And so, the Dalit bastee in Patle Gau is 
deserted from October immediately after celebration of Hindu festivals of Dasain 
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and Tihar because slightly more than half of the Dalit families who live there 
annually migrate to Bhaktapur to work in brick kilns for six months.  
 These brick kilns operate in open spaces. Since rain can significantly 
hamper brick production, particularly the “drying” and “firing” processes, the 
production period has to avoid the wet monsoon period from June to September. 
And except for chimneys used for “firing” the bricks, everything else from 
labourers’ quarters to places for drying bricks is temporary. The brick-kiln Saujees 
(owners) rent a number of adjoining plots of land from local land-owners in 
October for six months after which the respective land-owners re-assume the 
plots to produce rice, taking advantage of the monsoon. The brick-kiln operators 
provide the labourers with some space for sitting quarters, drilled water services, 
“raw bricks” for constructing their temporary houses and cash in advance, and 
the labourers themselves construct their own temporary chapras (slum-like 
dwellings). These cramped chapras are usually four-feet tall covering a few 
meters in area with just enough space to sleep and cook. The labourers pile up 
bricks which function as “walls”. They then lay a tin sheet on top of the walls, 
weigh it down with stones and other bricks, thus providing a “roof” to the house. 
A similar piece of small tin sheet works as a door to these slum-like houses. 
Labourers are responsible for bringing all these housing materials in tractors 
from their homes to these brick-kilns, the costs of which are borne by the Naika, 
another Dalal who mediates between the brick Saujees and the labourers.  Since 
no toilets are provided the workers defecate in open spaces seriously threatening 
their health as well as the health of other surrounding residents. But no matter 
how dreadful the living conditions it is not only men who work in these brick 
kilns, in many instances even whole families including wives and children 
migrate here to work. While teenagers and adults labour in the brick kilns, the 
children may go to schools close-by. 
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 Although various ethnic and caste groups such as Tamangs and Chhetris 
from other parts of Nepal particularly from remote districts like Humla and Doti 
work in the brick kilns it is only the Dalits from Patle Gau who opt for this 
livelihood option. Most Bahuns in Patle Gau are already well-off economically 
and even the poorer ones have sufficient land-holding or keep enough livestock 
to earn a living. The question of eking out a living by working in such harsh 
conditions is beyond their consideration. Similarly, for Tamangs, as one of the 
poorer Tamang men told me, “Why toil there? I have to take care of my farm and 
livestock here. Thyahko paisa le posaudaina (The money is not good either).” But 
for most landless or near landless Dalits in Patle Gau, massive drudgery and 
harsh living and working conditions are not a deterrent but rather an aspect of 
one of their only choices available for survival.  
 It was quite hard for me to locate the Dalit families working in brick kilns 
in Bhaktapur. Finding a Naike was the suggested first port of call. A naike is a 
dalal, intermediary of some kind, who usually is a man who has had some years 
of previous experience of working in brick kilns himself. Because of his previous 
experience he may have earned the trust both of the brick-kiln Saujees and the 
labourers. A brick-kiln Saujuee pays a number of naikes for arranging a number 
of labourers for producing an agreed number of bricks within a set period of time.  
To collect labourers the Naike normally visits bastees of potential labourers and 
verbally agrees with several individuals or families to arrange for their work in 
the brick kilns. He conducts his trips to the bastee typically in August before the 
start of Dasain so that he is able to make some advance payments so the labourers 
are able to celebrate the festivities. The Naike usually keeps the land deeds, if 
available, or even citizenship certificates of the workers as collateral, so that if the 
labourers fail to deliver as agreed, he retains the documents and thus prevents 
the labourers from making other transactions that require those documents.   
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 After a few weeks of searching, I finally traced one Dalit family, led by 
Lok Purkoti, in a brick-kiln in Bhaktapur (Figure 43). Lok Purkoti had come there 
with his son and his son’s wife who in turn had brought their small daughter. 
Lok Purkoti was a frail man in his late 50s. That day I was lucky to have met him 
in his chapra in the afternoon right after his lunch so he could spare some time to 
talk to me before resuming his work. After some niceties and formal introduction, 
I began the conversation by asking him why he chose to work in the brick kiln. 
Lok Purkoti opened up:   
Ani ke garne ta (Then what else can be done)? We don’t have much 
land to cultivate. We don’t have other skills with which we can make 
money. Lek pad ni chaina (I cannot read or write). This body and its 
labour are the only things with which we can earn a living. Khanai 
paryo … (We have to eat …) Bachnai paryo … (We have to survive), 
no? 
I asked Lok Purkoti to describe his typical day at the kiln. Lok explained: 
A typical day actually starts at night; at one. A cup of black tea or hot 
water is the “diet” for three or four hours during which time we mix 
clay with water to make it doughy. Since this task is to be done 
outside, we prefer working at night to avoid being exposed to the 
sun under which we would become sweaty and tired quickly. 
However, one thing that really hurts is the very cold water which we 
have to use with our bare hands to prepare the clay for brick. By 
seven in the morning, we have already made clay doughy enough to 
be moulded into bricks by putting them into saacho (wooden brick 
frame). At this time we have a few biscuits or whatever with water to 
get some energy. Then we spend the rest of the day constantly 
turning clay into “raw/uncooked” bricks and stacking them up by 
the side of the working site. In between these works, we also manage 
time to cook lunch which normally is bhat (rice) and dal (lentil soup). 
We normally retire by five in the evening. We again have a little bit 
of the same thing that we have during the lunch. By seven we try to 
sleep. Otherwise it would be difficult to get up at one next morning.  
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Answering my question regarding how many days a week they worked, Lok 
replied: 
We work six days a week taking rest only on Saturdays. But then 
again if there are urgent things that we have to take care of, we 
attend to those things too. And if we want to visit our homes we do 
that too. It really does not matter, you know, since we don’t get paid 
by the hour or week. It is a contract whereby we receive payment for 
the number of bricks we make. 
 
Figure 43 Lok Purkoti prepares the clay and stands in front of the chimney        
(Photos by author) 
 
 
A labourer like Lok Purkoti whether working alone or seeking the help of 
his entire family including wife, sons, daughters, and daughters-in-law, normally 
receives around NRs 40,000 (approximately AuD 500) for delivering 200,000 
bricks during a six month stay at the brick kilns. This roughly converts to NRs 
6,666/month. And for an average family size of 4.73126, this translates to NRs 1409 
per month per person which would come to about NRs 16,908 per person per 
annum if the labourers worked throughout the year in brick kilns. This is only 
about 17% of the Minimum Wage Rate of NRs 96,000 per person per annum and 
                                                          
126 I have taken the average household size for Kavre district. 
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also falls short of the poverty line NRs. 19,261 per person per annum (ADB, 2012). 
This simple calculation shows that even if poor people like Lok Purkoti are to be 
employed throughout the year under such pay arrangements, it is difficult for 
them to escape poverty. And since this work is only seasonal, poor Dalits 
labouring in these brick kilns hunt for other labouring work in Patle Gau or 
elsewhere during the wet season when they are not employed in the brick-kilns 
to generate further income. However, they largely remain unemployed outside 
of the brick kilns since labouring job opportunities especially in the agricultural 
sector are infrequent and seasonal. To make ends meet some families use their 
under-age children to assist them to produce more bricks (Gurung, 2001; ILO, 
2011; IREWOC, 2010; World-Education, 2009) (Figure 44).  
Figure 44 A young Dalit girl making bricks (Photo by author) 
 
The sub-human working and living conditions of the brick kilns and the 
use of child labour prompt some to label the bricks produced there “blood bricks” 
(Vries, 2012). Despite these horrible conditions this is still the only survival option 
for many Dalits who cannot rely on caste-based occupations like tailoring and 
cannot find regular labouring opportunities elsewhere and do not have enough 
land like Tikaram Dholkoti to grow food. Brick-kilns thus provide an 
opportunity where they can sell their bodily capital to earn income, no matter 
how little.  
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Semi-permanent Internal Migration 
My survey results as well as interviews with locals in Patle Gau showed 
that while many Dalits adopted seasonal circulatory migration to Bhaktapur to 
work in brick-kilns, some of the younger members of Dalit families also moved 
to Kathmandu. Finding Dalits who were in Kathmandu was an even more 
difficult task. They did not come to visit Patle Gau as much as their Bahun and 
Tamang counterparts. I was told by their families that they visited them only 
during the time of Hindu festivals, Dasain and Tihar. And the Dalit family 
themselves were quite reluctant to provide me with mobile phone numbers. But 
with perseverance I finally obtained the mobile phone number of a Dalit man. 
His name was Rajesh. Reaching Kathmandu, I called Rajesh and after some 
hesitancy he named a place where I could meet him for about half an hour. When 
I finally met Rajesh in a cheeyapasal, I provided him with my full introduction and 
appraised him of my research project.  
MR: You are Rajesh …? 
Rajesh: Rajesh Katuwal. 
MR: But I thought you were Rajesh Pariyar since you are from Patle 
Gau. 
Rajesh: We are Pariyar but some of us have kept our surnames as 
Katuwal even in citizenship certificates. Everybody around here 
knows me as Katuwal. 
MR: Oh, ok. 
As indicated in earlier chapters most Nepalese ethnic and caste groups are 
identifiable by their surnames but Dalits share some surnames with Bahuns and 
Chhetris since they traditionally have the same Hindu origins. Due to caste-based 
discrimination Dalits find it particularly difficult to rent a room even in cities like 
Kathmandu if the home-owners (Ghar patee/Saujees), who are usually non-Dalits, 
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insist on caste distinctions (B K, 2011; Bhattachan, et al., 2009; Goyal, Dhawan, & 
Narula, 2005; ILO, 2005). This was confirmed by a Dalit friend who recently 
completed his PhD overseas and also by Purna Nepali127, another Dalit and a 
development practitioner in Nepal, who told me: 
The Dalit identity is not only economically or politically 
disempowering but also psychologically depressing. That also makes 
the Dalits weak. I know some Dalit families who are well-to-do. Even 
I myself and my family are not doing that badly in economic terms. 
But my children tell me when there is a discussion on caste and 
ethnicity and they have to tell their surnames, they just get rato peero 
(red and blushed) and nervous. They prefer to say the first names 
only. Like I said, this psychologically depressing condition is so 
weakening, so disempowering. 
Reflecting on Purna’s words, I realised why Rajesh prefers to stick to the 
surname Katuwal. Since Dalits and the “high-castes” have similar phenotypic 
features which are typically different from Janajati features adoption of surnames 
common to both caste groups is a strategy to confuse caste-based identities and 
avoid associated stigma. Back in Patle Gau such negotiations with social identity 
through surnames is impossible since everyone knows everyone else. Steven 
Folmar refers to such political strategy of manipulating or even masking caste 
identities to deal with social and cultural degradation as the “politics of 
anonymity” (Folmar, 2007; p. 45). As Folmar suggests: 
This type of action, the politics of anonymity, is an adjunct to identity 
politics. It entails cloaking one’s identity so that it is either 
ambiguous or appropriates a higher status by suggesting 
membership in a caste to which one does not, in fact, belong. Identity 
politics operates most effectively at the group level, where the force 
of numbers makes it possible to contest one’s low status. 
Individually, however, it is difficult to confront the social force 
behind discrimination successfully and the more effective strategy is 
                                                          
127 Like Pariyar, Nepali is another common surname to refer to Damai (tailor). 
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often to deny or obscure one’s identity in favour of adopting another 
(Folmar, 2007, p. 50). 
 Clearly Rajesh Katuwal himself was engaged in such a political practice at 
the individual level. His reluctance to meet me in the first place, his choice of 
location to meet me, and his avoidance of telling me exactly where he lived in 
Kathmandu signify that he wanted his social identity to remain “discreet.” But 
having the ability to manipulate his social identity in Kathmandu, Rajesh 
Katuwal also felt that Kathmandu provided him with employment opportunities 
not available in Patle Gau: 
Rajesh: You have already lived in Patle Gau for so long, so you 
should know that we don’t have much land and hence we cannot do 
much farming. I used to go to the brick factories too but it is really 
demanding. You have to get up at night at 1am to avoid the heat of 
the day. And then you have to “play” with the mud to turn it into 
clay with your bare hands using the coldest of waters and bending 
your back to its limits. So I stopped doing that. Instead one 
acquaintance introduced me to this construction sector. First I 
worked as a labourer on construction sites carrying sand, stone, 
gravel, bricks and iron rods. Slowly I started learning to plaster 
walls. Now I am mostly plastering. I don’t have jobs throughout the 
year. I stay home a few months. But that is ok. I am still employed 
most of the year. And I earn more now than what I used to get 
working in brick kilns.  
Living anonymously and letting others think that he is a Chhetri in Kathmandu, 
Rajesh Katuwal has also made some progress economically. This has been 
possible in Kathmandu, not in Patle Gau. Therefore, Rajesh does not like to visit 
Patle Gau often. 
MR: How often do you go to Patle Gau then? 
Rajesh: Rarely. Actually only once a year during Dasain. What is 
there in Patle Gau, anyway? What do you do there? Here at least 
most of the year I am making money. Here my kids go to a good 
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school compared to the one that we have there. There is nothing 
there.  
 Rajesh has a dejected look when he thinks of Patle Gau. Patle Gau does 
not excite him, does not attract him anymore. It seemed as if he was only bound 
to the village as the site of his birth and because his parents still live there. Only 
this parent-child tie binds him to Patle Gau. Even his sisters have been married 
off from Patle Gau: one to Kathmandu, the other to Dhulikhel. His material tie to 
Patle Gau is almost non-existent. Patle Gau reminds the likes of Rajesh Katuwal 
of a place where even a person as rich as Tikaram Dhalkoti lives a life of a Dalit.  
In Patle Gau they are the “lowly”, Damai, an inescapable identity. 
 An impersonal and alien space like Kathmandu provides Rajesh Katuwal 
and other Dalits like him a chance to escape their Dalit status. In Kathmandu, 
they do not have to continue caste-based jobs like their forefathers did - sewing 
and playing musical instruments in various social and religious ceremonies. 
Even if the opportunities for employment are limited to manual labouring, brick 
laying, plastering walls, or tailoring in garment houses to mass-produce apparel 
for domestic markets, it provides them with a chance to earn better wages and 
live on more equal social terms, avoiding discrimination as much as possible. 
Here, they can think of giving their children a better future through good 
education. So, they prefer to toil hard in Kathmandu. They do not want to go 
back to live in Patle Gau. Patle Gau is their past and bits of their present. But their 
future is somewhere else, perhaps in Kathmandu. 
 But if this is why Dalits leave Palte Gau, then Tamangs leave it for different 
reasons. While a small number of them are acquiring higher education in 
Kathmandu, most Tamangs go there for economic reasons. Having been 
classified traditionally as a “touchable” caste, Tamangs can find jobs in the food 
industry with no stigma attached. Some of them work as kitchen helpers or 
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waiters in restaurants to serve the expanding middle class in Kathmandu. But 
usually they drive taxis. They sometimes live there with their families or they 
leave them behind in Patle Gau and visit them from time to time. When I asked 
the sister of a Tamang man who was driving a taxi in Kathmandu why there was 
so many Tamangs driving taxis in Kathmandu, she responded:  
Afanta le afantalai tancha (Relative pull relatives). But then again you 
need to learn the skill, no? It takes time and money to do that. With 
brothers and relatives offering to help with training as well as 
practicing, I guess it makes it easier for them to pass on the skill, no?” 
An amalgamation of all sorts of capital - economic (the money needed to learn 
the skill), social (membership of related networks), and cultural (the embodiment 
of driving skills) has allowed Tamangs to work as taxi-drivers in Kathmandu 
more than any other ethnic or caste group from Patle Gau. It was not just Dalits 
and Tamangs who semi-permanently migrate to Kathmandu. Bahuns do too. But 
the motivations, sentiments, emotions and reasons are vastly different.  
 One day as I was going to Kathmandu from Patle Gau in a local bus to 
attend a conference on bikas, a young man sat next to me and smiled. I had seen 
him a few times before in the village and had known him to be a son of a Bahun 
man whose main occupation was to operate a poultry farm. As we talked with 
each other in the bus I came to know that like Sironmani Sapkota’s son he mostly 
stayed in Kathmandu where he was pursuing a Bachelor’s degree in Business 
Management. He was thus an example of someone who goes to Kathmandu not 
necessarily for economic capital but to accumulate cultural and social capital, 
which is re-invested in multiple forms of capital in the future.  Thomas Bell has 
also made similar observations: 
Young, mostly Brahmin [Bahun], men from the village elites came to 
Kathmandu to study. They lived as cheaply as they could, in rented 
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rooms at first, because everything about Kathmandu was expensive. 
Later they became journalists, lawyers, government officials, and aid 
industry middle managers. They hitched their wagons to one or 
other of the two main parties and became the rising class of 
democratic Nepal (Bell, 2014, p. 298).128 
These young Bahuns who are typically men—women are mostly made to marry 
rather than pursue professional career — take up university degrees in 
Kathmandu in order they may end up getting “white collar” jobs in the future or 
may eventually fly abroad to the US to secure an even better future. Or as in the 
case of Bikash Acharya, his father’s expanding dairy business means he needed 
to give up his studies to help his father manage this flourishing business that he 
will one day inherit. Things are similar for Sandesh Timilsina, but he does not 
have to directly compete with Bikash since his father has a lucrative commercial 
poultry farm.  
 It is not only relatively well-off Bahun youth who have to take care of 
business in Patle Gau but even economically poor Bahun youth do not feel the 
pressure to leave it altogether. Shankar Dhakal is one such case. The son of a 
widow, Shankar Dhakal could not pursue a university degree because of 
financial constraints, so he stayed back in Patle Gau where he assisted his mother 
in cultivating vegetables commercially and selling buffalo milk to local dairies. 
They have more than ten ropanis of land and can easily access the services of the 
District Agriculture Development Office due to their social networks (Shankar is 
a nephew of Jayjeev Dhakal who frequents bikase offices in Dhulikhel). Shankar 
actually irrigates his farms using subsidised pipes and pumps received through 
public programmes. Similarly, his younger brother Subash Dhakal works as a 
temporary teacher in a local primary school because their uncle, Jayjeev Dhakal 
                                                          
128 The Figures 21 to 25 in Chapter Five also are testimonies that powerful political positions 
have mostly taken up by Bahun men in Kavre district and Patle Gau from 1960s till date. 
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happens to be the chair of the school management committee and was influential 
in hiring Subash. 
 In almost exact opposition to young Dalit men, for young Bahun men Patle 
Gau is a sweet home. A place to stay. And to come back to often even if they are 
studying in Kathmandu undertaking higher degrees. They maintain strong 
emotional as well material ties with Patle Gau. Patle Gau is still lucrative for 
them. There is still a lot of scope and hope for them in Patle Gau, where their 
status and distinction can still be maintained and different combinations of 
power and influence can still be consolidated.  
Conclusion 
Migration of all sorts is not a new phenomenon in Nepal. Whether 
migrating within Nepal or outside of it Nepalese peoples have always been 
motivated to migrate for mostly economic reasons: in the past to seek better 
farming grounds for enhanced food production and in the present to search for 
greater incomes in the economically diversified capitalist economy of urban 
Nepal. This is also true of the three social groups residing in Patle Gau. By using 
the life trajectories of several of them such as Tikaram Dhalkoti, I have illustrated 
in this chapter how different caste groups engage with migration – whether 
international, circulatory or semi-permanent – and how they benefit from 
migration in quite distinct ways.  
 Citing a case in a hilly district of Khotang where three Dalit families were 
able to buy lands from thirteen Bahun families, Adhikari and Hobley draw 
attention to economic mobility to observe that “remittances are now driving 
social change in the hills, in ways that revolution and development [bikas] have 
really failed to deliver” (J. Adhikari & Hobley, 2011; p. 56). This is an 
exaggeration because even if migration allows room for upward economic 
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mobility and divergent ways of thinking and being, it does not necessarily 
change the worldviews of those left behind. Dalit women like Meena Purkoti and 
Durga B K, found agency to verbally and physically challenge the practices of 
caste-based discrimination (Chapter Four) not because they were international 
migrants but because they found “empowerment” in the Maoist discourse of 
only “two castes” (man and woman). Likewise, they learnt through the media, 
which broadcasts state development messages, that caste-based discriminatory 
practices were illegal and punishable. But Adhikary and Hobley are partly right 
to suggest that migration does open opportunities for unbelievable economic 
transformations. For instance, Tikaram Dhalkoti, was able to travel outside of 
Nepal in his youth, a move ironically made possible by his Bahun mit in an odd 
case of brother-like friendship between the ritually pure and the impure. Due to 
a kind employer Tikaram was able to work for the Indian Railways for twenty 
years and returned to Nepal with a considerable amount of wealth. His 
investment of that money makes him stand out from other Dalits: he is landed 
amongst the landless and near-landless Dalits. But even then, due to the deep-
seated social consciousness of caste system his upward economic mobility did 
not allow him any upward social mobility. His buying of lands and houses from 
Acharya Bahuns yielded the reverse of gentrification through which a former 
Bahun bastee turned into Dalit bastee as Bahuns started residing further away 
from him. His elevated economic status—that enabled him to own two houses 
and send two of his children to Malaysia, a feat difficult even for Bahuns and 
Tamangs lacking in necessary economic and social capital— does not cleanse him 
of his ritual impurity.  
Thus, he is as rich as the Bahuns and Tamangs who are deemed ritually 
clean to run food-based enterprises profitably and attain the status of Saujees - a 
rich man, a property holder, a money-lender.  But Tikaram is not a Saujee. 
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Nobody looks upon him for social and political leadership. He does not head the 
village development committee and he does not chair any of community-based 
bikase bodies. His economic upward mobility does not translate into any social or 
political upward mobility. Living among other Dalits he is still just another Dalit, 
another Meejar, another Sarkee. Yet his higher economic base provides him with 
the luxury to avoid the back-breaking toil of working in brick-kilns, and nor does 
he need to depend on other landed groups for agricultural produce. His financial 
wealth has allowed him to send two of his children to Malaysia which many 
Dalits and some Bahuns and Tamangs can only dream of. In fact, Dhan Bahadur 
Pariyar and his son have only gotten deeper into poverty while pursuing such a 
dream.  
 Many Dalits therefore deposit their land deeds and citizenship certificates 
with a dalal in order to perform back-breaking activities in the sub-human 
working conditions of brick-kilns. Others choose to migrate to cities and urban 
centres to live more dignified lives.  This is not to suggest that urban spaces like 
Kathmandu are totally discrimination free or that they harbour a society that is 
caste-conscious free. In fact, the concept of caste system permeates many walks 
of life not only in towns and urban spaces (B K, 2011; Gellner & Quigley, 1995; 
Parish, 1996) but also in the international diaspora (Pariyar, 2011, 2016). But what 
my ethnographic study shows is that unlike rural native villages where 
“anonymity” cannot be maintained or practiced, the “impersonal” nature and 
access to new environments in the urban spaces enables Dalits like Rajesh 
Katuwal to employ the strategic politics of anonymity to not only live dignified 
lives in equal social relations with other groups but also hope to carve out better 
future for their children through the attainment of added economic and 
educational resources.  
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 Tamangs, who mostly have sufficient lands to cultivate food and raise 
livestock start with a higher economic base than Dalits and hence do not toil in 
the brick-kilns. Instead their social capital allows them to deal with hurdles 
associated with finding foreign employment and to gain jobs as vehicle drivers 
and guards in Malaysia and Gulf countries. Not suffering from the stigma of 
“untouchability” they can also participate either as taxi-drivers or as kitchen 
helpers and restaurant waiters in Kathmandu. Migration for Tamangs is about 
upward economic mobility, for their social identity allows them to relate with 
Bahuns more or less on equal social terms. 
 While for the non-poor but non-rich Bahuns labouring in brick-kilns is 
“unthinkable” labouring in foreign countries for increased incomes is attractive. 
For richer Bahuns even “mediocre” remittances from foreign employment are not 
an attractive option as they enjoy higher social, political as well as economic 
status in Patle Gau. Saujees like Indra Acharya and Laxman Timilsina concentrate 
on expanding their profitable businesses in Patle Gau rather than migrating. And 
for politically “active” Siromani Sapkota who leads the local co-operative, 
managing bikase activities in Patle Gau, migration is not even a consideration. He 
would rather stay back in the village and chair this co-operative, manage the 
school management committee, co-ordinate with local leaders and incoming 
bikase government and non-government agents and remain happy attaining more 
power and influence in Patle Gau.  
 All of the above shows that the concept of caste system is so influential in 
Patle Gau that its residents choose migratory paths dependent on it. Enjoying the 
least cultural capital associated with caste system, Dalits employ the politics of 
anonymity; and enjoying the maximum cultural capital Bahuns consolidate their 
top social position by choosing or not choosing migration depending on their 
current strategies for optimising economic mobility. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
  I met Rajkumar Purkoti, a seventeen year old Dalit youth, a few times 
during my fieldtrip to Patle Gau. Rajkumar had scored brilliantly in level ten 
exams (School Leaving Certificate) and had hoped that he would become a 
medical doctor one day. But once he found how difficult it was for his father to 
accumulate NRs 8,000 (AuD 94) for his admission to a college, he lost all his 
hopes. He now has no dreams, whatsoever. Aahuti, a Dalit Marxist activist and 
intellectual, told me that if only Rajkumar had not come from a poor Dalit family, 
he could easily have been a doctor with the kind of academic score he had. 
Rajkumar’s younger sister, aged nine, who is also very good at her studies at 
school is totally unware of the structural barrier that Rajkumar had to face and 
so she still harbours the same dream. It is nice to note that her thoughts have not 
yet been conditioned by the encounters with caste-based structural barriers. My 
entire research was driven by a desire to understand such structural barriers 
which prevent poor Dalits to escape poverty in a deeply unequal Nepalese 
society.  
Scholars debate the precise nature of equality and generally agree that 
equal distribution of wealth and resources is an impractical ideal. But many still 
argue that equality of human worth and self-esteem is achievable (Anderson, 
1999; Arneson, 1995; Young, 2001) (Chapter 1). Such a conception of equality 
demands that peoples identifying with different caste, gender, ethnicity, religion 
and geography relate to each other equally. In a society where equal social 
relations exist everyone may not be equally wealthy, strong, intelligent or hold 
equally powerful (political) positions (Runciman, 1967) but each will still 
“express respect or recognition” (Fourie, et al., 2015, p. 5) to another and “make 
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claims … in virtue of their equality, not their inferiority [or superiority] to others” 
(Anderson, 1999, p. 289).  
I sought in a caste-conscious society like Patle Gau to explore existing 
asymmetrical and unequal social relations as when a Dalit cannot enter a house 
of a non-Dalit or when a non-Dalit cannot accept food or water provided by a 
Dalit while the reverse is not true (Chapter 2 and 4). Gerard Toffin argues that 
the idea of egalitarianism and equality is not a totally foreign concept to Nepal 
because a Hindu reformist movement challenged caste rigidity in the 
seventeenth century and many Nepalese ethnic populations themselves were 
traditionally devoid of caste-based hierarchical system (Toffin, 2013a). For 
instance, an indigenous Nepalese ethnic group Gurung customarily had distinct 
clan groups among them but these in no way treated each other as superiors or 
inferiors (Macfarlane, 1997). Each clan was different but not ranked. Toffin has 
similar remarks about the Tamang community (cited in Holmberg, 2007, p. 126). 
It was only after the Nepalese state’s enforcement of caste laws to make Nepal a 
pure Hindu kingdom in the eighteenth century that the tendency emerged 
among the ethnic groups to slowly but surely cultivate a sense of caste hierarchy 
(Bhattachan, 2000; Gurung, 2003, 2005; Michaels, 1997; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1997) 
(Chapter 2).  
The previous rulers of Nepal the Shahs, Ranas and the Panchayat system 
managers did not “invent” or “discover” the caste system but adapted it to 
solidify their legitimacy to rule and to consolidate their privileged “high-caste” 
positions (Michaels, 1997) (Chapters 1 and 2). But even when multi-party 
democracy was reinstated in 1990 devoid of old rulers and their style of ruling, it 
adopted neo-liberal approaches to governance and economy which remained 
blind to the cultural distinctions between caste and ethnic groups and only 
deepened the economic, social and political inequalities across class, caste, 
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ethnicity, gender, and geographies Bennett, et al., 2006; Gellner, 2007a, 2016; 
Lawoti, 2010b) (Chapters 2 and 3). Even the discourses of new Nepal initiated 
during the Maoist Revolution and culminating in Jana-andolan II which embraced 
the values of equality and egalitarianism have only reformulated the political 
governance systems failing to dismantle caste privileges (Ogura, 2012; Toffin, 
2013a, 2013b).  
The constant hope throughout the numerous andolans including Jana-
andolan II was to create political and social spaces within a legal frame in which 
each social group (based on caste, ethnicity, gender, etc.) could relate to all others 
in equal social relations and eventually enjoy deeper forms of equality. It was 
hoped that achieving equal social relations would provide equal opportunities 
for economic and social mobility. The rhetoric of bikas promulgated by the state 
was positioned in such ways that equal opportunities were to be given to all 
social groups to participate and benefit in the omnipresent practices of bikas 
(Fujikura, 2013; Pigg, 1992, 1993). Bikas rhetoric wanted everyone to believe that 
the new Nepal after 2006 would provide equal political and social spaces for 
every social group in a way the 1990 democratic governance had not. The 
discourse of new Nepal claimed that the country would be free from social 
inequality and that even if not everyone were to have equal wealth, wealth would 
still be re-distributed in such a way that no one would remain hungry, poor or 
landless (Frankfurt, 1987; Hachhethu & Gellner, 2010; Hangen, 2007; Mage & 
D'Mello, 2007; D. Thapa, 2012; Vasily, 2009).  
Even if the latest political lexicon has started to include unnatee 
(improvement), pragati (progression), sammunnatee (higher progression), and 
even sambridhi (prosperity), for all practical purposes they all mean the same 
thing: bikas (development). The andolans for equality and of discourse bikas have 
almost always inter-locked. But all the grand political statements and dreams for 
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social equality and equality of opportunities through the rhetoric of bikas have 
been undermined by extensive and everyday practices of caste discrimination 
which function as “structural social relations that tend to privilege some [high 
caste] more than the others [Dalits]” to “reproduce social processes that reinforce 
one another” (Young, 2001, p. 2) enabling some but constraining others to fully 
enact their agencies. 
It is against this backdrop of the dialectic between democratic values and 
caste structure which has made Nepal presently a “hybrid form of a formal 
republican political system superimposed on a durable caste base” (Toffin, 2013a, 
p. 123) that I aimed in this thesis to explore why it has been so difficult to achieve 
the equality of social relations as the very first step in this process. My central 
argument is that caste remains a major factor of discrimination that inhibits the 
attainment of equality of social relations and yields vast inequalities in economic 
wealth (landholding, rural enterprises and employment opportunities), cultural 
capital (including education) and even migration prospects (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 
7). In contradiction to Mark Liechty’s (Liechty, 2003, 2010) argument that the rise 
of the middle class in modern times has displaced caste in Nepal, my 
ethnography has shown, in agreement with Cameron, Folmar, Gellner, and 
Toffin, that caste identities remain “primordial” in Nepalese social psyche, most 
specifically in rural areas (Cameron, 2005; Folmar, 2004, 2007; Gellner, 2016; 
Toffin, 2013a).  
Unlike the arguments made by some scholars on similar topics in India 
that the modern economy has served to increasingly blur the caste-based 
boundaries diminishing occupational segregation and reducing inequalities 
(Kapur et al., 2010), my findings echo the arguments made by Corbridge et al.: 
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The notion that “caste does not matter any more” is endlessly 
repeated in the living rooms of India’s middle classes. But it has little 
meaning for Dalit labourers, whose lives continue to be shaped by 
discrimination (Corbridge, Harriss & Jeffrey, 2013, p. 257).  
Following Steven Folmar’s suggestion that in order to understand how 
bikas affects the social structure in Nepalese villages we need to untangle the 
dualism of things: traditional (caste social order) and modern (secular democratic 
citizenship) (Folmar, 2004, pp. 56-57), I show that bikas in Patle Gau can operate 
only in the limited space defined by the caste system. Consequently, uneven 
playing grounds are constructed for the different caste groups (Chapters 4, 5 and 
6). Such a caste-based cultural core means that in Nepalese society the conditions 
of material well-being in terms of land ownership, economic wealth, social and 
political powers in rural areas display almost one to one correspondence with the 
long-denounced caste hierarchical system – Bahuns at the top, Dalits at the 
bottom, and Tamangs (Janajatis) in between (GON & UNDP, 2014; UNDP-Nepal, 
2001, 2004). 
Throughout the thesis, I have shown that caste-based discrimination, 
although increasingly challenged and resisted in public places, continues to 
remain such a deeply held cultural core that it functions as “natural” and 
“primordial” distinction (birth-ascribed, God-given) in Patle Gau (Chapter 4). 
What Louis Dumont observed decades ago in arguing that caste societies are 
primarily organized around the notion of purity and pollution (Dumont, 1980) 
still holds true in Patle Gau, rural Nepal. I argue that Nepalese rural spaces still 
constitute a site where social relations are based not on equality of Nepalese 
citizenry but on unequal social relations of caste. Here, the distinction and purity 
of the Bahun is protected from the less pure Tamang and the impure and 
polluting Dalit. Caste system manifests in practices of segregated residential 
areas, asymmetrical entry into houses, unequal food sharing, differentiated 
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livestock keeping and endogamy. Residential segregation is such a strong marker 
for the maintenance of distinction that in an example of reverse gentrification, 
previously Bahun occupied land loses its purity when it becomes permanently 
occupied by the impure Dalit (e.g. Tikaram Dhalkoti, Chapter 4). A Dalit does 
not enter a non-Dalit’s house. Food and water still get accepted and rejected in 
terms of purity and impurity so that a Dalit cannot keep teashops, pubs or dairies. 
Pig-keeping becomes a boundary-marker between purity and impurity such that 
the Bahuns continue not to raise or consume pig. And, marriage gets arranged 
within caste groups perpetuating caste segregation and distinction. All these 
therefore remain the most distinct denominators of social relationships.  
The concept of caste system is so deeply held in rural minds and bodies 
that the Dalits stigmatized by such perceptions are forced to escape their 
“exposed” social identity, which precedes their individual identity, by migrating 
to urban spaces (Chapter 7). This is not to suggest that urban spaces are occupied 
with educated caste-less peoples who are less discriminatory in their practices. 
On the contrary, I present in the thesis several cases in which the educated urban 
dwellers, like their rural counter-parts, invoke dharma (religion, duty, natural 
order of things), chalan (tradition), and external structures such as family 
pressure as “excuses” to continue practicing discriminatory behaviours. Still, 
impersonal urban cities provide spaces for many Dalits enabling them to engage 
in the politics of anonymity (Folmar, 2007) to access employment opportunities 
and live more dignified lives than at their homes of origin. 
My study therefore shows that unequal social relationships of everyday 
life embedded in the deeply held social belief system of “natural” caste hierarchy 
continue to represent a structural obstacle to equality of opportunity. My 
research has shown that the neo-liberal claim that bikas can equalize the 
opportunity to anyone irrespective of group identity in ways that even the most 
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marginalized can be economically uplifted and are able to gain cultural capital 
like anyone else under similar circumstances, is not true.  The neo-liberal 
economic project accompanying the 1990 political democracy “that emphasized 
market deepening and capital access with little regard for the cultural politics of 
social change” (Rankin, 2004, p. 203) is blind to the structure of caste that 
privileges some and burdens others. Its claim that mobilization of the social 
economy (through NGOs, co-ops and community-based organizations) will 
provide credit facilities to all caste groups such that more economic growth will 
be achieved (GON, 1992) and poverty alleviated amongst the poor and landless 
(Dalits in the case of Patle Gau) fails to acknowledge that those dominating social 
relations channel these financial institutions and their services in ways that only 
consolidate the pre-existing unequal social and power relations and structural 
positions (Chapter 6). Therefore, the privileged continue performing the less 
labour demanding jobs while the most marginalized perform the most degraded 
and labour intensive roles. In 1972 A. Patricia Caplan wrote about a village in 
western Nepal: 
Only in a few instances does development [bikas] appear to bring 
opportunities to low-caste people, and this usually when there is a 
demand for services which most others are unwilling to perform 
because they are regarded either as degrading or polluting. The 
untouchables [Dalits] of Duari [a village] earn money by portering 
heavy loads of stones from mountain quarries to the bazaar (Caplan, 
1972, p. 87).    
More than forty years since Caplan wrote this, the Dalits still perform 
work that others can afford to ignore, such as making bricks under inhumane 
conditions in Bhaktapur (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). This is so because the “high-caste” 
(Bahun) and occasionally the ethnic Tamang utilize their “higher” and “middle” 
caste status to assume leadership and powerful roles and utilize their kin 
networks (afno-manche, natabad-kripabad) (Bista, 1991; Kondos, 1987a) to distribute 
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resources for the economic mobility of their own group such as in the (re) 
distribution of land, credit, fertilizer, or employment opportunities (Chapters 5 
and 6). The Dalits have no such cultural and social capital and so remain 
marginalized. Consequently, the unequal distribution of all kinds of capital 
within a weak Nepalese state without the resources to substantially expand the 
welfare programmes means that the respective structural positions of the social 
groups only become more consolidated. Thus, Indra Acharya does not mind his 
money (about NRs 25 lackh) being “stuck” in the village since his overall 
economic position is making him richer by the day, and Siromani Sapkota has 
become one of the new rich, while Jit Bahadur Pariyar and Dhan Bahadur Pariyar 
become more landless and remain in perpetual debt to the richer Bahuns, 
Tamangs and even co-ops (Chapters 5, 6 and 7).  
The Dalits who cannot escape Dalitness by permanently migrating to cities 
and have to remain in the village live paradoxically in economic inter-
dependence with the landed Bahuns as “friendly enemies” (Mouffe, 2000, p. 13): 
… persons who are friends because they share a common symbolic 
space but also enemies because they want to organize this common 
symbolic space in a different way (Mouffe, 2000, p. 13). 
The pure Bahun use the same spaces in Patle Gau to maintain their 
religiously superior caste status in sharp contrast to the impure Dalit who want 
to get rid of their impure status by appealing to their common identity as “equal” 
Nepalese citizens of the secular Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal. Even 
though they are differentiated in caste status, they remain economically inter-
dependent. The landed Bahuns need the labour of the landless to increase their 
economic wealth and the landless Dalit need the occasional labouring 
opportunities provided by the landed to subsist economically. Therefore, I do not 
suggest that their mutual economic inter-dependence be removed altogether 
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such that the poor and marginalized are liberated to act as resourceful agents 
with unrestrained agency to act as the liberal citizenship would like us believe 
(Robins, Cornwall, & Von Lieres, 2008, p. 1076). Totally dissolving such economic 
inter-dependence in an economy where the markets don’t favour the Dalits and 
where the financially poor state cannot provide them with sufficient welfare, the 
Dalits would have more to lose than gain. Rather, I argue that the forms of mutual 
inter-dependence (which dictate the practices of bikas presently) be mobilized in 
ways that are socially progressive such that the poor do not perpetually remain 
poor because they are impure and the rich do not continue to become richer 
purely on the basis that they are pure and naturally deserve such privileges 
(Rank, 2004; Rawls, 1971; Sandel, 2012; Stiglitz, 2012; Young, 1990, 2001). 
Dalit Marginalization: Structural Poverty 
Some attempts have been made previously to theorize Nepal’s failed bikas 
and resulting inequalities. But my ethnographic evidence shows it is not the 
belief in fatalism in which “one has no personal control over one’s life 
circumstances, which are determined through a divine or powerful external 
agent” (Bista, 1991, p. 4) that consigns the marginalized to their low status and 
allows the continuity of unequal social relations (Chapter 4). It is also not Nepal’s 
loss of autonomy in accepting aid conditionality from its bikase partners, as 
Panday suggests, that is the cause of the distribution of unequal opportunities in 
bikase practices (Panday, 1999). The class-based argument of Adhikari, Blaikie, 
Cameron and Seddon that it is the unequal relationship between elite class of 
Kathmandu and the non-elite classes in remote districts that causes the failure of 
bikas is also not adequate to explain the continuity of Dalit poverty in many non-
remote districts like Kavre (Adhikari, 2008; Blaikie, et al., 1980; Seddon, 1987). I 
argue that it is the sheer impregnability of the elite privileges of Bahun men 
maintained through inter-locking and mutually reinforcing nexus of caste status, 
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economic position (land-holding, wealth), leadership roles, education and social 
networks (afno-manche, natabad-cripabad) that continuously reproduce unequal 
social relations. This in turn has resulted in vast economic inequalities across 
caste groups which make it almost impossible for the Dalits to escape poverty.  
Perpetuation of such unequal social relations means that the rich landed 
powerful elite get to channel all resources and the gap between the poor and the 
rich is unaffected. Unless these unequal social relations are neutralised, poverty 
will remain, and massive group inequalities will endure. The vast economic 
inequalities and rampant poverty (amongst the Dalits) that the discourse and 
practices of bikas are intended to correct, cannot be understood by simply 
referring to the tools of economics, liberal democracy or aid/bikase management 
manuals because it is first and foremost a structural poverty (Farmer, 2004). It is 
not the failure of an individual but of a defective politico-economic system that 
is heavily biased against the poor and the least powerful, the (Royce, 2015). 
Poverty among Dalits can be: 
… traced back to structural factors that serve to favour certain 
groups over others, generally based on gender, class, or race [caste]. 
Of the various institutional environments that tend to sustain a 
multitude of economic barriers to different groups, it is discrimination 
based on race [caste] and gender that create most insidious 
obstructions (Jordan, 2004, p. 22 - my emphasis). 
And such poverty is: 
 … "structured" by historically given (and often economically driven) 
processes and forces that conspire—whether through routine, ritual, 
or, as is more commonly the case, the hard surfaces of life—to 
constrain agency … the arrangements are structural because they are 
embedded in the political and economic organization of our social 
world [such that] … for many … choices both large and small are 
limited by racism [casteism], sexism ... (Farmer, 2004, p. 6) 
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I have demonstrated throughout my thesis that political, social and 
economic structures in villages are such that they enormously curtail the Dalits’ 
agency to escape poverty. They cannot fully participate in the food economy 
because they cannot keep teashops or dairies and this is because non-Dalits will 
not eat any food touched or prepared by them. They cannot farm commercially 
because they are generally landless. And when even landlessness is overcome as 
Tikaram Dhalkoti did through his lucky and successful migration to India, he 
could not “upgrade” from Dalitness. His economic wealth did not allow him to 
attain the higher status of a Saujee (rich man) or become a “touchable.” Instead, 
even the house and the lands he bought from Bahuns have been converted from 
the Acharya (Bahun) bastee to a Dalit bastee (Chapters 4, 5 and 6).  
Most Dalits are illiterate and it may be proposed that illiteracy itself can 
be a structure which can be overcome to escape Dalitness. But attaining literacy 
does not allow a Dalit to be a non-Dalit. Literate Dalits like Meena Purkoti, Durga 
B K and Rajkumar Dhalkoti are still perceived to be Dalits. They live with Dalits 
as Dalits. Each day they face discrimination which they continuously resist, 
especially in public spaces. Even they cannot challenge the discriminatory 
practices occurring daily in the private spaces. So the rich, landed and educated 
Dalits still cannot rid their bodies of the “impurity” which the non-Dalits assume 
their bodies to possess. So, although Bahuns and Tamangs superficially consider 
the Dalits to be equal citizens in public and commercial spaces, deep in their 
minds they do not consider them as moral equals.  
I therefore argue that it is the notion of purity/impurity that prevents the 
Dalits from symmetrical water and food exchanges, inter-marriages, and 
residential inter-mingling. Consequently, it is not economic poverty (and 
landlessness) or illiteracy but the deeply held notion of purity/impurity in the 
minds of many rural residents combined with impregnable Bahun privileges that 
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act as the main structural impediments for the Dalits to fully realise their 
agencies, escape poverty and live lives with ijjat (respect).  
In the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal where the marginalized 
(landless, small peasants, women) have achieved greater participation in bikase 
processes is because the state’s redistribution policies created political spaces 
within which the political clout of the landed elite was heavily reduced and poor 
groups could participate within and beyond the formal state institutions (Harriss, 
1999; Hickey & Mohan, 2005; Webster & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002). In Nepal, such 
radical political spaces have never been created, not even by the radical Maoist 
Revolution and their governments who have lost the impetus in turning their 
caste-less ideology to reality, perhaps because they were forced to compromise 
in joining the mainstream politics and then were further weakened in their defeat 
in the second Constituent Assembly elections. The many social changes in the 
name of equality that they dreamed of and struggled for during the ten-year 
revolution have not fully materialized (Ogura, 2012; Toffin, 2013b). Their 
demands for proscribing alcohol consumption, practices of untouchability, child 
marriage, teaching Sanskrit and celebrating Hindu festivals such as Dasain were 
so radical and at times so violently imposed that as soon as they ended their war 
to join the mainstream parliamentary democracy, many of these demands 
regressed (Ogura, 2012). Even their radical vision of having only two jat (castes) 
in Nepal (men and women) lost ground. When forced into a tactical renunciation 
of revolutionary methods as demanded by the international revolutionary 
movement they were quickly and thoroughly “domesticated by the (existing) 
political culture … which is far from the Marxist ideology of opposing classes” 
so much so that their momentum for drastic changes towards attaining all sorts 
of equality conclusively halted (Toffin, 2013b, p. 40). Some have argued that 
many women were “empowered”, whether by accident or by intention, during 
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the Maoist Revolution (Leve, 2007; Pettigrew, 2012; Pettigrew & Shneiderman, 
2004), but the “domesticated” Maoists after joining the liberal democracy have 
ditched “any plans for state-building” to “play extremely short-term politics” 
pursuing personal powers and have shelved any long-term programmes for 
lessening social equalities (Ogura, 2012). Therefore, the country continues to be 
run by conservative “high caste” men in political leadership and civil 
bureaucracy with elements of reform of social and gender inclusion (Lawoti, 
2010b, 2012; Toffin, 2013b).  So unlike in Kerala and West Bengal, the landed elite 
in Nepal have consistently remained politically powerful as the translators and 
brokers of bikas (Lewis & Mosse, 2006) in ways that further cement their original 
privileged statuses. 
Caste, Social Change and Bikas 
The narrative thus far is not to suggest that rural societies remain static in 
a “capsule” unaffected by time. However, some changes have occurred. Shifts 
from caste-hierarchy to equal citizenry are occurring. But the change is slow and 
minimal. To accelerate the change towards equal citizenry the Nepalese state 
managers accommodated the Maoists demands for social change and shifted 
Nepal’s macro-structure from Hindu monarchy to secular republic. They even 
declared the nation as “untouchability and caste-based discrimination free” 
nation in 2006, criminalized the acts of caste-based discrimination in private and 
public spaces through enactment of the Caste-based Discrimination and 
Untouchability Act in 2011 and aired social messages on television against caste-
based discrimination. All this demonstrated the political commitment at undoing 
what Muluki Ain (National Code) did in 1854 by which the then Nepalese state 
managers imposed and enforced caste-hierarchy to change the behaviours of 
even the non-Hindu ethnic groups who enforced to behave like castes according 
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to the ranks given to them (Chapter Two) (Allen, 1997; Michaels, 1997; Pfaff-
Czarnecka, 1997).   
At the village-level, the distinction between Kumai Bahun and Purbia 
Bahun has completely vanished but their distinction from the Tamang and Dalits 
as a Bahun group persists. The vocabulary of social identity has changed from 
one that focused on the caste-based purity/impurity dichotomy and hierarchy to 
one that represents a political citizenship of difference. Former cultural identities 
of “achhyut” (untouchable) “sano jat” (small caste), “pani na chalne jat” (water 
unacceptable caste) have changed into the political identity of Dalits. However, 
to replace the primordial religious connotation with a political one whose 
disadvantages may be corrected through political means has proved difficult. 
The shameful and polluting “matwali” (alcohol-drinker) have become Janajati 
asserting their unique and proud cultural bearings. Even the Bahun-Chhetri or 
Chhetri-Bahun are no more thulo jat (big caste), matheello jat (high caste) or 
thagadhaari (wearer of holy cords). They are simply Bahun or Chhetri.  In the latest 
political lexicon the Bahu-Chhetri have been renamed as Khas Arya. Although 
this renaming was a move to allow the economically poor among Bahun-Chhetri 
to participate in the state’s affirmative programmes, it is also a shift from 
hierarchized identity (ranked above Matwaali and pani na chalne jat) to one that is 
only vertically different in terms of culture (What/who is below of Khas Arya? 
None/no one). Such naming and renaming of social identities in the present 
contexts demonstrated that the Nepalese society is moving more and more from 
caste-based hierarchial structure to becoming more egalitarian encompassing 
horizontal differences of cultural identities. 
The naming and renaming of social identities and the politics involved in 
accessing economic opportunities through programmes of affirmative actions 
may harden ethnic differences (Shneiderman, 2013) but they do not affirm caste 
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hierarchy. These are palpable shifts towards attaining social equality as David 
Gellner puts it: 
Within the lifetime of today’s senior citizens Nepal has moved from a 
genuinely hierarchical society, where all difference implied rank and 
where genuine difference was tolerated and encompassed, to an 
avowedly egalitarian society that guarantees human rights and 
equality in its constitution. Rank and status still exist, of course, but 
they can no longer be openly asserted. Status differences must, rather 
in the manner that Louis Dumont argued, be denied, hidden, 
disavowed, and reintroduced as a form of radical genetic or national 
difference. It is inevitably painful to change the hierarchical, empire-
based models of the past and replace them with universal equality 
(Gellner, 2016, pp. 31-32). 
This pain is measured in the thousands of lives lost during the Maoist Revolution.  
The most marginalized have also shown some social and economic 
mobility too. A few Dalits have escaped Dalitness to find jobs and earn better 
livelihoods in the cities. A couple of Dalit women have assumed leadership roles 
leading bikase activities. Since everyday politics are fully interwoven with acts of 
dominance and resistance (Masaki, 2006, 2010) overt forms of discrimination 
especially in public places have been increasingly challenged and resisted and 
consequently have declined (Chapter 4).  
Nonetheless, all these are superficial compromises and cosmetic 
compliances to the national political rhetoric of equality. The discourse of 
inclusion has infiltrated villages but the practical benefits are still limited. Just as 
the feminist literature argues that women hit the “glass ceiling” (Bruckmüller, 
Ryan, Rink, & Haslam, 2014) which acts as subtle but real barrier to their attempts 
to conquer the organizational hierarchy, so the Dalits and even Tamangs have 
not reached the social position that allows them to manage, guide, and lead rural 
villages and their bikase activities. Their nominal presence in the executive 
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committees of the many bikase institutions is for appearance only. Most times they 
don’t attend meetings because they are labouring for much-needed money. 
When they do attend these meetings, they either remain silent or their voices do 
not carry weight. Therefore, the village is still led by Bahun men in all spheres. 
They represent most of the central political parties and become the parties’ 
power-brokers and translators in the village such that any all-party mechanisms 
at district and village levels are overwhelmingly composed of them. They 
dominate numerous bikase government offices and non-government local bodies 
such as school management committees, co-ops and NGOs in number and in 
voice. They also control the rural economy as property holders of shops, dairies, 
vegetable collection centres and many other enterprises on top of being local 
money-lenders. Therefore, the Bahun men’s higher ritual and caste status, 
although increasingly challenged, “backed by wealth and power” (Gupta, 2005, 
p. 409), continuously provides them a position of superiority on an unequal social 
playing field.  
Reflecting on one of Alexi de Tocqueville’s major works on the French 
Revolution, Toffin writes about change in Nepal: 
… contemporary Nepal is not made up of just one society but of 
several different diverging societies far removed from each other, 
positioned on opposite trajectories … a major alteration in the 
political system does not automatically imply a change in society. 
Overthrowing a political regime is not enough to change the social 
structure. The past is always at work in the present. By analysing 
social and historical facts in these terms … the reader learns how to 
go beyond the simple facts and the surface in a way to understand 
hidden structures (Toffin, 2013b, p. 45). 
Another observer of Nepal Mary Cameron thinks that the Nepalese people have 
a deeply embedded sense of caste hierarchy in “their sense of self, identity, and 
religious views …” (Cameron, 2005, p. 284) and pessimistically predicts that she 
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does not see any change in this area for several generations to come. But Nepal 
does not remain isolated as in the past where Nepalese could not think and see 
beyond what was given or told to them, a condition that the political elite 
capitalised on. It now participates in a much more globalized world where 
alternate modernities are seen to be possible. However, my research gives little 
sign of these caste and ethnic identities vanishing soon: 
The ideal of a just society as eliminating group differences is both 
unrealistic and undesirable. Instead justice in a group-differentiated 
society demands social equality of groups, and mutual recognition 
and affirmation of group differences (Young, 1990, p. 191). 
As each social group, women, Dalit, Janajati, Madheshi and even Khas-Arya 
desire equality in the post 2006 political context, the caste and ethnic identities 
conform less and less to old Hindu caste hierarchies and more and more to 
vertical differences of equality (Gellner, 2001, 2016; Gupta, 2004; Lawoti, 2012; 
Toffin, 2013a; Vatuk, 1996).  
I conclude my thesis with the argument that the notion of purity and 
pollution still occupies the minds of most rural residents such that it becomes the 
key structural barrier to Dalit fully benefiting. Almost all of my elderly 
interlocutors thought and acted within the spaces provided by the idea of caste 
system. Some of my youthful (in their early 30s) and middle-aged interlocutors 
were ambivalent towards caste system blaming structures such as chalan 
(tradition) and social pressure emanating from families to perform caste practices 
on one hand and rejecting it on the basis of democratic citizenship on the other.  
All of them were heavily influenced by the modernization aspect of bikas, as the 
state promoted it, and therefore found bikas only in development of physical 
infrastructure and material (economic) growth. But some of my younger 
interlocutors understood bikas also in social terms. For them bikas is not just 
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economic growth but progress towards equalizing social relations, free of 
discrimination. This is where hope for equal social relations even in the practices 
of bikas can be located. So, if bikas is to be understood not as an evolutionary game 
of race where the so called least and less developed countries eventually become 
“developed” but is understood as a signifier such as “freedom”, “justice” and 
“solidarity” as Tatsuro Fujikura suggests (Fujikura, 2013, p. 275), then bikas 
practices have to be non-discriminatory and inclusive. They should cease to 
function in the spaces provided by the concept of caste system since the caste 
system greatly limits the equalizing of social relations, the very first step towards 
attaining deeper forms of equality. If bikas is not to be a “redistribution of foreign 
monies into (elite) local hands”, then the caste-based hierarchical social order 
must be opposed (Bista, 1991, p. 157). 
Only by removing such a structural barrier can the Dalits participate more 
equally in bikase activities and benefit equally. Therefore, the bikas practices 
themselves have to engage with the politics of equal citizenry, the very first step 
of which is to treat each other regardless of caste, ethnicity or gender with ijjat 
(respect). For this to happen the discursive nature of bikas which is 
overwhelmingly economic at the present has to be transformed to be sufficiently 
social and political such that caste exists only as a social marker of horizontal 
difference but not as vertical difference of hierarchy (Gupta, 2004; Vatuk, 1996). 
Only this can create equal citizenry on a level playing field. Although the 
thousands of years-old system of caste was clearly not created by the Shah and 
Rana rulers, they definitely took hundreds of years to instil discriminatory caste-
consciousness as a hegemonic (Gramsci, 1992) principle into the minds of every 
social group in Nepal. This cannot be “undone” in one generation. But as I 
suggested the process of “undoing” at least at the centre, Kathmandu, has 
already begun. While many still are cognitively “locked” in the idea of caste 
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system and behave in discriminatory fashion, even in non-remote villages like 
Patle Gau the “undoing” has started to be quite palpable.  
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